GSD-2020-26896
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:22Details
Prior to 0.11.0-beta, LND (Lightning Network Daemon) had a vulnerability in its invoice database. While claiming on-chain a received HTLC output, it didn't verify that the corresponding outgoing off-chain HTLC was already settled before releasing the preimage. In the case of a hash-and-amount collision with an invoice, the preimage for an expected payment was instead released. A malicious peer could have deliberately intercepted an HTLC intended for the victim node, probed the preimage through a colluding relayed HTLC, and stolen the intercepted HTLC. The impact is a loss of funds in certain situations, and a weakening of the victim's receiver privacy.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2020-26896",
"description": "Prior to 0.11.0-beta, LND (Lightning Network Daemon) had a vulnerability in its invoice database. While claiming on-chain a received HTLC output, it didn\u0027t verify that the corresponding outgoing off-chain HTLC was already settled before releasing the preimage. In the case of a hash-and-amount collision with an invoice, the preimage for an expected payment was instead released. A malicious peer could have deliberately intercepted an HTLC intended for the victim node, probed the preimage through a colluding relayed HTLC, and stolen the intercepted HTLC. The impact is a loss of funds in certain situations, and a weakening of the victim\u0027s receiver privacy.",
"id": "GSD-2020-26896"
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
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"aliases": [
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"details": "Prior to 0.11.0-beta, LND (Lightning Network Daemon) had a vulnerability in its invoice database. While claiming on-chain a received HTLC output, it didn\u0027t verify that the corresponding outgoing off-chain HTLC was already settled before releasing the preimage. In the case of a hash-and-amount collision with an invoice, the preimage for an expected payment was instead released. A malicious peer could have deliberately intercepted an HTLC intended for the victim node, probed the preimage through a colluding relayed HTLC, and stolen the intercepted HTLC. The impact is a loss of funds in certain situations, and a weakening of the victim\u0027s receiver privacy.",
"id": "GSD-2020-26896",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:22:09.149356Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
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"impact": {
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"cvssV2": {
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"authentication": "NONE",
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"baseScore": 5.8,
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"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N",
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"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 4.2
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2020-11-05T15:43Z",
"publishedDate": "2020-10-21T02:15Z"
}
}
}
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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