GHSA-XJR9-GG9Q-JX3V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 20:47 – Updated: 2026-06-19 20:47
VLAI
Summary
CoreWCF: Authentication bypass in CoreWCF SAML 1.1 / 2.0 token signature validation
Details

Impact

Full impersonation of any principal the trusted STS could have issued an assertion for — including administrative principals when the relying party grants them via SAML claims. Affects both SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0.

Preconditions

Relying-party service is hosted with WSFederationHttpBinding or WS2007FederationHttpBinding (or any binding that triggers FederatedSecurityTokenManager for issued-token validation), and IdentityConfiguration is wired (UseIdentityConfiguration = true). Attacker can reach the service over the network and knows the trusted STS’s public certificate (public certs are by design discoverable).

Patches

Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1

Workarounds

None

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "CoreWCF.Primitives"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "CoreWCF.Primitives"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54782"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T20:47:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nFull impersonation of any principal the trusted STS could have issued an assertion for \u2014 including administrative principals when the relying party grants them via SAML claims. Affects both SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0.\n\n#### Preconditions\nRelying-party service is hosted with WSFederationHttpBinding or WS2007FederationHttpBinding (or any binding that triggers FederatedSecurityTokenManager for issued-token validation), and IdentityConfiguration is wired (UseIdentityConfiguration = true).\nAttacker can reach the service over the network and knows the trusted STS\u2019s public certificate (public certs are by design discoverable).\n\n### Patches\nFixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1\n\n### Workarounds\nNone",
  "id": "GHSA-xjr9-gg9q-jx3v",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T20:47:11Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T20:47:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-xjr9-gg9q-jx3v"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CoreWCF: Authentication bypass in CoreWCF SAML 1.1 / 2.0 token signature validation"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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