GSD-2022-29219
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:19Details
Lodestar is a TypeScript implementation of the Ethereum Consensus specification. Prior to version 0.36.0, there is a possible consensus split given maliciously-crafted `AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` being included on-chain. Because the developers represent `uint64` values as native javascript `number`s, there is an issue when those variables with large (greater than 2^53) `uint64` values are included on chain. In those cases, Lodestar may view valid_`AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` as invalid, due to rounding errors in large `number` values. This causes a consensus split, where Lodestar nodes are forked away from the main network. Similarly, Lodestar may consider invalid `ProposerSlashing` as valid, thus including in proposed blocks that will be considered invalid by the network. Version 0.36.0 contains a fix for this issue. As a workaround, use `BigInt` to represent `Slot` and `Epoch` values in `AttesterSlashing` and `ProposerSlashing` objects. `BigInt` is too slow to be used in all `Slot` and `Epoch` cases, so one may carefully use `BigInt` just where necessary for consensus.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2022-29219",
"description": "Lodestar is a TypeScript implementation of the Ethereum Consensus specification. Prior to version 0.36.0, there is a possible consensus split given maliciously-crafted `AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` being included on-chain. Because the developers represent `uint64` values as native javascript `number`s, there is an issue when those variables with large (greater than 2^53) `uint64` values are included on chain. In those cases, Lodestar may view valid_`AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` as invalid, due to rounding errors in large `number` values. This causes a consensus split, where Lodestar nodes are forked away from the main network. Similarly, Lodestar may consider invalid `ProposerSlashing` as valid, thus including in proposed blocks that will be considered invalid by the network. Version 0.36.0 contains a fix for this issue. As a workaround, use `BigInt` to represent `Slot` and `Epoch` values in `AttesterSlashing` and `ProposerSlashing` objects. `BigInt` is too slow to be used in all `Slot` and `Epoch` cases, so one may carefully use `BigInt` just where necessary for consensus.",
"id": "GSD-2022-29219"
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-29219"
],
"details": "Lodestar is a TypeScript implementation of the Ethereum Consensus specification. Prior to version 0.36.0, there is a possible consensus split given maliciously-crafted `AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` being included on-chain. Because the developers represent `uint64` values as native javascript `number`s, there is an issue when those variables with large (greater than 2^53) `uint64` values are included on chain. In those cases, Lodestar may view valid_`AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` as invalid, due to rounding errors in large `number` values. This causes a consensus split, where Lodestar nodes are forked away from the main network. Similarly, Lodestar may consider invalid `ProposerSlashing` as valid, thus including in proposed blocks that will be considered invalid by the network. Version 0.36.0 contains a fix for this issue. As a workaround, use `BigInt` to represent `Slot` and `Epoch` values in `AttesterSlashing` and `ProposerSlashing` objects. `BigInt` is too slow to be used in all `Slot` and `Epoch` cases, so one may carefully use `BigInt` just where necessary for consensus.",
"id": "GSD-2022-29219",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:19:42.391628Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
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"STATE": "PUBLIC",
"TITLE": "Integer Overflow in Lodestar"
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"affects": {
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"description": {
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"value": "Lodestar is a TypeScript implementation of the Ethereum Consensus specification. Prior to version 0.36.0, there is a possible consensus split given maliciously-crafted `AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` being included on-chain. Because the developers represent `uint64` values as native javascript `number`s, there is an issue when those variables with large (greater than 2^53) `uint64` values are included on chain. In those cases, Lodestar may view valid_`AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` as invalid, due to rounding errors in large `number` values. This causes a consensus split, where Lodestar nodes are forked away from the main network. Similarly, Lodestar may consider invalid `ProposerSlashing` as valid, thus including in proposed blocks that will be considered invalid by the network. Version 0.36.0 contains a fix for this issue. As a workaround, use `BigInt` to represent `Slot` and `Epoch` values in `AttesterSlashing` and `ProposerSlashing` objects. `BigInt` is too slow to be used in all `Slot` and `Epoch` cases, so one may carefully use `BigInt` just where necessary for consensus."
}
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},
"impact": {
"cvss": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
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"value": "CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound"
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},
{
"name": "https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/pull/3977",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/pull/3977"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/releases/tag/v0.36.0",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/releases/tag/v0.36.0"
}
]
},
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-cvj7-5f3c-9vg9",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
}
},
"gitlab.com": {
"advisories": [
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"affected_range": "\u003c0.36.0",
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-190",
"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2022-06-07",
"description": "Lodestar is a TypeScript implementation of the Ethereum Consensus specification. Prior to version 0.36.0, there is a possible consensus split given maliciously-crafted `AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` being included on-chain. Because the developers represent `uint64` values as native javascript `number`s, there is an issue when those variables with large (greater than 2^53) `uint64` values are included on chain. In those cases, Lodestar may view valid_`AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` as invalid, due to rounding errors in large `number` values. This causes a consensus split, where Lodestar nodes are forked away from the main network. Similarly, Lodestar may consider invalid `ProposerSlashing` as valid, thus including in proposed blocks that will be considered invalid by the network. Version 0.36.0 contains a fix for this issue. As a workaround, use `BigInt` to represent `Slot` and `Epoch` values in `AttesterSlashing` and `ProposerSlashing` objects. `BigInt` is too slow to be used in all `Slot` and `Epoch` cases, so one may carefully use `BigInt` just where necessary for consensus.",
"fixed_versions": [
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"identifier": "CVE-2022-29219",
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"not_impacted": "All versions starting from 0.36.0",
"package_slug": "npm/@chainsafe/lodestar-cli",
"pubdate": "2022-05-24",
"solution": "Upgrade to version 0.36.0 or above.",
"title": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound",
"urls": [
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29219",
"https://github.com/ChainSafe/lodestar/security/advisories/GHSA-cvj7-5f3c-9vg9",
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"uuid": "366f23a5-ce15-4f88-89d9-5023e02089ce"
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"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2022-05-24",
"description": "Lodestar is a TypeScript implementation of the Ethereum Consensus specification. Prior to version 0.36.0, there is a possible consensus split given maliciously-crafted `AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` being included on-chain. Because the developers represent `uint64` values as native javascript `number`s, there is an issue when those variables with large (greater than 2^53) `uint64` values are included on chain. In those cases, Lodestar may view valid_`AttesterSlashing` or `ProposerSlashing` as invalid, due to rounding errors in large `number` values. This causes a consensus split, where Lodestar nodes are forked away from the main network. Similarly, Lodestar may consider invalid `ProposerSlashing` as valid, thus including in proposed blocks that will be considered invalid by the network. Version 0.36.0 contains a fix for this issue. As a workaround, use `BigInt` to represent `Slot` and `Epoch` values in `AttesterSlashing` and `ProposerSlashing` objects. `BigInt` is too slow to be used in all `Slot` and `Epoch` cases, so one may carefully use `BigInt` just where necessary for consensus.",
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"pubdate": "2022-05-24",
"solution": "Upgrade to version 0.36.0 or above.",
"title": "Integer Overflow or Wraparound",
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"lastModifiedDate": "2022-06-07T16:25Z",
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}
}
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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