GHSA-XQW2-JP99-QFHH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-21 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: Reorder rpcrdma_rn_unregister before rdma_destroy_id
svc_rdma_free() caches rdma->sc_cm_id->device before teardown, then calls rdma_destroy_id(sc_cm_id) which frees the cm_id. rpcrdma_rn_unregister() follows, but between those two calls the transport's sc_rn entry is still installed in the device's rd_xa. A concurrent ib_unregister_device walk can dispatch svc_rdma_xprt_done() against the now-freed sc_cm_id.
Move rpcrdma_rn_unregister() before rdma_destroy_id() so the transport's notification entry is removed from the xarray before the cm_id it references is destroyed.
Also guard the sc_cm_id dereference with a NULL check: the following patches introduce paths that reach svc_rdma_free() with sc_cm_id == NULL (listener create failure, ADDR_CHANGE replacement failure).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89535"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsvcrdma: Reorder rpcrdma_rn_unregister before rdma_destroy_id\n\nsvc_rdma_free() caches rdma-\u003esc_cm_id-\u003edevice before teardown,\nthen calls rdma_destroy_id(sc_cm_id) which frees the cm_id.\nrpcrdma_rn_unregister() follows, but between those two calls\nthe transport\u0027s sc_rn entry is still installed in the device\u0027s\nrd_xa. A concurrent ib_unregister_device walk can dispatch\nsvc_rdma_xprt_done() against the now-freed sc_cm_id.\n\nMove rpcrdma_rn_unregister() before rdma_destroy_id() so the\ntransport\u0027s notification entry is removed from the xarray before\nthe cm_id it references is destroyed.\n\nAlso guard the sc_cm_id dereference with a NULL check: the\nfollowing patches introduce paths that reach svc_rdma_free()\nwith sc_cm_id == NULL (listener create failure, ADDR_CHANGE\nreplacement failure).",
"id": "GHSA-xqw2-jp99-qfhh",
"modified": "2026-09-21T15:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89535"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4488e912973773d64368828acf3b8e39d93650ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f2f5d0999364c7070306cd422d8babc2621070d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfca6eb3345ba4a23cf9a1153ad09bf19faabfc9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcd4a752ac840d39356f4d2a424d3aca4e39716b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.