GHSA-XGPP-V9MR-6FG2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 06:31 – Updated: 2026-07-01 06:31The WP-BusinessDirectory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to and including 4.0.1. This is due to insufficient path validation in the remove() method of the JBusinessDirectoryControllerUpload class. The task=upload.remove endpoint is accessible without authentication via the plugin's frontend routing system. The _filename parameter is accepted with RAW filter (no sanitization), and the helper function makePathFile() only normalizes directory separator characters without stripping path traversal sequences (../). When combined with the _path_type=2 parameter, which sets the base directory to the plugin's site folder, an attacker can supply a _filename value containing ../ sequences to traverse outside the plugin directory and call PHP's unlink() on arbitrary files — including wp-config.php, wp-config-backup.php, or other critical server files accessible to the web server process. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6070"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T05:16:23Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The WP-BusinessDirectory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to and including 4.0.1. This is due to insufficient path validation in the remove() method of the JBusinessDirectoryControllerUpload class. The task=upload.remove endpoint is accessible without authentication via the plugin\u0027s frontend routing system. The _filename parameter is accepted with RAW filter (no sanitization), and the helper function makePathFile() only normalizes directory separator characters without stripping path traversal sequences (../). When combined with the _path_type=2 parameter, which sets the base directory to the plugin\u0027s site folder, an attacker can supply a _filename value containing ../ sequences to traverse outside the plugin directory and call PHP\u0027s unlink() on arbitrary files \u2014 including wp-config.php, wp-config-backup.php, or other critical server files accessible to the web server process. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server.",
"id": "GHSA-xgpp-v9mr-6fg2",
"modified": "2026-07-01T06:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T06:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6070"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-businessdirectory/tags/4.0.0/site/controllers/upload.php#L127"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-businessdirectory/tags/4.0.0/site/controllers/upload.php#L450"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-businessdirectory/trunk/site/controllers/upload.php#L127"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-businessdirectory/trunk/site/controllers/upload.php#L450"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d7d68f43-2a57-4352-8aae-0657b386ac7c?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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