{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "stigmem-node"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0a12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:43:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nOn a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and **admit or reject** quarantined facts belonging to **other** tenants. The list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact` in `routes/quarantine.py` lacked an `f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped \u2014 reached via the `/v1/quarantine` list and admit/reject endpoints.\n\n### Impact\nCross-tenant confidentiality (reading another tenant\u0027s quarantined content) and cross-tenant integrity (moderating \u2014 admitting or rejecting \u2014 another tenant\u0027s facts), gated only by a plain tenant `write` capability rather than a node-level admin authority.\n\n### Affected configurations\nThis is a cross-**tenant** break. It is exploitable **only** on deployments running the opt-in `stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant` (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only `tenant=\"default\"` \u2014 there is no second tenant to cross \u2014 so it is **not exploitable** on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `0.9.0a12` (PR #728): `AND f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` was added to the list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact`; the garden lookup is now tenant-scoped; and any genuinely cross-tenant moderation is gated behind `can_admin_federation()` (node superadmin), not a tenant `write` capability. A tenant-B admin can no longer list, admit, or reject tenant-A\u0027s quarantined facts.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone other than upgrading to `0.9.0a12`. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.",
  "id": "GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:43:00Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:43:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/security/advisories/GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/pull/728"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "stistigmem-node: quarantine review surface exposes and mutates other tenants\u0027 quarantined facts (cross-tenant BOLA)"
}