GSD-2024-23591
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2024-01-19 06:02{
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23591"
],
"details": "ThinkSystem SR670V2 servers manufactured from approximately June 2021 to July 2023 were left in Manufacturing Mode which could allow \n\nan attacker with privileged logical access to the host or physical access to server internals to modify or disable Intel Boot Guard firmware integrity, SPS security, and other SPS configuration setting.\n\n",
"id": "GSD-2024-23591",
"modified": "2024-01-19T06:02:13.338858Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
"namespaces": {
"cve.org": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "psirt@lenovo.com",
"ID": "CVE-2024-23591",
"STATE": "PUBLIC"
},
"affects": {
"vendor": {
"vendor_data": [
{
"product": {
"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "ThinkSystem SR670 V2",
"version": {
"version_data": [
{
"version_affected": "\u003c",
"version_name": " ",
"version_value": "U8E126I-2.20"
}
]
}
}
]
},
"vendor_name": "Lenovo"
}
]
}
},
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Lenovo thanks Eclypsium\u2019s Supply Chain Security Solution for identifying instances of this issue."
}
],
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "ThinkSystem SR670V2 servers manufactured from approximately June 2021 to July 2023 were left in Manufacturing Mode which could allow \n\nan attacker with privileged logical access to the host or physical access to server internals to modify or disable Intel Boot Guard firmware integrity, SPS security, and other SPS configuration setting.\u00a0The server\u2019s NIST SP\n800-193-compliant Platform Firmware Resiliency (PFR) security subsystem\nsignificantly mitigates this issue."
}
]
},
"generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.1.0-dev"
},
"impact": {
"cvss": [
{
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 2,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
]
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-1269",
"lang": "eng",
"value": "CWE-1269 Product Released in Non-Release Configuration"
}
]
}
]
},
"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"name": "https://https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-150020",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-150020"
}
]
},
"solution": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "Update system UEFI firmware to version u8e126i-2.20 (or newer) indicated for your model in the Product Impact section of our advisory: \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-150020\"\u003ehttps://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-150020\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Update system UEFI firmware to version u8e126i-2.20 (or newer) indicated for your model in the Product Impact section of our advisory: https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-150020 \n"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
}
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
"cve": {
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "ThinkSystem SR670V2 servers manufactured from approximately June 2021 to July 2023 were left in Manufacturing Mode which could allow \n\nan attacker with privileged logical access to the host or physical access to server internals to modify or disable Intel Boot Guard firmware integrity, SPS security, and other SPS configuration setting.\u00a0The server\u2019s NIST SP\n800-193-compliant Platform Firmware Resiliency (PFR) security subsystem\nsignificantly mitigates this issue."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Los servidores ThinkSystem SR670V2 fabricados aproximadamente entre junio de 2021 y julio de 2023 se dejaron en modo de fabricaci\u00f3n, lo que podr\u00eda permitir a un atacante con acceso l\u00f3gico privilegiado al host o acceso f\u00edsico a las partes internas del servidor modificar o deshabilitar la Integridad del firmware Intel Boot Guard, seguridad de SPS y otros ajustes de configuraci\u00f3n de SPS."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-23591",
"lastModified": "2024-02-20T22:15:08.353",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 2.0,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 0.6,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "psirt@lenovo.com",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2024-02-16T17:15:08.800",
"references": [
{
"source": "psirt@lenovo.com",
"url": "https://https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-150020"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "psirt@lenovo.com",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-1269"
}
],
"source": "psirt@lenovo.com",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.