OESA-2024-2579 (CVE-2024-4109)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2024-12-20 11:08 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:08 – Source websiteJava web server using non-blocking IO
Security Fix(es):
Description: Product Security received a report that Undertow might incorrectly re-use an HTTP request header value from a previous stream for a request associated with a subsequent stream on the same HTTP/2 connection. The issue is linked to the readHpackString method and its interaction with the stringBuilder field. While such behavior typically results in an error followed by the termination of the HTTP/2 connection, it presents a potential vector for information leakage between requests. The original reporter referenced a similar issue in Apache Tomcat (CVE-2020-17527). In the patch for that vulnerability (https://github.com/apache/tomcat/commit/8d2fe6894d6e258a6d615d7f786acca80e6020cb) a StringBuilder field was improperly reused across multiple requests, leading to this issue. In the io.undertow.protocols.http2.HpackDecoder class of Undertow, within the readHpackString method, there is a code pattern identical to the one mentioned: for (int i = 0; i < length; ++i) { stringBuilder.append((char) buffer.get()); } String ret = stringBuilder.toString(); stringBuilder.setLength(0); if (ret.isEmpty()) { //return the interned empty string, rather than allocating a new one each time return ""; } Steps to reproduce: No reproducers or PoC were provided, this issue was identified through static testing. Affected versions: 2.2.x, 2.3.x, and 3.x(CVE-2024-4109)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"noarch": [
"undertow-1.4.0-8.oe2203sp3.noarch.rpm",
"undertow-javadoc-1.4.0-8.oe2203sp3.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"undertow-1.4.0-8.oe2203sp3.src.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP3",
"name": "undertow",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/undertow\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0-8.oe2203sp3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"noarch": [
"undertow-1.4.0-8.oe2003sp4.noarch.rpm",
"undertow-javadoc-1.4.0-8.oe2003sp4.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"undertow-1.4.0-8.oe2003sp4.src.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "undertow",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/undertow\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0-8.oe2003sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"noarch": [
"undertow-1.4.0-8.oe2203sp1.noarch.rpm",
"undertow-javadoc-1.4.0-8.oe2203sp1.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"undertow-1.4.0-8.oe2203sp1.src.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1",
"name": "undertow",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/undertow\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0-8.oe2203sp1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"noarch": [
"undertow-1.4.0-9.oe2403.noarch.rpm",
"undertow-javadoc-1.4.0-9.oe2403.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"undertow-1.4.0-9.oe2403.src.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS",
"name": "undertow",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/undertow\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0-9.oe2403"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"noarch": [
"undertow-1.4.0-8.oe2203sp4.noarch.rpm",
"undertow-javadoc-1.4.0-8.oe2203sp4.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"undertow-1.4.0-8.oe2203sp4.src.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "undertow",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/undertow\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0-8.oe2203sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "Java web server using non-blocking IO\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nDescription: Product Security received a report that Undertow might incorrectly re-use an HTTP request header value from a previous stream for a request associated with a subsequent stream on the same HTTP/2 connection. The issue is linked to the readHpackString method and its interaction with the stringBuilder field. While such behavior typically results in an error followed by the termination of the HTTP/2 connection, it presents a potential vector for information leakage between requests. The original reporter referenced a similar issue in Apache Tomcat (CVE-2020-17527). In the patch for that vulnerability (https://github.com/apache/tomcat/commit/8d2fe6894d6e258a6d615d7f786acca80e6020cb) a StringBuilder field was improperly reused across multiple requests, leading to this issue. In the io.undertow.protocols.http2.HpackDecoder class of Undertow, within the readHpackString method, there is a code pattern identical to the one mentioned: ``` for (int i = 0; i \u0026lt; length; ++i) { stringBuilder.append((char) buffer.get()); } String ret = stringBuilder.toString(); stringBuilder.setLength(0); if (ret.isEmpty()) { //return the interned empty string, rather than allocating a new one each time return \u0026quot;\u0026quot;; } ``` Steps to reproduce: No reproducers or PoC were provided, this issue was identified through static testing. Affected versions: 2.2.x, 2.3.x, and 3.x(CVE-2024-4109)",
"id": "OESA-2024-2579",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:08:03Z",
"published": "2024-12-20T11:08:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-2579"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4109"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "undertow security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-4109"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.