GSD-2020-36787

Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2024-02-27 06:02
Details
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: aspeed: fix clock handling logic Video engine uses eclk and vclk for its clock sources and its reset control is coupled with eclk so the current clock enabling sequence works like below. Enable eclk De-assert Video Engine reset 10ms delay Enable vclk It introduces improper reset on the Video Engine hardware and eventually the hardware generates unexpected DMA memory transfers that can corrupt memory region in random and sporadic patterns. This issue is observed very rarely on some specific AST2500 SoCs but it causes a critical kernel panic with making a various shape of signature so it's extremely hard to debug. Moreover, the issue is observed even when the video engine is not actively used because udevd turns on the video engine hardware for a short time to make a query in every boot. To fix this issue, this commit changes the clock handling logic to make the reset de-assertion triggered after enabling both eclk and vclk. Also, it adds clk_unprepare call for a case when probe fails. clk: ast2600: fix reset settings for eclk and vclk Video engine reset setting should be coupled with eclk to match it with the setting for previous Aspeed SoCs which is defined in clk-aspeed.c since all Aspeed SoCs are sharing a single video engine driver. Also, reset bit 6 is defined as 'Video Engine' reset in datasheet so it should be de-asserted when eclk is enabled. This commit fixes the setting.
Aliases

{
  "gsd": {
    "metadata": {
      "exploitCode": "unknown",
      "remediation": "unknown",
      "reportConfidence": "confirmed",
      "type": "vulnerability"
    },
    "osvSchema": {
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2020-36787"
      ],
      "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: aspeed: fix clock handling logic\n\nVideo engine uses eclk and vclk for its clock sources and its reset\ncontrol is coupled with eclk so the current clock enabling sequence works\nlike below.\n\n Enable eclk\n De-assert Video Engine reset\n 10ms delay\n Enable vclk\n\nIt introduces improper reset on the Video Engine hardware and eventually\nthe hardware generates unexpected DMA memory transfers that can corrupt\nmemory region in random and sporadic patterns. This issue is observed\nvery rarely on some specific AST2500 SoCs but it causes a critical\nkernel panic with making a various shape of signature so it\u0027s extremely\nhard to debug. Moreover, the issue is observed even when the video\nengine is not actively used because udevd turns on the video engine\nhardware for a short time to make a query in every boot.\n\nTo fix this issue, this commit changes the clock handling logic to make\nthe reset de-assertion triggered after enabling both eclk and vclk. Also,\nit adds clk_unprepare call for a case when probe fails.\n\nclk: ast2600: fix reset settings for eclk and vclk\nVideo engine reset setting should be coupled with eclk to match it\nwith the setting for previous Aspeed SoCs which is defined in\nclk-aspeed.c since all Aspeed SoCs are sharing a single video engine\ndriver. Also, reset bit 6 is defined as \u0027Video Engine\u0027 reset in\ndatasheet so it should be de-asserted when eclk is enabled. This\ncommit fixes the setting.",
      "id": "GSD-2020-36787",
      "modified": "2024-02-27T06:02:42.211234Z",
      "schema_version": "1.4.0"
    }
  },
  "namespaces": {
    "cve.org": {
      "CVE_data_meta": {
        "ASSIGNER": "cve@kernel.org",
        "ID": "CVE-2020-36787",
        "STATE": "PUBLIC"
      },
      "affects": {
        "vendor": {
          "vendor_data": [
            {
              "product": {
                "product_data": [
                  {
                    "product_name": "Linux",
                    "version": {
                      "version_data": [
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003c",
                          "version_name": "d2b4387f3bdf",
                          "version_value": "1dc1d30ac101"
                        },
                        {
                          "version_value": "not down converted",
                          "x_cve_json_5_version_data": {
                            "defaultStatus": "affected",
                            "versions": [
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                                "status": "affected",
                                "version": "5.0"
                              },
                              {
                                "lessThan": "5.0",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "0",
                                "versionType": "custom"
                              },
                              {
                                "lessThanOrEqual": "5.4.*",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "5.4.119",
                                "versionType": "custom"
                              },
                              {
                                "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "5.10.37",
                                "versionType": "custom"
                              },
                              {
                                "lessThanOrEqual": "5.11.*",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "5.11.21",
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                              {
                                "lessThanOrEqual": "5.12.*",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "5.12.4",
                                "versionType": "custom"
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                              {
                                "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "5.13",
                                "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
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              "vendor_name": "Linux"
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      },
      "data_format": "MITRE",
      "data_type": "CVE",
      "data_version": "4.0",
      "description": {
        "description_data": [
          {
            "lang": "eng",
            "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: aspeed: fix clock handling logic\n\nVideo engine uses eclk and vclk for its clock sources and its reset\ncontrol is coupled with eclk so the current clock enabling sequence works\nlike below.\n\n Enable eclk\n De-assert Video Engine reset\n 10ms delay\n Enable vclk\n\nIt introduces improper reset on the Video Engine hardware and eventually\nthe hardware generates unexpected DMA memory transfers that can corrupt\nmemory region in random and sporadic patterns. This issue is observed\nvery rarely on some specific AST2500 SoCs but it causes a critical\nkernel panic with making a various shape of signature so it\u0027s extremely\nhard to debug. Moreover, the issue is observed even when the video\nengine is not actively used because udevd turns on the video engine\nhardware for a short time to make a query in every boot.\n\nTo fix this issue, this commit changes the clock handling logic to make\nthe reset de-assertion triggered after enabling both eclk and vclk. Also,\nit adds clk_unprepare call for a case when probe fails.\n\nclk: ast2600: fix reset settings for eclk and vclk\nVideo engine reset setting should be coupled with eclk to match it\nwith the setting for previous Aspeed SoCs which is defined in\nclk-aspeed.c since all Aspeed SoCs are sharing a single video engine\ndriver. Also, reset bit 6 is defined as \u0027Video Engine\u0027 reset in\ndatasheet so it should be de-asserted when eclk is enabled. This\ncommit fixes the setting."
          }
        ]
      },
      "generator": {
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            "description": [
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                "lang": "eng",
                "value": "n/a"
              }
            ]
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        ]
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      "references": {
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            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1dc1d30ac101bb8335d9852de2107af60c2580e7",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1dc1d30ac101bb8335d9852de2107af60c2580e7"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a59d01384c80a8a4392665802df57c3df20055f5",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a59d01384c80a8a4392665802df57c3df20055f5"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2964c37563e86cfdc439f217eb3c5a69adfdba6a",
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            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2964c37563e86cfdc439f217eb3c5a69adfdba6a"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75321dc8aebe3f30eff226028fe6da340fe0bf02",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75321dc8aebe3f30eff226028fe6da340fe0bf02"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3536169f8531c2c5b153921dc7d1ac9fd570cda7",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3536169f8531c2c5b153921dc7d1ac9fd570cda7"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    "nvd.nist.gov": {
      "cve": {
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: aspeed: fix clock handling logic\n\nVideo engine uses eclk and vclk for its clock sources and its reset\ncontrol is coupled with eclk so the current clock enabling sequence works\nlike below.\n\n Enable eclk\n De-assert Video Engine reset\n 10ms delay\n Enable vclk\n\nIt introduces improper reset on the Video Engine hardware and eventually\nthe hardware generates unexpected DMA memory transfers that can corrupt\nmemory region in random and sporadic patterns. This issue is observed\nvery rarely on some specific AST2500 SoCs but it causes a critical\nkernel panic with making a various shape of signature so it\u0027s extremely\nhard to debug. Moreover, the issue is observed even when the video\nengine is not actively used because udevd turns on the video engine\nhardware for a short time to make a query in every boot.\n\nTo fix this issue, this commit changes the clock handling logic to make\nthe reset de-assertion triggered after enabling both eclk and vclk. Also,\nit adds clk_unprepare call for a case when probe fails.\n\nclk: ast2600: fix reset settings for eclk and vclk\nVideo engine reset setting should be coupled with eclk to match it\nwith the setting for previous Aspeed SoCs which is defined in\nclk-aspeed.c since all Aspeed SoCs are sharing a single video engine\ndriver. Also, reset bit 6 is defined as \u0027Video Engine\u0027 reset in\ndatasheet so it should be de-asserted when eclk is enabled. This\ncommit fixes the setting."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2020-36787",
        "lastModified": "2024-02-28T14:06:45.783",
        "metrics": {},
        "published": "2024-02-28T09:15:37.030",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1dc1d30ac101bb8335d9852de2107af60c2580e7"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2964c37563e86cfdc439f217eb3c5a69adfdba6a"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3536169f8531c2c5b153921dc7d1ac9fd570cda7"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75321dc8aebe3f30eff226028fe6da340fe0bf02"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a59d01384c80a8a4392665802df57c3df20055f5"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
      }
    }
  }
}



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