OESA-2025-1170 (CVE-2021-28235)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2025-02-21 11:08 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:08 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
etcd security update
Details

%{expand:

Security Fix(es):

Authentication vulnerability found in Etcd-io v.3.4.10 allows remote attackers to escalate privileges via the debug function.(CVE-2021-28235)

Parsing malicious or large YAML documents can consume excessive amounts of CPU or memory.(CVE-2022-3064)

Etcd v3.5.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via function PageWriter.write in pagewriter.go. NOTE: the vendor's position is that this is not a vulnerability.(CVE-2022-34038)

A maliciously crafted HTTP/2 stream could cause excessive CPU consumption in the HPACK decoder, sufficient to cause a denial of service from a small number of small requests.(CVE-2022-41723)

etcd is a distributed key-value store for the data of a distributed system. Prior to versions 3.4.26 and 3.5.9, the LeaseTimeToLive API allows access to key names (not value) associated to a lease when Keys parameter is true, even a user doesn't have read permission to the keys. The impact is limited to a cluster which enables auth (RBAC). Versions 3.4.26 and 3.5.9 fix this issue. There are no known workarounds.(CVE-2023-32082)

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "etcd-3.4.14-11.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "etcd-3.4.14-11.oe2203sp4.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "etcd-3.4.14-11.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4",
        "name": "etcd",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/etcd\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.14-11.oe2203sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "%{expand:\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nAuthentication vulnerability found in Etcd-io v.3.4.10 allows remote attackers to escalate privileges via the debug function.(CVE-2021-28235)\n\nParsing malicious or large YAML documents can consume excessive amounts of CPU or memory.(CVE-2022-3064)\n\nEtcd v3.5.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via function PageWriter.write in pagewriter.go. NOTE: the vendor\u0026apos;s position is that this is not a vulnerability.(CVE-2022-34038)\n\nA maliciously crafted HTTP/2 stream could cause excessive CPU consumption in the HPACK decoder, sufficient to cause a denial of service from a small number of small requests.(CVE-2022-41723)\n\netcd is a distributed key-value store for the data of a distributed system. Prior to versions 3.4.26 and 3.5.9, the LeaseTimeToLive API allows access to key names (not value) associated to a lease when `Keys` parameter is true, even a user doesn\u0026apos;t have read permission to the keys. The impact is limited to a cluster which enables auth (RBAC). Versions 3.4.26 and 3.5.9 fix this issue. There are no known workarounds.(CVE-2023-32082)",
  "id": "OESA-2025-1170",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:08:16Z",
  "published": "2025-02-21T11:08:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2025-1170"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-28235"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3064"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34038"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41723"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32082"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "etcd security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2021-28235",
    "CVE-2022-3064",
    "CVE-2022-34038",
    "CVE-2022-41723",
    "CVE-2023-32082"
  ]
}



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