OESA-2023-1204 (CVE-2023-25809)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2023-04-11 11:05 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:05 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
runc security update
Details

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification.

Security Fix(es):

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In affected versions it was found that rootless runc makes /sys/fs/cgroup writable in following conditons: 1. when runc is executed inside the user namespace, and the config.json does not specify the cgroup namespace to be unshared (e.g.., (docker|podman|nerdctl) run --cgroupns=host, with Rootless Docker/Podman/nerdctl) or 2. when runc is executed outside the user namespace, and /sys is mounted with rbind, ro (e.g., runc spec --rootless; this condition is very rare). A container may gain the write access to user-owned cgroup hierarchy /sys/fs/cgroup/user.slice/... on the host . Other users's cgroup hierarchies are not affected. Users are advised to upgrade to version 1.1.5. Users unable to upgrade may unshare the cgroup namespace ((docker|podman|nerdctl) run --cgroupns=private). This is the default behavior of Docker/Podman/nerdctl on cgroup v2 hosts. or add /sys/fs/cgroup to maskedPaths.(CVE-2023-25809)

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. It was found that AppArmor can be bypassed when /proc inside the container is symlinked with a specific mount configuration. This issue has been fixed in runc version 1.1.5, by prohibiting symlinked /proc. See PR #3785 for details. users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should avoid using an untrusted container image.(CVE-2023-28642)

Severity
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "docker-runc-1.1.3-13.oe2203sp1.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "docker-runc-1.1.3-13.oe2203sp1.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "docker-runc-1.1.3-13.oe2203sp1.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP1",
        "name": "runc",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/runc\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "docker-1.1.3-13.oe2203sp1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nrunc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In affected versions it was found that rootless runc makes `/sys/fs/cgroup` writable in following conditons: 1. when runc is executed inside the user namespace, and the `config.json` does not specify the cgroup namespace to be unshared (e.g.., `(docker|podman|nerdctl) run --cgroupns=host`, with Rootless Docker/Podman/nerdctl) or 2. when runc is executed outside the user namespace, and `/sys` is mounted with `rbind, ro` (e.g., `runc spec --rootless`; this condition is very rare). A container may gain the write access to user-owned cgroup hierarchy `/sys/fs/cgroup/user.slice/...` on the host . Other users\u0026apos;s cgroup hierarchies are not affected. Users are advised to upgrade to version 1.1.5. Users unable to upgrade may unshare the cgroup namespace (`(docker|podman|nerdctl) run --cgroupns=private)`. This is the default behavior of Docker/Podman/nerdctl on cgroup v2 hosts. or add `/sys/fs/cgroup` to `maskedPaths`.(CVE-2023-25809)\r\n\r\nrunc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. It was found that AppArmor can be bypassed when `/proc` inside the container is symlinked with a specific mount configuration. This issue has been fixed in runc version 1.1.5, by prohibiting symlinked `/proc`. See PR #3785 for details. users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should avoid using an untrusted container image.(CVE-2023-28642)",
  "id": "OESA-2023-1204",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:05:40Z",
  "published": "2023-04-11T11:05:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2023-1204"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25809"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28642"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "runc security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2023-25809",
    "CVE-2023-28642"
  ]
}



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