ICSA-20-042-12
Vulnerability from csaf_cisa - Published: 2020-02-11 00:00 - Updated: 2020-02-11 00:00| Product | Identifier | Version | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Siemens SIPROTEC 4 and SIPROTEC Compact relays equipped with EN100 Ethernet communication modules: All versions
Siemens / SIPROTEC 4 and SIPROTEC Compact relays equipped with EN100 Ethernet communication modules
|
vers:all/* |
Mitigation
Mitigation
|
{
"document": {
"acknowledgments": [
{
"organization": "Siemens ProductCERT",
"summary": "reporting this vulnerability to CISA."
},
{
"names": [
"Tal Keren"
],
"organization": "Claroty",
"summary": "for coordinating disclosure"
}
],
"category": "csaf_security_advisory",
"csaf_version": "2.0",
"distribution": {
"text": "Disclosure is not limited",
"tlp": {
"label": "WHITE",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/tlp/"
}
},
"lang": "en",
"notes": [
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Operators of critical power systems (e.g. TSOs) worldwide are usually required by regulations to build resilience into the power grids by applying multi-level redundant secondary protection schemes. It is therefore recommended that the operators check whether appropriate resilient protection measures are in place. The risk of cyber incidents impacting the grid\u0027s reliability can thus be minimized by virtue of the grid design. Siemens strongly recommends applying the provided security updates using the corresponding tooling and documented procedures made available with the product. If supported by the product, an automated means to apply the security updates across multiple product instances may be used. Siemens strongly recommends prior validation of any security update before being applied, and supervision by trained staff of the update process in the target environment. As a general security measure Siemens strongly recommends to protect network access with appropriate mechanisms (e.g. firewalls, segmentation, VPN). It is advised to configure the environment according to our operational guidelines in order to run the devices in a protected IT environment. Recommended security guidelines to Secure Substations can be found at:",
"title": "General Recommendations"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "https://www.siemens.com/gridsecurity",
"title": "Additional Resources"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "Siemens Security Advisories are subject to the terms and conditions contained in Siemens\u0027 underlying license terms or other applicable agreements previously agreed to with Siemens (hereinafter \"License Terms\"). To the extent applicable to information, software or documentation made available in or through a Siemens Security Advisory, the Terms of Use of Siemens\u0027 Global Website (https://www.siemens.com/terms_of_use, hereinafter \"Terms of Use\"), in particular Sections 8-10 of the Terms of Use, shall apply additionally. In case of conflicts, the License Terms shall prevail over the Terms of Use.",
"title": "Terms of Use"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "All information products included in https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics are provided \"as is\" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information about TLP, see https://us-cert.cisa.gov/tlp/.",
"title": "Legal Notice"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "This CISA CSAF advisory was converted from a Siemens ProductCERT\u0027s advisory.",
"title": "Advisory Conversion Disclaimer"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "Multiple",
"title": "Critical infrastructure sectors"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "Worldwide",
"title": "Countries/areas deployed"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "Germany",
"title": "Company headquarters location"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of this vulnerability.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.",
"title": "Recommended Practices"
}
],
"publisher": {
"category": "other",
"contact_details": "central@cisa.dhs.gov",
"name": "CISA",
"namespace": "https://www.cisa.gov/"
},
"references": [
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "SSA-974843: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in SIPROTEC 4 and SIPROTEC Compact Relay\n Families - HTML Version",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-974843.html"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "ICS Advisory ICSA-20-042-12 JSON",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2020/icsa-20-042-12.json"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "ICS Advisory ICSA-20-042-12 - Web Version",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-20-042-12"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-10-301-01"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/ics-recommended-practices"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/industrial-control-systems"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cybersecurity_Best_Practices_for_Industrial_Control_Systems.pdf"
},
{
"category": "external",
"summary": "Recommended Practices",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B"
}
],
"title": "Siemens SIPROTEC 4 and SIPROTEC Compact",
"tracking": {
"current_release_date": "2020-02-11T00:00:00.000000Z",
"generator": {
"engine": {
"name": "CISA CSAF Generator",
"version": "1.0.0"
}
},
"id": "ICSA-20-042-12",
"initial_release_date": "2020-02-11T00:00:00.000000Z",
"revision_history": [
{
"date": "2020-02-11T00:00:00.000000Z",
"legacy_version": "1.0",
"number": "1",
"summary": "Publication Date"
}
],
"status": "final",
"version": "1"
}
},
"product_tree": {
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:all/*",
"product": {
"name": "Siemens SIPROTEC 4 and SIPROTEC Compact relays equipped with EN100 Ethernet communication modules: All versions",
"product_id": "CSAFPID-0001"
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "SIPROTEC 4 and SIPROTEC Compact relays equipped with EN100 Ethernet communication modules"
}
],
"category": "vendor",
"name": "Siemens"
}
]
},
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"cve": "CVE-2019-19279",
"cwe": {
"id": "CWE-20",
"name": "Improper Input Validation"
},
"notes": [
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "Specially crafted packets sent to port 50000/UDP of the EN100 Ethernet communication modules could cause a Denial-of-Service of the affected device. A manual reboot is required to recover the service of the device. At the time of advisory publication no public exploitation of this security vulnerability was known to Siemens.",
"title": "Summary"
}
],
"product_status": {
"known_affected": [
"CSAFPID-0001"
]
},
"remediations": [
{
"category": "mitigation",
"details": "For relays equipped with EN100 Ethernet communication modules having IEC 61850 firmware version V4.30 and higher, activate DTLS-secured communication in DIGSI 4 and in the EN100 module, and set a connection password in the EN100 module to permit only authenticated users to access the relay over the network.",
"product_ids": [
"CSAFPID-0001"
]
},
{
"category": "mitigation",
"details": "Limit access to port 50000/UDP.",
"product_ids": [
"CSAFPID-0001"
]
}
],
"scores": [
{
"cvss_v3": {
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:P/RL:T/RC:C",
"version": "3.1"
},
"products": [
"CSAFPID-0001"
]
}
],
"title": "CVE-2019-19279"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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