GHSA-XQ5Q-48GP-2PGW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-01 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: regulatory: improve invalid hints checking
Syzbot keeps reporting an issue [1] that occurs when erroneous symbols sent from userspace get through into user_alpha2[] via regulatory_hint_user() call. Such invalid regulatory hints should be rejected.
While a sanity check from commit 47caf685a685 ("cfg80211: regulatory: reject invalid hints") looks to be enough to deter these very cases, there is a way to get around it due to 2 reasons.
1) The way isalpha() works, symbols other than latin lower and upper letters may be used to determine a country/domain. For instance, greek letters will also be considered upper/lower letters and for such characters isalpha() will return true as well. However, ISO-3166-1 alpha2 codes should only hold latin characters.
2) While processing a user regulatory request, between reg_process_hint_user() and regulatory_hint_user() there happens to be a call to queue_regulatory_request() which modifies letters in request->alpha2[] with toupper(). This works fine for latin symbols, less so for weird letter characters from the second part of _ctype[].
Syzbot triggers a warning in is_user_regdom_saved() by first sending over an unexpected non-latin letter that gets malformed by toupper() into a character that ends up failing isalpha() check.
Prevent this by enhancing is_an_alpha2() to ensure that incoming symbols are latin letters and nothing else.
[1] Syzbot report: ------------[ cut here ]------------ Unexpected user alpha2: A� WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 964 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00044-gc1e939a21eb1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: events_power_efficient crda_timeout_work RIP: 0010:is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline] RIP: 0010:restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline] RIP: 0010:restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516 ... Call Trace: crda_timeout_work+0x27/0x50 net/wireless/reg.c:542 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa65/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21910"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-01T16:15:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: cfg80211: regulatory: improve invalid hints checking\n\nSyzbot keeps reporting an issue [1] that occurs when erroneous symbols\nsent from userspace get through into user_alpha2[] via\nregulatory_hint_user() call. Such invalid regulatory hints should be\nrejected.\n\nWhile a sanity check from commit 47caf685a685 (\"cfg80211: regulatory:\nreject invalid hints\") looks to be enough to deter these very cases,\nthere is a way to get around it due to 2 reasons.\n\n1) The way isalpha() works, symbols other than latin lower and\nupper letters may be used to determine a country/domain.\nFor instance, greek letters will also be considered upper/lower\nletters and for such characters isalpha() will return true as well.\nHowever, ISO-3166-1 alpha2 codes should only hold latin\ncharacters.\n\n2) While processing a user regulatory request, between\nreg_process_hint_user() and regulatory_hint_user() there happens to\nbe a call to queue_regulatory_request() which modifies letters in\nrequest-\u003ealpha2[] with toupper(). This works fine for latin symbols,\nless so for weird letter characters from the second part of _ctype[].\n\nSyzbot triggers a warning in is_user_regdom_saved() by first sending\nover an unexpected non-latin letter that gets malformed by toupper()\ninto a character that ends up failing isalpha() check.\n\nPrevent this by enhancing is_an_alpha2() to ensure that incoming\nsymbols are latin letters and nothing else.\n\n[1] Syzbot report:\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nUnexpected user alpha2: A\ufffd\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline]\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline]\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 964 at net/wireless/reg.c:442 restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 964 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-syzkaller-00044-gc1e939a21eb1 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024\nWorkqueue: events_power_efficient crda_timeout_work\nRIP: 0010:is_user_regdom_saved net/wireless/reg.c:440 [inline]\nRIP: 0010:restore_alpha2 net/wireless/reg.c:3424 [inline]\nRIP: 0010:restore_regulatory_settings+0x3c0/0x1e50 net/wireless/reg.c:3516\n...\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n crda_timeout_work+0x27/0x50 net/wireless/reg.c:542\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xa65/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310\n worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391\n kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389\n ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244\n \u003c/TASK\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-xq5q-48gp-2pgw",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:33:22Z",
"published": "2025-04-01T18:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21910"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17aa34c84867f6cd181a5743e1c647e7766962a6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35ef07112b61b06eb30683a6563c9f6378c02476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59b348be7597c4a9903cb003c69e37df20c04a30"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62b1a9bbfebba4b4c2bb6c1ede9ef7ecee7a9ff6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a5e3b23054cee3b92683d1467e3fa83921f5622"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be7c5f00aa7f1344293e4d48d0e12be83a2f223d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da3f599517ef2ea851208df3229d07728d238dc5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4112cb477c727a65787a4065a75ca593bb5b2f4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00030.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00045.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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