GSD-2023-51447
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-21 06:01Details
Decidim is a participatory democracy framework. Starting in version 0.27.0 and prior to versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0, the dynamic file upload feature is subject to potential cross-site scripting attacks in case the attacker manages to modify the file names of the records being uploaded to the server. This appears in sections where the user controls the file upload dialogs themselves and has the technical knowledge to change the file names through the dynamic upload endpoint. Therefore I believe it would require the attacker to control the whole session of the particular user but in any case, this needs to be fixed. Successful exploit of this vulnerability would require the user to have successfully uploaded a file blob to the server with a malicious file name and then have the possibility to direct the other user to the edit page of the record where the attachment is attached. The users are able to craft the direct upload requests themselves controlling the file name that gets stored to the database. The attacker is able to change the filename e.g. to `<svg onload=alert('XSS')>` if they know how to craft these requests themselves. And then enter the returned blob ID to the form inputs manually by modifying the edit page source. Versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, disable dynamic uploads for the instance, e.g. from proposals.
Aliases
{
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-51447"
],
"details": "Decidim is a participatory democracy framework. Starting in version 0.27.0 and prior to versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0, the dynamic file upload feature is subject to potential cross-site scripting attacks in case the attacker manages to modify the file names of the records being uploaded to the server. This appears in sections where the user controls the file upload dialogs themselves and has the technical knowledge to change the file names through the dynamic upload endpoint. Therefore I believe it would require the attacker to control the whole session of the particular user but in any case, this needs to be fixed. Successful exploit of this vulnerability would require the user to have successfully uploaded a file blob to the server with a malicious file name and then have the possibility to direct the other user to the edit page of the record where the attachment is attached. The users are able to craft the direct upload requests themselves controlling the file name that gets stored to the database. The attacker is able to change the filename e.g. to `\u003csvg onload=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e` if they know how to craft these requests themselves. And then enter the returned blob ID to the form inputs manually by modifying the edit page source. Versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, disable dynamic uploads for the instance, e.g. from proposals.",
"id": "GSD-2023-51447",
"modified": "2023-12-21T06:01:31.694980Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
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"value": "Decidim is a participatory democracy framework. Starting in version 0.27.0 and prior to versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0, the dynamic file upload feature is subject to potential cross-site scripting attacks in case the attacker manages to modify the file names of the records being uploaded to the server. This appears in sections where the user controls the file upload dialogs themselves and has the technical knowledge to change the file names through the dynamic upload endpoint. Therefore I believe it would require the attacker to control the whole session of the particular user but in any case, this needs to be fixed. Successful exploit of this vulnerability would require the user to have successfully uploaded a file blob to the server with a malicious file name and then have the possibility to direct the other user to the edit page of the record where the attachment is attached. The users are able to craft the direct upload requests themselves controlling the file name that gets stored to the database. The attacker is able to change the filename e.g. to `\u003csvg onload=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e` if they know how to craft these requests themselves. And then enter the returned blob ID to the form inputs manually by modifying the edit page source. Versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, disable dynamic uploads for the instance, e.g. from proposals."
}
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"impact": {
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 6.3,
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"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
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"name": "https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/a967d355c6fee9ad9b8bd115d43bc8b0fc207e7e/activestorage/app/controllers/active_storage/direct_uploads_controller.rb#L14",
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Decidim is a participatory democracy framework. Starting in version 0.27.0 and prior to versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0, the dynamic file upload feature is subject to potential cross-site scripting attacks in case the attacker manages to modify the file names of the records being uploaded to the server. This appears in sections where the user controls the file upload dialogs themselves and has the technical knowledge to change the file names through the dynamic upload endpoint. Therefore I believe it would require the attacker to control the whole session of the particular user but in any case, this needs to be fixed. Successful exploit of this vulnerability would require the user to have successfully uploaded a file blob to the server with a malicious file name and then have the possibility to direct the other user to the edit page of the record where the attachment is attached. The users are able to craft the direct upload requests themselves controlling the file name that gets stored to the database. The attacker is able to change the filename e.g. to `\u003csvg onload=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e` if they know how to craft these requests themselves. And then enter the returned blob ID to the form inputs manually by modifying the edit page source. Versions 0.27.5 and 0.28.0 contain a patch for this issue. As a workaround, disable dynamic uploads for the instance, e.g. from proposals."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-51447",
"lastModified": "2024-02-20T19:50:53.960",
"metrics": {
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
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"version": "3.1"
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"exploitabilityScore": 2.1,
"impactScore": 4.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
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"published": "2024-02-20T18:15:50.547",
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"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/a967d355c6fee9ad9b8bd115d43bc8b0fc207e7e/activestorage/app/controllers/active_storage/direct_uploads_controller.rb#L14"
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}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.