GHSA-XJJR-RJJ9-3W22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()
ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC login response with
user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz;
user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (user->passkey)
memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz);
resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy() reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack hash[] buffer before allocating and copying.
[ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611 [ 2030.242296] [ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ 2030.242763] Call Trace: [ 2030.242769] [ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0 [ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200 [ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70 [ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150 [ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0 [ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 [ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120 [ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00 [ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0 [ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140 [ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0 [ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300 [ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0 [ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280 [ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490 [ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490 [ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490 [ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300 [ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110 [ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20 [ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470 [ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910 [ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0 [ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2030.243564] [ 2030.243570] [ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279: [ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 [ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0 [ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750 [ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340 [ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0 [ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0 [ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40 [ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930 [ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00 [ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140 [ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470 [ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100 [ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460 [ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 2030.305594] [ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640 [ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192 [ 2030.309595] The buggy address ---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90174"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()\n\nksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp-\u003ehash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC\nlogin response with\n\n\tuser-\u003epasskey_sz = resp-\u003ehash_sz;\n\tuser-\u003epasskey = kmalloc(resp-\u003ehash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);\n\tif (user-\u003epasskey)\n\t\tmemcpy(user-\u003epasskey, resp-\u003ehash, resp-\u003ehash_sz);\n\nresp-\u003ehash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp-\u003ehash[] is\nonly KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login\nresponse can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy()\nreads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not\nbound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack\nhash[] buffer before allocating and copying.\n\n[ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611\n[ 2030.242296]\n[ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy)\n[ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014\n[ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work\n[ 2030.242763] Call Trace:\n[ 2030.242769] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0\n[ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200\n[ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70\n[ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150\n[ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0\n[ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70\n[ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680\n[ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120\n[ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00\n[ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0\n[ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140\n[ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0\n[ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300\n[ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0\n[ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280\n[ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490\n[ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490\n[ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490\n[ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300\n[ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110\n[ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20\n[ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470\n[ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910\n[ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0\n[ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n[ 2030.243564] \u003c/TASK\u003e\n[ 2030.243570]\n[ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279:\n[ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80\n[ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90\n[ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0\n[ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750\n[ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340\n[ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0\n[ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0\n[ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40\n[ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930\n[ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00\n[ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140\n[ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470\n[ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100\n[ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460\n[ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n[ 2030.305594]\n[ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640\n[ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192\n[ 2030.309595] The buggy address \n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-xjjr-rjj9-3w22",
"modified": "2026-09-18T18:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90174"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/497c221bf6b2f659511719a6acfae84cc1be1caf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7405d0ba294306721843bc551611775e6edef516"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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