GSD-2024-26613
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2024-02-20 06:02Details
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: Fix UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in rds_cmsg_recv
Syzcaller UBSAN crash occurs in rds_cmsg_recv(),
which reads inc->i_rx_lat_trace[j + 1] with index 4 (3 + 1),
but with array size of 4 (RDS_RX_MAX_TRACES).
Here 'j' is assigned from rs->rs_rx_trace[i] and in-turn from
trace.rx_trace_pos[i] in rds_recv_track_latency(),
with both arrays sized 3 (RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX). So fix the
off-by-one bounds check in rds_recv_track_latency() to prevent
a potential crash in rds_cmsg_recv().
Found by syzcaller:
=================================================================
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/rds/recv.c:585:39
index 4 is out of range for type 'u64 [4]'
CPU: 1 PID: 8058 Comm: syz-executor228 Not tainted 6.6.0-gd2f51b3516da #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x136/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd5/0x130 lib/ubsan.c:348
rds_cmsg_recv+0x60d/0x700 net/rds/recv.c:585
rds_recvmsg+0x3fb/0x1610 net/rds/recv.c:716
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1066
__sys_recvfrom+0x1b6/0x2f0 net/socket.c:2246
__do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2264 [inline]
__se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2260
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
==================================================================
Aliases
{
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26613"
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: Fix UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in rds_cmsg_recv\n\nSyzcaller UBSAN crash occurs in rds_cmsg_recv(),\nwhich reads inc-\u003ei_rx_lat_trace[j + 1] with index 4 (3 + 1),\nbut with array size of 4 (RDS_RX_MAX_TRACES).\nHere \u0027j\u0027 is assigned from rs-\u003ers_rx_trace[i] and in-turn from\ntrace.rx_trace_pos[i] in rds_recv_track_latency(),\nwith both arrays sized 3 (RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX). So fix the\noff-by-one bounds check in rds_recv_track_latency() to prevent\na potential crash in rds_cmsg_recv().\n\nFound by syzcaller:\n=================================================================\nUBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/rds/recv.c:585:39\nindex 4 is out of range for type \u0027u64 [4]\u0027\nCPU: 1 PID: 8058 Comm: syz-executor228 Not tainted 6.6.0-gd2f51b3516da #1\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),\nBIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x136/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106\n ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline]\n __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd5/0x130 lib/ubsan.c:348\n rds_cmsg_recv+0x60d/0x700 net/rds/recv.c:585\n rds_recvmsg+0x3fb/0x1610 net/rds/recv.c:716\n sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]\n sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1066\n __sys_recvfrom+0x1b6/0x2f0 net/socket.c:2246\n __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2264 [inline]\n __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline]\n __x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2260\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b\n==================================================================",
"id": "GSD-2024-26613",
"modified": "2024-02-20T06:02:29.130775Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
"namespaces": {
"cve.org": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "cve@kernel.org",
"ID": "CVE-2024-26613",
"STATE": "REJECT"
},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "** REJECT ** This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority."
}
]
}
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
"cve": {
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-26613",
"lastModified": "2024-03-12T14:15:07.310",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2024-03-11T18:15:19.223",
"references": [],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Rejected"
}
}
}
}
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