GHSA-XR66-5V48-7CRQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-28 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: enforce cursor size limits for MOB cursors
vmw_cursor_plane_atomic_check() bounds cursor width and height only on the legacy update path; the SVGA_CAP2_CURSOR_MOB path -- the default on modern hosts -- accepts any size. When the requested size exceeds SVGA_REG_CURSOR_MAX_DIMENSION or SVGA_REG_MOB_MAX_SIZE, vmw_cursor_mob_get() returns -EINVAL and leaves vps->cursor.mob NULL. Its return value is then discarded in vmw_cursor_plane_prepare_fb(), so the subsequent vmw_cursor_update_mob() calls vmw_bo_map_and_cache(NULL) and oopses inside vmw_bo_map_and_cache_size() on the tbo.base.size load.
Reachable from any DRM master via DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CURSOR2 with a sufficiently large width or height (e.g. cursor_max_dim + 1).
Reject oversized cursors in atomic_check for both MOB-backed cursor update types. The MOB byte-size limit only applies to the SVGA_CAP2_CURSOR_MOB path (vmw_cursor_mob_size() returns 0 for GB_ONLY); compute the required MOB size in 64-bit to avoid overflow when very large dimensions are requested.
In prepare_fb only call vmw_cursor_mob_get()/_map() for VMW_CURSOR_UPDATE_MOB -- the GB_ONLY path uses bo->map.virtual directly and would otherwise be silently downgraded to NONE on hosts without SVGA_CAP2_CURSOR_MOB (where vmw_cursor_mob_get() always returns -EINVAL). Degrade the update to NONE if vmw_cursor_mob_get() or vmw_cursor_mob_map() fails so the update path does not run with a NULL backing MOB.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80701"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T08:16:55Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/vmwgfx: enforce cursor size limits for MOB cursors\n\nvmw_cursor_plane_atomic_check() bounds cursor width and height only\non the legacy update path; the SVGA_CAP2_CURSOR_MOB path -- the\ndefault on modern hosts -- accepts any size. When the requested size\nexceeds SVGA_REG_CURSOR_MAX_DIMENSION or SVGA_REG_MOB_MAX_SIZE,\nvmw_cursor_mob_get() returns -EINVAL and leaves vps-\u003ecursor.mob NULL.\nIts return value is then discarded in vmw_cursor_plane_prepare_fb(),\nso the subsequent vmw_cursor_update_mob() calls\nvmw_bo_map_and_cache(NULL) and oopses inside\nvmw_bo_map_and_cache_size() on the tbo.base.size load.\n\nReachable from any DRM master via DRM_IOCTL_MODE_CURSOR2 with a\nsufficiently large width or height (e.g. cursor_max_dim + 1).\n\nReject oversized cursors in atomic_check for both MOB-backed cursor\nupdate types. The MOB byte-size limit only applies to the\nSVGA_CAP2_CURSOR_MOB path (vmw_cursor_mob_size() returns 0 for\nGB_ONLY); compute the required MOB size in 64-bit to avoid overflow\nwhen very large dimensions are requested.\n\nIn prepare_fb only call vmw_cursor_mob_get()/_map() for\nVMW_CURSOR_UPDATE_MOB -- the GB_ONLY path uses bo-\u003emap.virtual\ndirectly and would otherwise be silently downgraded to NONE on hosts\nwithout SVGA_CAP2_CURSOR_MOB (where vmw_cursor_mob_get() always\nreturns -EINVAL). Degrade the update to NONE if vmw_cursor_mob_get()\nor vmw_cursor_mob_map() fails so the update path does not run with a\nNULL backing MOB.",
"id": "GHSA-xr66-5v48-7crq",
"modified": "2026-08-28T09:31:50Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T09:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80701"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1eb4f796695be39e0b5c4383350033ced9ade703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9109b7935b9c058b75348610ef8437c52f9020e3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5ed8749168ad13c0dbaa8300f68d854b6076966"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.