GHSA-XF98-5FQF-RH4F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 09:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in read_log_rec_buf()
read_log_rec_buf() copies a log record into a caller buffer starting at
u32 off = lsn_to_page_off(log, lsn) + log->record_header_len;
log->record_header_len (and log->data_off, used for the following pages) comes verbatim from the on-disk restart area and is only checked for 8-byte alignment in is_rst_area_valid(), so off can exceed log->page_size. "tail = log->page_size - off" then underflows and memcpy() reads past the page_size-sized buffer returned by read_log_page(), spilling adjacent slab memory into the replay buffer.
This is reachable by mounting a crafted NTFS image:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_log_rec_buf+0x216/0x580 Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800a877ff8 by task exploit/127 read_log_rec_buf fs/ntfs3/fslog.c:2299 log_replay fs/ntfs3/fslog.c:4216 ntfs_loadlog_and_replay fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:324 ntfs_fill_super fs/ntfs3/super.c:1392 get_tree_bdev_flags fs/super.c:1694 __x64_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4360 The buggy address is located 4088 bytes to the right of the 4096-byte region [ffff88800a876000, ffff88800a877000)
Reject an in-page offset outside the current page before the copy.
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: replaced the >= sign with >]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89781"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T09:17:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in read_log_rec_buf()\n\nread_log_rec_buf() copies a log record into a caller buffer starting at\n\n\tu32 off = lsn_to_page_off(log, lsn) + log-\u003erecord_header_len;\n\nlog-\u003erecord_header_len (and log-\u003edata_off, used for the following pages)\ncomes verbatim from the on-disk restart area and is only checked for\n8-byte alignment in is_rst_area_valid(), so off can exceed\nlog-\u003epage_size. \"tail = log-\u003epage_size - off\" then underflows and\nmemcpy() reads past the page_size-sized buffer returned by\nread_log_page(), spilling adjacent slab memory into the replay buffer.\n\nThis is reachable by mounting a crafted NTFS image:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_log_rec_buf+0x216/0x580\n Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800a877ff8 by task exploit/127\n read_log_rec_buf fs/ntfs3/fslog.c:2299\n log_replay fs/ntfs3/fslog.c:4216\n ntfs_loadlog_and_replay fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:324\n ntfs_fill_super fs/ntfs3/super.c:1392\n get_tree_bdev_flags fs/super.c:1694\n __x64_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4360\n The buggy address is located 4088 bytes to the right of\n the 4096-byte region [ffff88800a876000, ffff88800a877000)\n\nReject an in-page offset outside the current page before the copy.\n\n[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: replaced the \u003e= sign with \u003e]",
"id": "GHSA-xf98-5fqf-rh4f",
"modified": "2026-09-16T15:30:57Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T09:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89781"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b2d31f1083beb80c55d1152249f652c1445a559"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49f7cbc902b08b56eb7d2633163ecc57a0e7145a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53e56f7aa1d0f950a8bc2e4cdb3ba9fe45967531"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/700973cc65db405bde0368ccf88699390150943e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74a83aa05f73033af719771ab1f0c269928b4865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de603b9d377fab57a5e6432fa84a9f36b32c1636"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df099bfdb57773ba7f40f8a9dcc82e75af277922"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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