GSD-2020-10282

Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:22
Details
The Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol presents no authentication mechanism on its version 1.0 (nor authorization) whichs leads to a variety of attacks including identity spoofing, unauthorized access, PITM attacks and more. According to literature, version 2.0 optionally allows for package signing which mitigates this flaw. Another source mentions that MAVLink 2.0 only provides a simple authentication system based on HMAC. This implies that the flying system overall should add the same symmetric key into all devices of network. If not the case, this may cause a security issue, that if one of the devices and its symmetric key are compromised, the whole authentication system is not reliable.
Aliases
Aliases
CVE-2020-10282
To clipboard 

{
  "GSD": {
    "alias": "CVE-2020-10282",
    "description": "The Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol presents no authentication mechanism on its version 1.0 (nor authorization) whichs leads to a variety of attacks including identity spoofing, unauthorized access, PITM attacks and more. According to literature, version 2.0 optionally allows for package signing which mitigates this flaw. Another source mentions that MAVLink 2.0 only provides a simple authentication system based on HMAC. This implies that the flying system overall should add the same symmetric key into all devices of network. If not the case, this may cause a security issue, that if one of the devices and its symmetric key are compromised, the whole authentication system is not reliable.",
    "id": "GSD-2020-10282"
  },
  "gsd": {
    "metadata": {
      "exploitCode": "unknown",
      "remediation": "unknown",
      "reportConfidence": "confirmed",
      "type": "vulnerability"
    },
    "osvSchema": {
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2020-10282"
      ],
      "details": "The Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol presents no authentication mechanism on its version 1.0 (nor authorization) whichs leads to a variety of attacks including identity spoofing, unauthorized access, PITM attacks and more. According to literature, version 2.0 optionally allows for package signing which mitigates this flaw. Another source mentions that MAVLink 2.0 only provides a simple authentication system based on HMAC. This implies that the flying system overall should add the same symmetric key into all devices of network. If not the case, this may cause a security issue, that if one of the devices and its symmetric key are compromised, the whole authentication system is not reliable.",
      "id": "GSD-2020-10282",
      "modified": "2023-12-13T01:22:04.041324Z",
      "schema_version": "1.4.0"
    }
  },
  "namespaces": {
    "cve.org": {
      "CVE_data_meta": {
        "ASSIGNER": "cve@aliasrobotics.com",
        "DATE_PUBLIC": "2020-07-03T14:21:35 +00:00",
        "ID": "CVE-2020-10282",
        "STATE": "PUBLIC",
        "TITLE": "RVD#3316: No authentication in MAVLink protocol"
      },
      "affects": {
        "vendor": {
          "vendor_data": [
            {
              "product": {
                "product_data": [
                  {
                    "product_name": "MAVLink",
                    "version": {
                      "version_data": [
                        {
                          "version_value": " v1.0"
                        }
                      ]
                    }
                  }
                ]
              },
              "vendor_name": ""
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "credit": [
        {
          "lang": "eng",
          "value": "None"
        }
      ],
      "data_format": "MITRE",
      "data_type": "CVE",
      "data_version": "4.0",
      "description": {
        "description_data": [
          {
            "lang": "eng",
            "value": "The Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol presents no authentication mechanism on its version 1.0 (nor authorization) whichs leads to a variety of attacks including identity spoofing, unauthorized access, PITM attacks and more. According to literature, version 2.0 optionally allows for package signing which mitigates this flaw. Another source mentions that MAVLink 2.0 only provides a simple authentication system based on HMAC. This implies that the flying system overall should add the same symmetric key into all devices of network. If not the case, this may cause a security issue, that if one of the devices and its symmetric key are compromised, the whole authentication system is not reliable."
          }
        ]
      },
      "generator": {
        "engine": "Robot Vulnerability Database (RVD)"
      },
      "impact": {
        "cvss": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "critical",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.0"
        }
      },
      "problemtype": {
        "problemtype_data": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "eng",
                "value": "CWE-306"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "reference_data": [
          {
            "name": "https://github.com/rligocki/Diploma_thesis_px4",
            "refsource": "CONFIRM",
            "url": "https://github.com/rligocki/Diploma_thesis_px4"
          }
        ]
      },
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "RVD#3316"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      }
    },
    "nvd.nist.gov": {
      "configurations": {
        "CVE_data_version": "4.0",
        "nodes": [
          {
            "children": [],
            "cpe_match": [
              {
                "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:dronecode:micro_air_vehicle_link:1.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                "cpe_name": [],
                "vulnerable": true
              }
            ],
            "operator": "OR"
          }
        ]
      },
      "cve": {
        "CVE_data_meta": {
          "ASSIGNER": "cve@aliasrobotics.com",
          "ID": "CVE-2020-10282"
        },
        "data_format": "MITRE",
        "data_type": "CVE",
        "data_version": "4.0",
        "description": {
          "description_data": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "The Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol presents no authentication mechanism on its version 1.0 (nor authorization) whichs leads to a variety of attacks including identity spoofing, unauthorized access, PITM attacks and more. According to literature, version 2.0 optionally allows for package signing which mitigates this flaw. Another source mentions that MAVLink 2.0 only provides a simple authentication system based on HMAC. This implies that the flying system overall should add the same symmetric key into all devices of network. If not the case, this may cause a security issue, that if one of the devices and its symmetric key are compromised, the whole authentication system is not reliable."
            }
          ]
        },
        "problemtype": {
          "problemtype_data": [
            {
              "description": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "CWE-306"
                }
              ]
            }
          ]
        },
        "references": {
          "reference_data": [
            {
              "name": "https://github.com/rligocki/Diploma_thesis_px4",
              "refsource": "CONFIRM",
              "tags": [
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/rligocki/Diploma_thesis_px4"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "impact": {
        "baseMetricV2": {
          "acInsufInfo": false,
          "cvssV2": {
            "accessComplexity": "LOW",
            "accessVector": "NETWORK",
            "authentication": "NONE",
            "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
            "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
            "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P",
            "version": "2.0"
          },
          "exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
          "impactScore": 6.4,
          "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
          "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
          "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
          "severity": "HIGH",
          "userInteractionRequired": false
        },
        "baseMetricV3": {
          "cvssV3": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 9.8,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
          "impactScore": 5.9
        }
      },
      "lastModifiedDate": "2020-10-23T18:19Z",
      "publishedDate": "2020-07-03T15:15Z"
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.