OESA-2022-1962 (CVE-2020-36403)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2022-09-23 11:05 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:05 – Source websiteHTSlib is an implementation of a unified C library for accessing common file formats, such as SAM, CRAM and VCF, used for high-throughput sequencing data, and is the core library used by samtools and bcftools. HTSlib only depends on zlib. It is known to be compatible with gcc, g++ and clang. HTSlib implements a generalized BAM index, with file extension .csi ( coordinate-sorted index). The HTSlib file reader first looks for the new index and then for the old if the new index is absent.
Security Fix(es):
HTSlib through 1.10.2 allows out-of-bounds write access in vcf_parse_format (called from vcf_parse and vcf_read).(CVE-2020-36403)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"htslib-1.11-1.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
"htslib-debuginfo-1.11-1.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
"htslib-debugsource-1.11-1.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
"htslib-devel-1.11-1.oe1.aarch64.rpm",
"htslib-tools-1.11-1.oe1.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"htslib-1.11-1.oe1.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"htslib-1.11-1.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
"htslib-debugsource-1.11-1.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
"htslib-tools-1.11-1.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
"htslib-devel-1.11-1.oe1.x86_64.rpm",
"htslib-debuginfo-1.11-1.oe1.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:20.03-LTS-SP1",
"name": "htslib",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/htslib\u0026distro=openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.11-1.oe1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "HTSlib is an implementation of a unified C library for accessing common file formats, such as SAM, CRAM and VCF, used for high-throughput sequencing data, and is the core library used by samtools and bcftools. HTSlib only depends on zlib. It is known to be compatible with gcc, g++ and clang. HTSlib implements a generalized BAM index, with file extension .csi ( coordinate-sorted index). The HTSlib file reader first looks for the new index and then for the old if the new index is absent.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\r\n\r\nHTSlib through 1.10.2 allows out-of-bounds write access in vcf_parse_format (called from vcf_parse and vcf_read).(CVE-2020-36403)",
"id": "OESA-2022-1962",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:05:16Z",
"published": "2022-09-23T11:05:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/safety-bulletin/detail.html?id=openEuler-SA-2022-1962"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36403"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "htslib security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2020-36403"
]
}
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