GSD-2023-52569
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2024-03-03 06:01Details
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: remove BUG() after failure to insert delayed dir index item
Instead of calling BUG() when we fail to insert a delayed dir index item
into the delayed node's tree, we can just release all the resources we
have allocated/acquired before and return the error to the caller. This is
fine because all existing call chains undo anything they have done before
calling btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index() or BUG_ON (when creating pending
snapshots in the transaction commit path).
So remove the BUG() call and do proper error handling.
This relates to a syzbot report linked below, but does not fix it because
it only prevents hitting a BUG(), it does not fix the issue where somehow
we attempt to use twice the same index number for different index items.
Aliases
{
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52569"
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: remove BUG() after failure to insert delayed dir index item\n\nInstead of calling BUG() when we fail to insert a delayed dir index item\ninto the delayed node\u0027s tree, we can just release all the resources we\nhave allocated/acquired before and return the error to the caller. This is\nfine because all existing call chains undo anything they have done before\ncalling btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index() or BUG_ON (when creating pending\nsnapshots in the transaction commit path).\n\nSo remove the BUG() call and do proper error handling.\n\nThis relates to a syzbot report linked below, but does not fix it because\nit only prevents hitting a BUG(), it does not fix the issue where somehow\nwe attempt to use twice the same index number for different index items.",
"id": "GSD-2023-52569",
"modified": "2024-03-03T06:01:51.799531Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
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"affects": {
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"version_name": "1da177e4c3f4",
"version_value": "39c4a9522db0"
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.56",
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"version": "6.5.6",
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{
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"version": "6.6",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: remove BUG() after failure to insert delayed dir index item\n\nInstead of calling BUG() when we fail to insert a delayed dir index item\ninto the delayed node\u0027s tree, we can just release all the resources we\nhave allocated/acquired before and return the error to the caller. This is\nfine because all existing call chains undo anything they have done before\ncalling btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index() or BUG_ON (when creating pending\nsnapshots in the transaction commit path).\n\nSo remove the BUG() call and do proper error handling.\n\nThis relates to a syzbot report linked below, but does not fix it because\nit only prevents hitting a BUG(), it does not fix the issue where somehow\nwe attempt to use twice the same index number for different index items."
}
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"value": "n/a"
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"name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39c4a9522db0072570d602e9b365119e17fb9f4f",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39c4a9522db0072570d602e9b365119e17fb9f4f"
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c58c3931ede7cd08cbecf1f1a4acaf0a04a41a9"
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"nvd.nist.gov": {
"cve": {
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: remove BUG() after failure to insert delayed dir index item\n\nInstead of calling BUG() when we fail to insert a delayed dir index item\ninto the delayed node\u0027s tree, we can just release all the resources we\nhave allocated/acquired before and return the error to the caller. This is\nfine because all existing call chains undo anything they have done before\ncalling btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index() or BUG_ON (when creating pending\nsnapshots in the transaction commit path).\n\nSo remove the BUG() call and do proper error handling.\n\nThis relates to a syzbot report linked below, but does not fix it because\nit only prevents hitting a BUG(), it does not fix the issue where somehow\nwe attempt to use twice the same index number for different index items."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-52569",
"lastModified": "2024-03-04T13:58:23.447",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2024-03-02T22:15:49.163",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c58c3931ede7cd08cbecf1f1a4acaf0a04a41a9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39c4a9522db0072570d602e9b365119e17fb9f4f"
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"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
}
}
}
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