GSD-2023-22487
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:20Details
Flarum is a forum software for building communities. Using the mentions feature provided by the flarum/mentions extension, users can mention any post ID on the forum with the special `@"<username>"#p<id>` syntax. The following behavior never changes no matter if the actor should be able to read the mentioned post or not: A URL to the mentioned post is inserted into the actor post HTML, leaking its discussion ID and post number. The `mentionsPosts` relationship included in the `POST /api/posts` and `PATCH /api/posts/<id>` JSON responses leaks the full JSON:API payload of all mentioned posts without any access control. This includes the content, date, number and attributes added by other extensions. An attacker only needs the ability to create new posts on the forum to exploit the vulnerability. This works even if new posts require approval. If they have the ability to edit posts, the attack can be performed even more discreetly by using a single post to scan any size of database and hiding the attack post content afterward. The attack allows the leaking of all posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to, and private discussions created by other extensions like FriendsOfFlarum Byobu. This also includes non-comment posts like tag changes or renaming events. The discussion payload is not leaked but using the mention HTML payload it's possible to extract the discussion ID of all posts and combine all posts back together into their original discussions even if the discussion title remains unknown. All Flarum versions prior to 1.6.3 are affected. The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. As a workaround, user can disable the mentions extension.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2023-22487",
"id": "GSD-2023-22487"
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-22487"
],
"details": "Flarum is a forum software for building communities. Using the mentions feature provided by the flarum/mentions extension, users can mention any post ID on the forum with the special `@\"\u003cusername\u003e\"#p\u003cid\u003e` syntax. The following behavior never changes no matter if the actor should be able to read the mentioned post or not: A URL to the mentioned post is inserted into the actor post HTML, leaking its discussion ID and post number. The `mentionsPosts` relationship included in the `POST /api/posts` and `PATCH /api/posts/\u003cid\u003e` JSON responses leaks the full JSON:API payload of all mentioned posts without any access control. This includes the content, date, number and attributes added by other extensions. An attacker only needs the ability to create new posts on the forum to exploit the vulnerability. This works even if new posts require approval. If they have the ability to edit posts, the attack can be performed even more discreetly by using a single post to scan any size of database and hiding the attack post content afterward. The attack allows the leaking of all posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to, and private discussions created by other extensions like FriendsOfFlarum Byobu. This also includes non-comment posts like tag changes or renaming events. The discussion payload is not leaked but using the mention HTML payload it\u0027s possible to extract the discussion ID of all posts and combine all posts back together into their original discussions even if the discussion title remains unknown. All Flarum versions prior to 1.6.3 are affected. The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. As a workaround, user can disable the mentions extension.",
"id": "GSD-2023-22487",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:20:42.261999Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
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"vendor": {
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{
"product": {
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"description": {
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"lang": "eng",
"value": "Flarum is a forum software for building communities. Using the mentions feature provided by the flarum/mentions extension, users can mention any post ID on the forum with the special `@\"\u003cusername\u003e\"#p\u003cid\u003e` syntax. The following behavior never changes no matter if the actor should be able to read the mentioned post or not: A URL to the mentioned post is inserted into the actor post HTML, leaking its discussion ID and post number. The `mentionsPosts` relationship included in the `POST /api/posts` and `PATCH /api/posts/\u003cid\u003e` JSON responses leaks the full JSON:API payload of all mentioned posts without any access control. This includes the content, date, number and attributes added by other extensions. An attacker only needs the ability to create new posts on the forum to exploit the vulnerability. This works even if new posts require approval. If they have the ability to edit posts, the attack can be performed even more discreetly by using a single post to scan any size of database and hiding the attack post content afterward. The attack allows the leaking of all posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to, and private discussions created by other extensions like FriendsOfFlarum Byobu. This also includes non-comment posts like tag changes or renaming events. The discussion payload is not leaked but using the mention HTML payload it\u0027s possible to extract the discussion ID of all posts and combine all posts back together into their original discussions even if the discussion title remains unknown. All Flarum versions prior to 1.6.3 are affected. The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. As a workaround, user can disable the mentions extension."
}
]
},
"impact": {
"cvss": [
{
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
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},
"problemtype": {
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"lang": "eng",
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"references": {
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{
"name": "https://github.com/flarum/framework/security/advisories/GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/flarum/framework/security/advisories/GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/flarum/framework/commit/ab1c868b978e8b0d09a5d682c54665dae17d0985",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/flarum/framework/commit/ab1c868b978e8b0d09a5d682c54665dae17d0985"
}
]
},
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
}
},
"gitlab.com": {
"advisories": [
{
"affected_range": "\u003c1.6.3",
"affected_versions": "All versions before 1.6.3",
"cvss_v3": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1035",
"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2023-01-19",
"description": "Flarum is a forum software for building communities. Using the mentions feature provided by the flarum/mentions extension, users can mention any post ID on the forum with the special `@\"\u003cusername\u003e\"#p\u003cid\u003e` syntax. The following behavior never changes no matter if the actor should be able to read the mentioned post or not: A URL to the mentioned post is inserted into the actor post HTML, leaking its discussion ID and post number. The `mentionsPosts` relationship included in the `POST /api/posts` and `PATCH /api/posts/\u003cid\u003e` JSON responses leaks the full JSON:API payload of all mentioned posts without any access control. This includes the content, date, number and attributes added by other extensions. An attacker only needs the ability to create new posts on the forum to exploit the vulnerability. This works even if new posts require approval. If they have the ability to edit posts, the attack can be performed even more discreetly by using a single post to scan any size of database and hiding the attack post content afterward. The attack allows the leaking of all posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to, and private discussions created by other extensions like FriendsOfFlarum Byobu. This also includes non-comment posts like tag changes or renaming events. The discussion payload is not leaked but using the mention HTML payload it\u0027s possible to extract the discussion ID of all posts and combine all posts back together into their original discussions even if the discussion title remains unknown. All Flarum versions prior to 1.6.3 are affected. The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. As a workaround, user can disable the mentions extension.",
"fixed_versions": [
"1.6.3"
],
"identifier": "CVE-2023-22487",
"identifiers": [
"CVE-2023-22487",
"GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3"
],
"not_impacted": "All versions starting from 1.6.3",
"package_slug": "packagist/flarum/core",
"pubdate": "2023-01-11",
"solution": "Upgrade to version 1.6.3 or above.",
"title": "Improper Access Control",
"urls": [
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22487",
"https://github.com/flarum/framework/commit/ab1c868b978e8b0d09a5d682c54665dae17d0985",
"https://github.com/flarum/framework/security/advisories/GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3"
],
"uuid": "c801b69c-b35d-409b-901d-2c4a3e4c10d6"
},
{
"affected_range": "\u003c1.6.3",
"affected_versions": "All versions before 1.6.3",
"cvss_v3": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2023-01-19",
"description": "Flarum is a forum software for building communities. Using the mentions feature provided by the flarum/mentions extension, users can mention any post ID on the forum with the special `@\"\u003cusername\u003e\"#p\u003cid\u003e` syntax. The following behavior never changes no matter if the actor should be able to read the mentioned post or not: A URL to the mentioned post is inserted into the actor post HTML, leaking its discussion ID and post number. The `mentionsPosts` relationship included in the `POST /api/posts` and `PATCH /api/posts/\u003cid\u003e` JSON responses leaks the full JSON:API payload of all mentioned posts without any access control. This includes the content, date, number and attributes added by other extensions. An attacker only needs the ability to create new posts on the forum to exploit the vulnerability. This works even if new posts require approval. If they have the ability to edit posts, the attack can be performed even more discreetly by using a single post to scan any size of database and hiding the attack post content afterward. The attack allows the leaking of all posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to, and private discussions created by other extensions like FriendsOfFlarum Byobu. This also includes non-comment posts like tag changes or renaming events. The discussion payload is not leaked but using the mention HTML payload it\u0027s possible to extract the discussion ID of all posts and combine all posts back together into their original discussions even if the discussion title remains unknown. All Flarum versions prior to 1.6.3 are affected. The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. As a workaround, user can disable the mentions extension.",
"fixed_versions": [
"1.6.3"
],
"identifier": "CVE-2023-22487",
"identifiers": [
"CVE-2023-22487",
"GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3"
],
"not_impacted": "All versions starting from 1.6.3",
"package_slug": "packagist/flarum/flarum",
"pubdate": "2023-01-11",
"solution": "Upgrade to version 1.6.3 or above.",
"title": "Improper Access Control",
"urls": [
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22487",
"https://github.com/flarum/framework/commit/ab1c868b978e8b0d09a5d682c54665dae17d0985",
"https://github.com/flarum/framework/security/advisories/GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3"
],
"uuid": "0445bc71-a967-4e1d-90cb-264f00a88b8d"
},
{
"affected_range": "\u003c1.6.3",
"affected_versions": "All versions before 1.6.3",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1035",
"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2023-01-10",
"description": "Using the mentions feature provided by the flarum/mentions extension, users can mention any post ID on the forum with the special `@\"\u003cusername\u003e\"#p\u003cid\u003e` syntax.\n\nThe following behavior never changes no matter if the actor should be able to read the mentioned post or not:\n\nA URL to the mentioned post is inserted into the actor post HTML, leaking its discussion ID and post number.\n\nThe `mentionsPosts` relationship included in the `POST /api/posts` and `PATCH /api/posts/\u003cid\u003e` JSON responses leaks the full JSON:API payload of all mentioned posts without any access control. This includes the content, date, number and attributes added by other extensions.\n\nAn attacker only needs the ability to create new posts on the forum to exploit the vulnerability. This works even if new posts require approval. If they have the ability to edit posts, the attack can be performed even more discreetly by using a single post to scan any size of database and hiding the attack post content afterward.\n\n### Impact\nThe attack allows the leaking of all posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to, and private discussions created by other extensions like FriendsOfFlarum Byobu. This also includes non-comment posts like tag changes or renaming events.\n\nThe discussion payload is not leaked but using the mention HTML payload it\u0027s possible to extract the discussion ID of all posts and combine all posts back together into their original discussions even if the discussion title remains unknown.\n\nAll Flarum versions prior to `v1.6.3` are affected.\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. All communities running Flarum have to upgrade as soon as possible to v1.6.3 using:\n\n```\ncomposer update --prefer-dist --no-dev -a -W\n```\nYou can then confirm you run the latest version using:\n\n```\ncomposer show flarum/core\n```\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable the mentions extension.\n\n### For more information\nFor any questions or comments on this vulnerability please visit https://discuss.flarum.org/\n\nFor support questions create a discussion at https://discuss.flarum.org/t/support.\n\nA reminder that if you ever become aware of a security issue in Flarum, please report it to us privately by emailing [security@flarum.org](mailto:security@flarum.org), and we will address it promptly.\n",
"fixed_versions": [
"1.6.3"
],
"identifier": "GMS-2023-12",
"identifiers": [
"GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3",
"GMS-2023-12",
"CVE-2023-22487"
],
"not_impacted": "All versions starting from 1.6.3",
"package_slug": "packagist/flarum/mentions",
"pubdate": "2023-01-10",
"solution": "Upgrade to version 1.6.3 or above.",
"title": "Flarum post mentions can be used to read any post on the forum without access control",
"urls": [
"https://github.com/flarum/framework/security/advisories/GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3",
"https://github.com/flarum/framework/commit/ab1c868b978e8b0d09a5d682c54665dae17d0985",
"https://github.com/flarum/framework/releases/tag/v1.6.3",
"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3"
],
"uuid": "68f31f34-72dc-49d9-a121-9b53e66929e3"
}
]
},
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"value": "Flarum is a forum software for building communities. Using the mentions feature provided by the flarum/mentions extension, users can mention any post ID on the forum with the special `@\"\u003cusername\u003e\"#p\u003cid\u003e` syntax. The following behavior never changes no matter if the actor should be able to read the mentioned post or not: A URL to the mentioned post is inserted into the actor post HTML, leaking its discussion ID and post number. The `mentionsPosts` relationship included in the `POST /api/posts` and `PATCH /api/posts/\u003cid\u003e` JSON responses leaks the full JSON:API payload of all mentioned posts without any access control. This includes the content, date, number and attributes added by other extensions. An attacker only needs the ability to create new posts on the forum to exploit the vulnerability. This works even if new posts require approval. If they have the ability to edit posts, the attack can be performed even more discreetly by using a single post to scan any size of database and hiding the attack post content afterward. The attack allows the leaking of all posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to, and private discussions created by other extensions like FriendsOfFlarum Byobu. This also includes non-comment posts like tag changes or renaming events. The discussion payload is not leaked but using the mention HTML payload it\u0027s possible to extract the discussion ID of all posts and combine all posts back together into their original discussions even if the discussion title remains unknown. All Flarum versions prior to 1.6.3 are affected. The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. As a workaround, user can disable the mentions extension."
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"impact": {
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
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"baseScore": 4.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 1.4
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2023-01-19T16:26Z",
"publishedDate": "2023-01-11T20:15Z"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.