OESA-2024-1051 (CVE-2023-22496)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2024-01-12 11:06 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:06 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
netdata security update
Details

netdata is the fastest way to visualize metrics. It is a resource efficient, highly optimized system for collecting and visualizing any type of realtime time-series data, from CPU usage, disk activity, SQL queries, API calls, web site visitors, etc. netdata tries to visualize the truth of now, in its greatest detail, so that you can get insights of what is happening now and what just happened, on your systems and applications.

Security Fix(es):

Netdata is an open source option for real-time infrastructure monitoring and troubleshooting. An attacker with the ability to establish a streaming connection can execute arbitrary commands on the targeted Netdata agent. When an alert is triggered, the function health_alarm_execute is called. This function performs different checks and then enqueues a command by calling spawn_enq_cmd. This command is populated with several arguments that are not sanitized. One of them is the registry_hostname of the node for which the alert is raised. By providing a specially crafted registry_hostname as part of the health data that is streamed to a Netdata (parent) agent, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands at the remote host as a side-effect of the raised alert. Note that the commands are executed as the user running the Netdata Agent. This user is usually named netdata. The ability to run arbitrary commands may allow an attacker to escalate privileges by escalating other vulnerabilities in the system, as that user. The problem has been fixed in: Netdata agent v1.37 (stable) and Netdata agent v1.36.0-409 (nightly). As a workaround, streaming is not enabled by default. If you have previously enabled this, it can be disabled. Limiting access to the port on the recipient Agent to trusted child connections may mitigate the impact of this vulnerability.(CVE-2023-22496)

Netdata is an open source option for real-time infrastructure monitoring and troubleshooting. Each Netdata Agent has an automatically generated MACHINE GUID. It is generated when the agent first starts and it is saved to disk, so that it will persist across restarts and reboots. Anyone who has access to a Netdata Agent has access to its MACHINE_GUID. Streaming is a feature that allows a Netdata Agent to act as parent for other Netdata Agents (children), offloading children from various functions (increased data retention, ML, health monitoring, etc) that can now be handled by the parent Agent. Configuration is done via stream.conf. On the parent side, users configure in stream.conf an API key (any random UUID can do) to provide common configuration for all children using this API key and per MACHINE GUID configuration to customize the configuration for each child. The way this was implemented, allowed an attacker to use a valid MACHINE_GUID as an API key. This affects all users who expose their Netdata Agents (children) to non-trusted users and they also expose to the same users Netdata Agent parents that aggregate data from all these children. The problem has been fixed in: Netdata agent v1.37 (stable) and Netdata agent v1.36.0-409 (nightly). As a workaround, do not enable streaming by default. If you have previously enabled this, it can be disabled. Limiting access to the port on the recipient Agent to trusted child connections may mitigate the impact of this vulnerability.(CVE-2023-22497)


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "netdata-freeipmi-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "netdata-debugsource-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "netdata-debuginfo-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm",
          "netdata-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "noarch": [
          "netdata-data-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.noarch.rpm",
          "netdata-conf-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.noarch.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "netdata-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "netdata-debugsource-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "netdata-freeipmi-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "netdata-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm",
          "netdata-debuginfo-1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "netdata",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/netdata\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.39.1-1.oe2203sp1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Critical"
  },
  "details": "netdata is the fastest way to visualize metrics. It is a resource efficient, highly optimized system for collecting and visualizing any type of realtime time-series data, from CPU usage, disk activity, SQL queries, API calls, web site visitors, etc. netdata tries to visualize the truth of now, in its greatest detail, so that you can get insights of what is happening now and what just happened, on your systems and applications.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nNetdata is an open source option for real-time infrastructure monitoring and troubleshooting. An attacker with the ability to establish a streaming connection can execute arbitrary commands on the targeted Netdata agent. When an alert is triggered, the function `health_alarm_execute` is called. This function performs different checks and then enqueues a command by calling `spawn_enq_cmd`. This command is populated with several arguments that are not sanitized. One of them is the `registry_hostname` of the node for which the alert is raised. By providing a specially crafted `registry_hostname` as part of the health data that is streamed to a Netdata (parent) agent, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands at the remote host as a side-effect of the raised alert. Note that the commands are executed as the user running the Netdata Agent. This user is usually named `netdata`. The ability to run arbitrary commands may allow an attacker to escalate privileges by escalating other vulnerabilities in the system, as that user. The problem has been fixed in: Netdata agent v1.37 (stable) and Netdata agent v1.36.0-409 (nightly). As a workaround, streaming is not enabled by default. If you have previously enabled this, it can be disabled. Limiting access to the port on the recipient Agent to trusted child connections may mitigate the impact of this vulnerability.(CVE-2023-22496)\r\n\r\nNetdata is an open source option for real-time infrastructure monitoring and troubleshooting. Each Netdata Agent has an automatically generated MACHINE GUID. It is generated when the agent first starts and it is saved to disk, so that it will persist across restarts and reboots. Anyone who has access to a Netdata Agent has access to its MACHINE_GUID. Streaming is a feature that allows a Netdata Agent to act as parent for other Netdata Agents (children), offloading children from various functions (increased data retention, ML, health monitoring, etc) that can now be handled by the parent Agent. Configuration is done via `stream.conf`. On the parent side, users configure in `stream.conf` an API key (any random UUID can do) to provide common configuration for all children using this API key and per MACHINE GUID configuration to customize the configuration for each child. The way this was implemented, allowed an attacker to use a valid MACHINE_GUID as an API key. This affects all users who expose their Netdata Agents (children) to non-trusted users and they also expose to the same users Netdata Agent parents that aggregate data from all these children. The problem has been fixed in: Netdata agent v1.37 (stable) and Netdata agent v1.36.0-409 (nightly). As a workaround, do not enable streaming by default. If you have previously enabled this, it can be disabled. Limiting access to the port on the recipient Agent to trusted child connections may mitigate the impact of this vulnerability.(CVE-2023-22497)",
  "id": "OESA-2024-1051",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:06:30Z",
  "published": "2024-01-12T11:06:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2024-1051"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22496"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22497"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "netdata security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2023-22496",
    "CVE-2023-22497"
  ]
}



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