GHSA-XRPW-4CRP-8HGJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-19 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size

nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header in the device's interrupt packet and then walks packet->data[0..x_len) and packet->data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a threshold.

Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535). The existing adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still reach roughly 0xfeff. The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size (1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the packed header — so packet->data[] has 1017 valid bytes. read_data() callbacks are not given urb->actual_length, and nothing else bounds the walk.

A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read past the coherent DMA allocation. The first index whose byte exceeds NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events. Far enough out, the read can also hit an unmapped page and fault.

Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer's data[] capacity and x_len to data_len.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64014"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:41Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size\n\nnexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header\nin the device\u0027s interrupt packet and then walks packet-\u003edata[0..x_len)\nand packet-\u003edata[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a\nthreshold.\n\nBoth fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535).  The existing\nadjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still\nreach roughly 0xfeff.  The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size\n(1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the\npacked header \u2014 so packet-\u003edata[] has 1017 valid bytes.  read_data()\ncallbacks are not given urb-\u003eactual_length, and nothing else bounds the\nwalk.\n\nA device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read\npast the coherent DMA allocation.  The first index whose byte exceeds\nNEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the\nreported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to\nuserspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events.  Far enough out, the read can also\nhit an unmapped page and fault.\n\nFix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer\u0027s data[] capacity and\nx_len to data_len.",
  "id": "GHSA-xrpw-4crp-8hgj",
  "modified": "2026-07-19T18:31:49Z",
  "published": "2026-07-19T18:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64014"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ca809ea8e0355299266c46e5f1755040aa8dcf3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/103d2de9f505f56da173e43f12dba62f92620278"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2905281cbda52ec9df540113b35b835feb5fafd3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45c829e5eb3b974282bae50b7cca2cc891f74f0b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7585b6aa55d8ac85ad22f522e1059f93507727b6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95f47331dfde243f93e679ce70bd0c24b37c683d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d883312061ccde8c536595998aaf687ec070077c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7cdcb266ba06d8480809b78ab8bb2bf8ff51ccb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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