GSD-2024-0759
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2024-01-20 06:02Details
Should an instance of AnythingLLM be hosted on an internal network and the attacked be explicitly granted a permission level of manager or admin, they could link-scrape internally resolving IPs of other services that are on the same network as AnythingLLM.
This would require the attacker also be able to guess these internal IPs as `/*` ranging is not possible, but could be brute forced.
There is a duty of care that other services on the same network would not be fully open and accessible via a simple CuRL with zero authentication as it is not possible to set headers or access via the link collector.
Aliases
{
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-0759"
],
"details": "Should an instance of AnythingLLM be hosted on an internal network and the attacked be explicitly granted a permission level of manager or admin, they could link-scrape internally resolving IPs of other services that are on the same network as AnythingLLM.\n\nThis would require the attacker also be able to guess these internal IPs as `/*` ranging is not possible, but could be brute forced.\n\nThere is a duty of care that other services on the same network would not be fully open and accessible via a simple CuRL with zero authentication as it is not possible to set headers or access via the link collector.",
"id": "GSD-2024-0759",
"modified": "2024-01-20T06:02:15.978196Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
"namespaces": {
"cve.org": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "security@huntr.com",
"ID": "CVE-2024-0759",
"STATE": "PUBLIC"
},
"affects": {
"vendor": {
"vendor_data": [
{
"product": {
"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "mintplex-labs/anything-llm",
"version": {
"version_data": [
{
"version_affected": "\u003c",
"version_name": "unspecified",
"version_value": "1.0.0"
}
]
}
}
]
},
"vendor_name": "mintplex-labs"
}
]
}
},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "Should an instance of AnythingLLM be hosted on an internal network and the attacked be explicitly granted a permission level of manager or admin, they could link-scrape internally resolving IPs of other services that are on the same network as AnythingLLM.\n\nThis would require the attacker also be able to guess these internal IPs as `/*` ranging is not possible, but could be brute forced.\n\nThere is a duty of care that other services on the same network would not be fully open and accessible via a simple CuRL with zero authentication as it is not possible to set headers or access via the link collector."
}
]
},
"impact": {
"cvss": [
{
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.0"
}
]
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-918",
"lang": "eng",
"value": "CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"
}
]
}
]
},
"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"name": "https://huntr.com/bounties/9a978edd-ac94-41fc-8e3e-c35441bdd12b",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/9a978edd-ac94-41fc-8e3e-c35441bdd12b"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/0db6c3b2aa1787a7054ffdaba975474f122c20eb",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/0db6c3b2aa1787a7054ffdaba975474f122c20eb"
}
]
},
"source": {
"advisory": "9a978edd-ac94-41fc-8e3e-c35441bdd12b",
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
}
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
"cve": {
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Should an instance of AnythingLLM be hosted on an internal network and the attacked be explicitly granted a permission level of manager or admin, they could link-scrape internally resolving IPs of other services that are on the same network as AnythingLLM.\n\nThis would require the attacker also be able to guess these internal IPs as `/*` ranging is not possible, but could be brute forced.\n\nThere is a duty of care that other services on the same network would not be fully open and accessible via a simple CuRL with zero authentication as it is not possible to set headers or access via the link collector."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Si una instancia de AnythingLLM est\u00e1 alojada en una red interna y al atacado se le concede expl\u00edcitamente un nivel de permiso de administrador o administrador, podr\u00edan vincular IP de resoluci\u00f3n interna de otros servicios que est\u00e9n en la misma red que AnythingLLM. Esto requerir\u00eda que el atacante tambi\u00e9n pudiera adivinar estas IP internas, ya que el rango `/*` no es posible, pero podr\u00eda ser forzado de forma bruta. Existe el deber de tener cuidado de que otros servicios en la misma red no est\u00e9n completamente abiertos y accesibles a trav\u00e9s de un CuRL simple sin autenticaci\u00f3n, ya que no es posible configurar encabezados o acceder a trav\u00e9s del recopilador de enlaces."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2024-0759",
"lastModified": "2024-03-07T20:15:50.480",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV30": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
"impactScore": 4.0,
"source": "security@huntr.dev",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2024-02-27T06:15:45.493",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@huntr.dev",
"url": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/0db6c3b2aa1787a7054ffdaba975474f122c20eb"
},
{
"source": "security@huntr.dev",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/9a978edd-ac94-41fc-8e3e-c35441bdd12b"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@huntr.dev",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-918"
}
],
"source": "security@huntr.dev",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.