Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-XHP3-RRF4-C8RV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-17 21:31

Details

Affects deployments running Airflow 3.3 or later with the Keycloak auth manager. Earlier versions carried the Keycloak tokens inside the signed session token, so the binding existed and was lost when they moved into separate cookies.

Users of apache-airflow-providers-keycloak are recommended to upgrade to version 0.10.0 or later, which binds the cookie-supplied tokens to the session identity.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76186"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-565"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T10:16:52Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: from Airflow 3.3 the Keycloak auth manager takes a user\u0027s identity from the signed Airflow session token but takes the Keycloak access and refresh tokens used for every authorization decision from separate, unauthenticated cookies, and never checks that the two describe the same subject. A user who holds any valid Airflow login of their own, together with another subject\u0027s Keycloak access or refresh token obtained out of band, can pair the two: Airflow then authorizes requests with the foreign token\u0027s privileges while the session identity, audit log and cache keys continue to name the attacker\u0027s own account. The refresh path re-issues an Airflow session token for the original identity carrying the foreign tokens, so the mismatched pairing survives across sessions.\n\nAffects deployments running Airflow 3.3 or later with the Keycloak auth manager. Earlier versions carried the Keycloak tokens inside the signed session token, so the binding existed and was lost when they moved into separate cookies.\n\nUsers of apache-airflow-providers-keycloak are recommended to upgrade to version 0.10.0 or later, which binds the cookie-supplied tokens to the session identity.",
  "id": "GHSA-xhp3-rrf4-c8rv",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T21:31:34Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76186"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72207"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/5cqh5ojl3718ogb0q1dcd9vdr47z7gp3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/5cqh5ojl3718ogb0q1dcd9vdr47z7gp3?users@airflow.apache.org"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/15/8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-76186 (GCVE-0-2026-76186)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-16 09:09 – Updated: 2026-09-17 19:22

Title

Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: Keycloak token cookies not bound to Airflow session identity

Summary

Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: from Airflow 3.3 the Keycloak auth manager takes a user's identity from the signed Airflow session token but takes the Keycloak access and refresh tokens used for every authorization decision from separate, unauthenticated cookies, and never checks that the two describe the same subject. A user who holds any valid Airflow login of their own, together with another subject's Keycloak access or refresh token obtained out of band, can pair the two: Airflow then authorizes requests with the foreign token's privileges while the session identity, audit log and cache keys continue to name the attacker's own account. The refresh path re-issues an Airflow session token for the original identity carrying the foreign tokens, so the mismatched pairing survives across sessions. Affects deployments running Airflow 3.3 or later with the Keycloak auth manager. Earlier versions carried the Keycloak tokens inside the signed session token, so the binding existed and was lost when they moved into separate cookies. Users of apache-airflow-providers-keycloak are recommended to upgrade to version 0.10.0 or later, which binds the cookie-supplied tokens to the session identity.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-17 19:22 UTC

CWE

CWE-565 - Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking in a Security Decision

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1276 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72207	patch
https://lists.apache.org/thread/5cqh5ojl3718ogb0q…	vendor-advisory
https://lists.apache.org/thread/5cqh5ojl3718ogb0q…	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/15/8

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Airflow Keycloak provider	Affected: 0 , < 0.10.0 (semver)

Credits

Claude Security Scans Jarek Potiuk

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T09:12:55.896Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
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        },
        "references": [
          {
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/15/8"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      },
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "cvssV3_1": {
              "attackComplexity": "LOW",
              "attackVector": "NETWORK",
              "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
              "baseScore": 9.1,
              "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
              "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
              "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
              "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
              "scope": "UNCHANGED",
              "userInteraction": "NONE",
              "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
              "version": "3.1"
            }
          },
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-76186",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-17T19:22:24.154515Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T19:22:48.731Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
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          "collectionURL": "https://pypi.python.org",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
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          "product": "Apache Airflow Keycloak provider",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
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            }
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      "credits": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "type": "tool",
          "value": "Claude Security Scans"
        },
        {
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          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Jarek Potiuk"
        }
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      "descriptions": [
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          "supportingMedia": [
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              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: from Airflow 3.3 the Keycloak auth manager takes a user\u0026#x27;s identity from the signed Airflow session token but takes the Keycloak access and refresh tokens used for every authorization decision from separate, unauthenticated cookies, and never checks that the two describe the same subject. A user who holds any valid Airflow login of their own, together with another subject\u0026#x27;s Keycloak access or refresh token obtained out of band, can pair the two: Airflow then authorizes requests with the foreign token\u0026#x27;s privileges while the session identity, audit log and cache keys continue to name the attacker\u0026#x27;s own account. The refresh path re-issues an Airflow session token for the original identity carrying the foreign tokens, so the mismatched pairing survives across sessions.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAffects deployments running Airflow 3.3 or later with the Keycloak auth manager. Earlier versions carried the Keycloak tokens inside the signed session token, so the binding existed and was lost when they moved into separate cookies.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eUsers of apache-airflow-providers-keycloak are recommended to upgrade to version 0.10.0 or later, which binds the cookie-supplied tokens to the session identity."
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        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "other": {
            "content": {
              "text": "moderate"
            },
            "type": "Textual description of severity"
          }
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      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
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              "cweId": "CWE-565",
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        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-16T14:54:39.000Z",
        "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
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      "references": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72207"
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        {
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            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/5cqh5ojl3718ogb0q1dcd9vdr47z7gp3?users@airflow.apache.org"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
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          ],
          "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/5cqh5ojl3718ogb0q1dcd9vdr47z7gp3"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Apache Airflow Keycloak provider: Keycloak token cookies not bound to Airflow session identity",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "airflow-s/generate_cve_json.py"
      }
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  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
    "assignerShortName": "apache",
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    "datePublished": "2026-09-16T09:09:57.800Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-19T10:41:19.914Z",
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    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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