GSD-2021-47099
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2024-03-01 06:04{
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47099"
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nveth: ensure skb entering GRO are not cloned.\n\nAfter commit d3256efd8e8b (\"veth: allow enabling NAPI even without XDP\"),\nif GRO is enabled on a veth device and TSO is disabled on the peer\ndevice, TCP skbs will go through the NAPI callback. If there is no XDP\nprogram attached, the veth code does not perform any share check, and\nshared/cloned skbs could enter the GRO engine.\n\nIgnat reported a BUG triggered later-on due to the above condition:\n\n[ 53.970529][ C1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:3574!\n[ 53.981755][ C1] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\n[ 53.982634][ C1] CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5+ #25\n[ 53.982634][ C1] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RIP: 0010:skb_shift+0x13ef/0x23b0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] Code: ea 03 0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0\n7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 41 0c 00 00 41 80 7f 02 00 4d 8d b5 d0 00 00 00 0f\n85 74 f5 ff ff \u003c0f\u003e 0b 4d 8d 77 20 be 04 00 00 00 4c 89 44 24 78 4c 89\nf7 4c 89 8c\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RSP: 0018:ffff8881008f7008 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881180b4c80 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff8881180b4d3c RDI: ffff88810bc9cac2\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RBP: ffff8881008f70b8 R08: ffff8881180b4cf4 R09: ffff8881180b4cf0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] R10: ffffed1022999e5c R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000590\n[ 53.982634][ C1] R13: ffff88810f940c80 R14: ffff88810f940d50 R15: ffff88810bc9cac0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888235880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 53.982634][ C1] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 53.982634][ C1] CR2: 00007ff5f9b86680 CR3: 0000000108ce8004 CR4: 0000000000170ee0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] Call Trace:\n[ 53.982634][ C1] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_sacktag_walk+0xaba/0x18e0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_sacktag_write_queue+0xe7b/0x3460\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_ack+0x2666/0x54b0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_rcv_established+0x4d9/0x20f0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x551/0x810\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_v4_rcv+0x22ed/0x2ed0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x96/0xaf0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x1e0/0x2f0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x211/0x440\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x424/0x660\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_list_rcv+0x2c8/0x410\n[ 53.982634][ C1] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x65c/0x910\n[ 53.982634][ C1] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f9/0xcb0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] napi_complete_done+0x188/0x6e0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] gro_cell_poll+0x10c/0x1d0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] __napi_poll+0xa1/0x530\n[ 53.982634][ C1] net_rx_action+0x567/0x1270\n[ 53.982634][ C1] __do_softirq+0x28a/0x9ba\n[ 53.982634][ C1] run_ksoftirqd+0x32/0x60\n[ 53.982634][ C1] smpboot_thread_fn+0x559/0x8c0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] kthread+0x3b9/0x490\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30\n[ 53.982634][ C1] \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nAddress the issue by skipping the GRO stage for shared or cloned skbs.\nTo reduce the chance of OoO, try to unclone the skbs before giving up.\n\nv1 -\u003e v2:\n - use avoid skb_copy and fallback to netif_receive_skb - Eric",
"id": "GSD-2021-47099",
"modified": "2024-03-01T06:04:48.336510Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
"namespaces": {
"cve.org": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "cve@kernel.org",
"ID": "CVE-2021-47099",
"STATE": "PUBLIC"
},
"affects": {
"vendor": {
"vendor_data": [
{
"product": {
"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "Linux",
"version": {
"version_data": [
{
"version_affected": "\u003c",
"version_name": "d3256efd8e8b",
"version_value": "d2269ae48598"
},
{
"version_value": "not down converted",
"x_cve_json_5_version_data": {
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.13"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.13",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.12",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.16",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
]
},
"vendor_name": "Linux"
}
]
}
},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nveth: ensure skb entering GRO are not cloned.\n\nAfter commit d3256efd8e8b (\"veth: allow enabling NAPI even without XDP\"),\nif GRO is enabled on a veth device and TSO is disabled on the peer\ndevice, TCP skbs will go through the NAPI callback. If there is no XDP\nprogram attached, the veth code does not perform any share check, and\nshared/cloned skbs could enter the GRO engine.\n\nIgnat reported a BUG triggered later-on due to the above condition:\n\n[ 53.970529][ C1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:3574!\n[ 53.981755][ C1] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\n[ 53.982634][ C1] CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5+ #25\n[ 53.982634][ C1] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RIP: 0010:skb_shift+0x13ef/0x23b0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] Code: ea 03 0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0\n7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 41 0c 00 00 41 80 7f 02 00 4d 8d b5 d0 00 00 00 0f\n85 74 f5 ff ff \u003c0f\u003e 0b 4d 8d 77 20 be 04 00 00 00 4c 89 44 24 78 4c 89\nf7 4c 89 8c\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RSP: 0018:ffff8881008f7008 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881180b4c80 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff8881180b4d3c RDI: ffff88810bc9cac2\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RBP: ffff8881008f70b8 R08: ffff8881180b4cf4 R09: ffff8881180b4cf0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] R10: ffffed1022999e5c R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000590\n[ 53.982634][ C1] R13: ffff88810f940c80 R14: ffff88810f940d50 R15: ffff88810bc9cac0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888235880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 53.982634][ C1] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 53.982634][ C1] CR2: 00007ff5f9b86680 CR3: 0000000108ce8004 CR4: 0000000000170ee0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] Call Trace:\n[ 53.982634][ C1] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_sacktag_walk+0xaba/0x18e0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_sacktag_write_queue+0xe7b/0x3460\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_ack+0x2666/0x54b0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_rcv_established+0x4d9/0x20f0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x551/0x810\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_v4_rcv+0x22ed/0x2ed0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x96/0xaf0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x1e0/0x2f0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x211/0x440\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x424/0x660\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_list_rcv+0x2c8/0x410\n[ 53.982634][ C1] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x65c/0x910\n[ 53.982634][ C1] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f9/0xcb0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] napi_complete_done+0x188/0x6e0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] gro_cell_poll+0x10c/0x1d0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] __napi_poll+0xa1/0x530\n[ 53.982634][ C1] net_rx_action+0x567/0x1270\n[ 53.982634][ C1] __do_softirq+0x28a/0x9ba\n[ 53.982634][ C1] run_ksoftirqd+0x32/0x60\n[ 53.982634][ C1] smpboot_thread_fn+0x559/0x8c0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] kthread+0x3b9/0x490\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30\n[ 53.982634][ C1] \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nAddress the issue by skipping the GRO stage for shared or cloned skbs.\nTo reduce the chance of OoO, try to unclone the skbs before giving up.\n\nv1 -\u003e v2:\n - use avoid skb_copy and fallback to netif_receive_skb - Eric"
}
]
},
"generator": {
"engine": "bippy-4986f5686161"
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "n/a"
}
]
}
]
},
"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2269ae48598e05b59ec9ea9e6e44fd33941130d",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2269ae48598e05b59ec9ea9e6e44fd33941130d"
},
{
"name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9695b7de5b4760ed22132aca919570c0190cb0ce",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9695b7de5b4760ed22132aca919570c0190cb0ce"
}
]
}
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
"cve": {
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nveth: ensure skb entering GRO are not cloned.\n\nAfter commit d3256efd8e8b (\"veth: allow enabling NAPI even without XDP\"),\nif GRO is enabled on a veth device and TSO is disabled on the peer\ndevice, TCP skbs will go through the NAPI callback. If there is no XDP\nprogram attached, the veth code does not perform any share check, and\nshared/cloned skbs could enter the GRO engine.\n\nIgnat reported a BUG triggered later-on due to the above condition:\n\n[ 53.970529][ C1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:3574!\n[ 53.981755][ C1] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\n[ 53.982634][ C1] CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5+ #25\n[ 53.982634][ C1] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RIP: 0010:skb_shift+0x13ef/0x23b0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] Code: ea 03 0f b6 04 02 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0\n7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 41 0c 00 00 41 80 7f 02 00 4d 8d b5 d0 00 00 00 0f\n85 74 f5 ff ff \u003c0f\u003e 0b 4d 8d 77 20 be 04 00 00 00 4c 89 44 24 78 4c 89\nf7 4c 89 8c\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RSP: 0018:ffff8881008f7008 EFLAGS: 00010246\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881180b4c80 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff8881180b4d3c RDI: ffff88810bc9cac2\n[ 53.982634][ C1] RBP: ffff8881008f70b8 R08: ffff8881180b4cf4 R09: ffff8881180b4cf0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] R10: ffffed1022999e5c R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000590\n[ 53.982634][ C1] R13: ffff88810f940c80 R14: ffff88810f940d50 R15: ffff88810bc9cac0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888235880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 53.982634][ C1] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 53.982634][ C1] CR2: 00007ff5f9b86680 CR3: 0000000108ce8004 CR4: 0000000000170ee0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] Call Trace:\n[ 53.982634][ C1] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_sacktag_walk+0xaba/0x18e0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_sacktag_write_queue+0xe7b/0x3460\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_ack+0x2666/0x54b0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_rcv_established+0x4d9/0x20f0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x551/0x810\n[ 53.982634][ C1] tcp_v4_rcv+0x22ed/0x2ed0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x96/0xaf0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x1e0/0x2f0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x211/0x440\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0+0x424/0x660\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ip_list_rcv+0x2c8/0x410\n[ 53.982634][ C1] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x65c/0x910\n[ 53.982634][ C1] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x5f9/0xcb0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] napi_complete_done+0x188/0x6e0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] gro_cell_poll+0x10c/0x1d0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] __napi_poll+0xa1/0x530\n[ 53.982634][ C1] net_rx_action+0x567/0x1270\n[ 53.982634][ C1] __do_softirq+0x28a/0x9ba\n[ 53.982634][ C1] run_ksoftirqd+0x32/0x60\n[ 53.982634][ C1] smpboot_thread_fn+0x559/0x8c0\n[ 53.982634][ C1] kthread+0x3b9/0x490\n[ 53.982634][ C1] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30\n[ 53.982634][ C1] \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nAddress the issue by skipping the GRO stage for shared or cloned skbs.\nTo reduce the chance of OoO, try to unclone the skbs before giving up.\n\nv1 -\u003e v2:\n - use avoid skb_copy and fallback to netif_receive_skb - Eric"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2021-47099",
"lastModified": "2024-03-05T13:41:01.900",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2024-03-04T18:15:08.153",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9695b7de5b4760ed22132aca919570c0190cb0ce"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2269ae48598e05b59ec9ea9e6e44fd33941130d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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