GHSA-XWX9-X5X2-3CMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 09:30 – Updated: 2026-06-28 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid use of uninit sender vars
batadv_tp_recv_ack() and batadv_tp_stop() are only valid for tp_vars in the BATADV_TP_SENDER role. When called with a BATADV_TP_RECEIVER role, it proceeds to read sender-only members that were never initialized, leading to undefined behavior.
This can be triggered when a node that is currently acting as a receiver in an ongoing tp_meter session receives a malicious ACK packet.
Guard against this by checking tp_vars->role immediately after the lookup and bailing out if it is not BATADV_TP_SENDER, before any of those members are accessed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52931"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-457"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T08:16:23Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbatman-adv: tp_meter: avoid use of uninit sender vars\n\nbatadv_tp_recv_ack() and batadv_tp_stop() are only valid for tp_vars in the\nBATADV_TP_SENDER role. When called with a BATADV_TP_RECEIVER role, it\nproceeds to read sender-only members that were never initialized, leading\nto undefined behavior.\n\nThis can be triggered when a node that is currently acting as a receiver in\nan ongoing tp_meter session receives a malicious ACK packet.\n\nGuard against this by checking tp_vars-\u003erole immediately after the\nlookup and bailing out if it is not BATADV_TP_SENDER, before any of\nthose members are accessed.",
"id": "GHSA-xwx9-x5x2-3cmw",
"modified": "2026-06-28T09:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T09:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e388af04b3958b178a1b979527f93eb46ea1fee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a21c055f66e78973712a4a1be2a554f1ee2e4f4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53f931e0146ae5bdab4cba302646827d06b3794b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c65cf23d4c6170fcf5714c32aa64689718cb142"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85397e48afe6be83ffca5ad3f4792296bfc81d3d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9884c9c02d3c90e9215db3c5128f59045d20ae91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc2ae5fbd2dadc26735092f140b246841d969a11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecdaa3e4d91040206afe21bc8a0d1198a0971ff3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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