OESA-2024-2131 (CVE-2024-6119)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2024-09-14 11:07 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:07 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
edk2 security update
Details

EDK II is a modern, feature-rich, cross-platform firmware development environment for the UEFI and PI specifications.

Security Fix(es):

Issue summary: Applications performing certificate name checks (e.g., TLS clients checking server certificates) may attempt to read an invalid memory address resulting in abnormal termination of the application process.

Impact summary: Abnormal termination of an application can a cause a denial of service.

Applications performing certificate name checks (e.g., TLS clients checking server certificates) may attempt to read an invalid memory address when comparing the expected name with an otherName subject alternative name of an X.509 certificate. This may result in an exception that terminates the application program.

Note that basic certificate chain validation (signatures, dates, ...) is not affected, the denial of service can occur only when the application also specifies an expected DNS name, Email address or IP address.

TLS servers rarely solicit client certificates, and even when they do, they generally don't perform a name check against a reference identifier (expected identity), but rather extract the presented identity after checking the certificate chain. So TLS servers are generally not affected and the severity of the issue is Moderate.

The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.(CVE-2024-6119)

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "edk2-debuginfo-202308-10.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "edk2-debugsource-202308-10.oe2403.aarch64.rpm",
          "edk2-devel-202308-10.oe2403.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "noarch": [
          "edk2-aarch64-202308-10.oe2403.noarch.rpm",
          "edk2-help-202308-10.oe2403.noarch.rpm",
          "edk2-ovmf-202308-10.oe2403.noarch.rpm",
          "python3-edk2-devel-202308-10.oe2403.noarch.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "edk2-202308-10.oe2403.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "edk2-debuginfo-202308-10.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "edk2-debugsource-202308-10.oe2403.x86_64.rpm",
          "edk2-devel-202308-10.oe2403.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS",
        "name": "edk2",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/edk2\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "202308-10.oe2403"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "EDK II is a modern, feature-rich, cross-platform firmware development environment for the UEFI and PI specifications.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nIssue summary: Applications performing certificate name checks (e.g., TLS\nclients checking server certificates) may attempt to read an invalid memory\naddress resulting in abnormal termination of the application process.\r\n\r\nImpact summary: Abnormal termination of an application can a cause a denial of\nservice.\r\n\r\nApplications performing certificate name checks (e.g., TLS clients checking\nserver certificates) may attempt to read an invalid memory address when\ncomparing the expected name with an `otherName` subject alternative name of an\nX.509 certificate. This may result in an exception that terminates the\napplication program.\r\n\r\nNote that basic certificate chain validation (signatures, dates, ...) is not\naffected, the denial of service can occur only when the application also\nspecifies an expected DNS name, Email address or IP address.\r\n\r\nTLS servers rarely solicit client certificates, and even when they do, they\ngenerally don\u0026apos;t perform a name check against a reference identifier (expected\nidentity), but rather extract the presented identity after checking the\ncertificate chain.  So TLS servers are generally not affected and the severity\nof the issue is Moderate.\r\n\r\nThe FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.(CVE-2024-6119)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-2131",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:07:36Z",
  "published": "2024-09-14T11:07:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2024-2131"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6119"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "edk2 security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-6119"
  ]
}



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