GSD-2021-41077
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:23Details
The activation process in Travis CI, for certain 2021-09-03 through 2021-09-10 builds, causes secret data to have unexpected sharing that is not specified by the customer-controlled .travis.yml file. In particular, the desired behavior (if .travis.yml has been created locally by a customer, and added to git) is for a Travis service to perform builds in a way that prevents public access to customer-specific secret environment data such as signing keys, access credentials, and API tokens. However, during the stated 8-day interval, secret data could be revealed to an unauthorized actor who forked a public repository and printed files during a build process.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2021-41077",
"description": "The activation process in Travis CI, for certain 2021-09-03 through 2021-09-10 builds, causes secret data to have unexpected sharing that is not specified by the customer-controlled .travis.yml file. In particular, the desired behavior (if .travis.yml has been created locally by a customer, and added to git) is for a Travis service to perform builds in a way that prevents public access to customer-specific secret environment data such as signing keys, access credentials, and API tokens. However, during the stated 8-day interval, secret data could be revealed to an unauthorized actor who forked a public repository and printed files during a build process.",
"id": "GSD-2021-41077"
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
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],
"details": "The activation process in Travis CI, for certain 2021-09-03 through 2021-09-10 builds, causes secret data to have unexpected sharing that is not specified by the customer-controlled .travis.yml file. In particular, the desired behavior (if .travis.yml has been created locally by a customer, and added to git) is for a Travis service to perform builds in a way that prevents public access to customer-specific secret environment data such as signing keys, access credentials, and API tokens. However, during the stated 8-day interval, secret data could be revealed to an unauthorized actor who forked a public repository and printed files during a build process.",
"id": "GSD-2021-41077",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:23:27.133554Z",
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"impact": {
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"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.3,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N",
"version": "2.0"
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"exploitabilityScore": 8.6,
"impactScore": 2.9,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
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"severity": "MEDIUM",
"userInteractionRequired": false
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"baseScore": 7.5,
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"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6
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},
"lastModifiedDate": "2021-09-29T18:37Z",
"publishedDate": "2021-09-14T16:15Z"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.