GSD-2023-4957
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:20{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2023-4957",
"id": "GSD-2023-4957"
},
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"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
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"details": " A vulnerability of authentication bypass has been found on a Zebra Technologies ZTC ZT410-203dpi ZPL printer. This vulnerability allows an attacker that is in the same network as the printer, to change the username and password for the Web Page by sending a specially crafted POST request to the setvarsResults.cgi file. For this vulnerability to be exploitable, the printers protected mode must be disabled.",
"id": "GSD-2023-4957",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:20:27.220618Z",
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"product_name": "ZTC ZT410",
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"version_value": "203dpi ZPL 18J150703184"
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"baseScore": 5.4,
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"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
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"cweId": "CWE-288",
"lang": "eng",
"value": "CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel"
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"name": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso-sci/authentication-bypass-zebra-ztc",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso-sci/authentication-bypass-zebra-ztc"
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"value": "Zebra Printers running Link-OS v6.0 and later have a protected mode that protects the printer from this vulnerability. Activating this mode disables unauthorized changes and locks the current configuration until an administrator authorizes updates. By default, the secure mode is disabled as it is necessary to generate a password first. NOTE: the ZT410 industrial printer was discontinued on Oct 1st, 2020. The service and Support discontinuation dates are in September and December 2025 depending on region. Further information regarding security settings and best practices, including \u201cProtected Mode\u201d, can be found in the references."
}
],
"value": "Zebra Printers running Link-OS v6.0 and later have a protected mode that protects the printer from this vulnerability. Activating this mode disables unauthorized changes and locks the current configuration until an administrator authorizes updates. By default, the secure mode is disabled as it is necessary to generate a password first. NOTE: the ZT410 industrial printer was discontinued on Oct 1st, 2020. The service and Support discontinuation dates are in September and December 2025 depending on region. Further information regarding security settings and best practices, including \u201cProtected Mode\u201d, can be found in the references."
}
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"lastModifiedDate": "2023-10-16T14:08Z",
"publishedDate": "2023-10-11T14:15Z"
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}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.