GSD-2020-14474
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:22Details
The Cellebrite UFED physical device 5.0 through 7.5.0.845 relies on key material hardcoded within both the executable code supporting the decryption process, and within the encrypted files themselves by using a key enveloping technique. The recovered key material is the same for every device running the same version of the software, and does not appear to be changed with each new build. It is possible to reconstruct the decryption process using the hardcoded key material and obtain easy access to otherwise protected data.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2020-14474",
"description": "The Cellebrite UFED physical device 5.0 through 7.5.0.845 relies on key material hardcoded within both the executable code supporting the decryption process, and within the encrypted files themselves by using a key enveloping technique. The recovered key material is the same for every device running the same version of the software, and does not appear to be changed with each new build. It is possible to reconstruct the decryption process using the hardcoded key material and obtain easy access to otherwise protected data.",
"id": "GSD-2020-14474",
"references": [
"https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/cve/CVE-2020-14474"
]
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-14474"
],
"details": "The Cellebrite UFED physical device 5.0 through 7.5.0.845 relies on key material hardcoded within both the executable code supporting the decryption process, and within the encrypted files themselves by using a key enveloping technique. The recovered key material is the same for every device running the same version of the software, and does not appear to be changed with each new build. It is possible to reconstruct the decryption process using the hardcoded key material and obtain easy access to otherwise protected data.",
"id": "GSD-2020-14474",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:22:00.447226Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
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"affects": {
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"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "n/a",
"version": {
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"version_value": "n/a"
}
]
}
}
]
},
"vendor_name": "n/a"
}
]
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},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
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"value": "The Cellebrite UFED physical device 5.0 through 7.5.0.845 relies on key material hardcoded within both the executable code supporting the decryption process, and within the encrypted files themselves by using a key enveloping technique. The recovered key material is the same for every device running the same version of the software, and does not appear to be changed with each new build. It is possible to reconstruct the decryption process using the hardcoded key material and obtain easy access to otherwise protected data."
}
]
},
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"name": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2020/Jun/31",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2020/Jun/31"
},
{
"name": "https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2020-003.txt",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2020-003.txt"
},
{
"name": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/158254/Cellebrite-EPR-Decryption-Hardcoded-AES-Key-Material.html",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/158254/Cellebrite-EPR-Decryption-Hardcoded-AES-Key-Material.html"
}
]
}
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
"configurations": {
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"nodes": [
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"children": [
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"cpe_match": [
{
"cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:o:cellebrite:ufed_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"cpe_name": [],
"versionEndIncluding": "7.5.0.845",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
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"operator": "OR"
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{
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"cpe_match": [
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"cve": {
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"description": {
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"value": "The Cellebrite UFED physical device 5.0 through 7.5.0.845 relies on key material hardcoded within both the executable code supporting the decryption process, and within the encrypted files themselves by using a key enveloping technique. The recovered key material is the same for every device running the same version of the software, and does not appear to be changed with each new build. It is possible to reconstruct the decryption process using the hardcoded key material and obtain easy access to otherwise protected data."
}
]
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
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"value": "CWE-798"
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},
"references": {
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{
"name": "https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2020-003.txt",
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},
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},
{
"name": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/158254/Cellebrite-EPR-Decryption-Hardcoded-AES-Key-Material.html",
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"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/158254/Cellebrite-EPR-Decryption-Hardcoded-AES-Key-Material.html"
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},
"impact": {
"baseMetricV2": {
"acInsufInfo": false,
"cvssV2": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.0,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
"impactScore": 2.9,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"userInteractionRequired": false
},
"baseMetricV3": {
"cvssV3": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2020-07-10T14:26Z",
"publishedDate": "2020-06-30T19:15Z"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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