GHSA-XPHM-V24C-73F6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Check skb->transport_header is set in bpf_skb_check_mtu
The bpf_skb_check_mtu helper needs to use skb->transport_header when the BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS flag is used:
bpf_skb_check_mtu(skb, ifindex, &mtu_len, 0, BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS)
The transport_header is not always set. There is a WARN_ON_ONCE report when CONFIG_DEBUG_NET is enabled + skb->gso_size is set + bpf_prog_test_run is used:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2216 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 skb_gso_validate_network_len bpf_skb_check_mtu bpf_prog_3920e25740a41171_tc_chk_segs_flag # A test in the next patch bpf_test_run bpf_prog_test_run_skb
For a normal ingress skb (not test_run), skb_reset_transport_header is performed but there is plan to avoid setting it as described in commit 2170a1f09148 ("net: no longer reset transport_header in __netif_receive_skb_core()").
This patch fixes the bpf helper by checking skb_transport_header_was_set(). The check is done just before skb->transport_header is used, to avoid breaking the existing bpf prog. The WARN_ON_ONCE is limited to bpf_prog_test_run, so targeting bpf-next.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68363"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T11:15:59Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Check skb-\u003etransport_header is set in bpf_skb_check_mtu\n\nThe bpf_skb_check_mtu helper needs to use skb-\u003etransport_header when\nthe BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS flag is used:\n\n\tbpf_skb_check_mtu(skb, ifindex, \u0026mtu_len, 0, BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS)\n\nThe transport_header is not always set. There is a WARN_ON_ONCE\nreport when CONFIG_DEBUG_NET is enabled + skb-\u003egso_size is set +\nbpf_prog_test_run is used:\n\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2216 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071\n skb_gso_validate_network_len\n bpf_skb_check_mtu\n bpf_prog_3920e25740a41171_tc_chk_segs_flag # A test in the next patch\n bpf_test_run\n bpf_prog_test_run_skb\n\nFor a normal ingress skb (not test_run), skb_reset_transport_header\nis performed but there is plan to avoid setting it as described in\ncommit 2170a1f09148 (\"net: no longer reset transport_header in __netif_receive_skb_core()\").\n\nThis patch fixes the bpf helper by checking\nskb_transport_header_was_set(). The check is done just before\nskb-\u003etransport_header is used, to avoid breaking the existing bpf prog.\nThe WARN_ON_ONCE is limited to bpf_prog_test_run, so targeting bpf-next.",
"id": "GHSA-xphm-v24c-73f6",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:01Z",
"published": "2025-12-24T12:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68363"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c30e4afc5507f0069cc09bd561e510e4d97fbf7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30ce906557a21adef4cba5901c8e995dc18263a9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/942268e2726ac7f16e3ec49dbfbbbe7cf5af9da5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97b876fa88322625228792cf7a5fd77531815a80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3171a5e4622e915e94599a55f4964078bdec27e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d946f3c98328171fa50ddb908593cf833587f725"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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