GHSA-XC88-J6Q5-VWWX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix one-byte OOB read in smb2_parse_native_symlink()
When parsing a share-root relative native symlink, memcpy copies smb_target+1 (skipping the leading separator) but uses strlen(smb_target)+1 as the length, reading one byte past the allocated buffer.
This fixes the following KASAN splat when accessing an SMB symlink with a target of '\a\b':
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smb2_parse_native_symlink+0x4f5/0xca0 Read of size 5 at addr ffff88800878fe21 by task netfsfuzz-execu/1 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: netfsfuzz-execu Tainted: G N 7.2.0-11943-g2709dd5ae32f-dirty #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996) Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x7b/0xa0 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xe5/0x120 kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 smb2_parse_native_symlink+0x4f5/0xca0 parse_reparse_point+0x68a/0x1530 reparse_info_to_fattr+0x752/0xa20 cifs_get_fattr+0x873/0x15b0 cifs_get_inode_info+0xc0/0x310 cifs_lookup+0x308/0xa70 __lookup_slow+0x122/0x2b0 lookup_slow+0x50/0x70 path_lookupat+0x525/0xaf0 filename_lookup+0x1f2/0x550 vfs_statx+0xd1/0x1a0 vfs_fstatat+0x65/0xc0 __do_sys_newfstatat+0x9a/0x120 do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97560"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:06Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix one-byte OOB read in smb2_parse_native_symlink()\n\nWhen parsing a share-root relative native symlink, memcpy copies\nsmb_target+1 (skipping the leading separator) but uses\nstrlen(smb_target)+1 as the length, reading one byte past the\nallocated buffer.\n\nThis fixes the following KASAN splat when accessing an SMB symlink\nwith a target of \u0027\\a\\b\u0027:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smb2_parse_native_symlink+0x4f5/0xca0\n Read of size 5 at addr ffff88800878fe21 by task netfsfuzz-execu/1\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: netfsfuzz-execu Tainted: G N\n 7.2.0-11943-g2709dd5ae32f-dirty #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix,\n 1996)\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x7b/0xa0\n print_report+0xd0/0x630\n kasan_report+0xe5/0x120\n kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0\n __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60\n smb2_parse_native_symlink+0x4f5/0xca0\n parse_reparse_point+0x68a/0x1530\n reparse_info_to_fattr+0x752/0xa20\n cifs_get_fattr+0x873/0x15b0\n cifs_get_inode_info+0xc0/0x310\n cifs_lookup+0x308/0xa70\n __lookup_slow+0x122/0x2b0\n lookup_slow+0x50/0x70\n path_lookupat+0x525/0xaf0\n filename_lookup+0x1f2/0x550\n vfs_statx+0xd1/0x1a0\n vfs_fstatat+0x65/0xc0\n __do_sys_newfstatat+0x9a/0x120\n do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f",
"id": "GHSA-xc88-j6q5-vwwx",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97560"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22a9d0a9ba0c89be57558c1aa80dc60a571dd89c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a302fdbaf7dd00d285303c94af8f48321c22993"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb26524ef4ac28fcfa554c0656e8dc412c38a8ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1f173d28e964ba2c3c4ebe7491d594dc8c77a40"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff411fcbfc55eec1d66ea82483d254319dc8e973"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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