GHSA-XH7V-965R-23F7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-05 21:18 – Updated: 2025-09-13 03:03Summary
Atlantis publicly exposes detailed version information on its /status endpoint. This information disclosure could allow attackers to identify and target known vulnerabilities associated with the specific versions, potentially compromising the service's security posture.
Details
The /status endpoint in Atlantis returns not only a health check but also detailed version and build information. This disclosure violates the principle of minimizing exposed sensitive metadata and can be leveraged by adversaries to correlate the version information with public vulnerability databases, including CVE listings. Although Atlantis is a public repository maintained by an external team, reducing this exposure can lessen the overall risk of targeted attacks.
For example, the source code handling the /status endpoint exposes version details that allow one to infer software dependencies and system configurations. Best practices, including guidelines from the OWASP Top 10 and recommendations discussed in NIST SP 800-53, advocate for restricting such potentially exploitable information.
PoC
- Issue a GET request to
http://<atlantis-host>/statususing a tool likecurlor a web browser. - Note that the API response includes detailed version and build information.
- Verify that no authentication is required to access the endpoint, leading to public exposure.
- Cross-reference the disclosed version with public vulnerability databases (e.g., NVD) for likely vulnerabilities.
Impact
The vulnerability falls under the category of information disclosure. Attackers could use the version details to scan public vulnerability repositories and tailor attacks based on known flaws in that particular version. This could potentially escalate into a broader compromise if the underlying software has exploitable vulnerabilities. Therefore, the affected parties include any users or administrators who rely on Atlantis, as well as the maintainers who are responsible for keeping the service secure.
CVS Severity Assessment
Based on the current circumstances, this issue is assessed as CVS Severity: LOW. However, if the disclosed version is known to contain critical vulnerabilities, the severity rating could be re-evaluated to Medium. It is recommended to restrict this information to safeguarded internal channels to mitigate the risk of targeted attacks.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.35.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58445"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-05T21:18:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-06T20:15:30Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAtlantis publicly exposes detailed version information on its `/status` endpoint. This information disclosure could allow attackers to identify and target known vulnerabilities associated with the specific versions, potentially compromising the service\u0027s security posture.\n\n### Details\nThe `/status` endpoint in Atlantis returns not only a health check but also detailed version and build information. This disclosure violates the principle of minimizing exposed sensitive metadata and can be leveraged by adversaries to correlate the version information with public vulnerability databases, including CVE listings. Although Atlantis is a public repository maintained by an external team, reducing this exposure can lessen the overall risk of targeted attacks.\n\nFor example, the source code handling the `/status` endpoint exposes version details that allow one to infer software dependencies and system configurations. Best practices, including guidelines from the [OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/) and recommendations discussed in NIST SP 800-53, advocate for restricting such potentially exploitable information.\n\n### PoC\n1. Issue a GET request to `http://\u003catlantis-host\u003e/status` using a tool like `curl` or a web browser.\n2. Note that the API response includes detailed version and build information.\n3. Verify that no authentication is required to access the endpoint, leading to public exposure.\n4. Cross-reference the disclosed version with public vulnerability databases (e.g., [NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov)) for likely vulnerabilities.\n\n### Impact\nThe vulnerability falls under the category of information disclosure. Attackers could use the version details to scan public vulnerability repositories and tailor attacks based on known flaws in that particular version. This could potentially escalate into a broader compromise if the underlying software has exploitable vulnerabilities. Therefore, the affected parties include any users or administrators who rely on Atlantis, as well as the maintainers who are responsible for keeping the service secure.\n\n### CVS Severity Assessment\nBased on the current circumstances, this issue is assessed as **CVS Severity: LOW**. However, if the disclosed version is known to contain critical vulnerabilities, the severity rating could be re-evaluated to **Medium**. It is recommended to restrict this information to safeguarded internal channels to mitigate the risk of targeted attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-xh7v-965r-23f7",
"modified": "2025-09-13T03:03:00Z",
"published": "2025-09-05T21:18:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security/advisories/GHSA-xh7v-965r-23f7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58445"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Atlantis Exposes Service Version Publicly on /status API Endpoint"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.