GHSA-X9W7-CH6F-9PQX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: snapshot dentry names in file and setattr traces

Patch series "ocfs2: stabilize dentry names in file and setattr traces", v4.

Snapshot names at all six users of ocfs2__file_ops and at the separate setattr event. Patch 1 handles the five ordinary file-operation callers and setattr. Patch 2 handles release separately to preserve its locked open-count sample and take the snapshot outside that critical section.

The release explanation distinguishes its existing RCU lifetime coverage from name/length consistency. It does not claim that the ordinary callers' external-name UAF interleaving crosses the held inode spinlock. The release source change is unchanged from v3.

Patch 1 also removes the read callback's redundant NULL-inode check. The two patches apply independently and leave trace formats unchanged.

This patch (of 2):

The open, fsync, read, write and splice-read trace calls pass the live dentry name and length to the shared ocfs2__file_ops event class. ocfs2_setattr() passes the same unprotected arguments to its own event. Both events size and copy a __string field separately. A reference to the dentry does not pin the external storage backing an individual name.

With an event enabled, a caller can be preempted after loading the name pointer. A long-to-short rename can then replace the name and reclaim its old external allocation before the trace callback sizes or copies it, provided no other snapshot retains that allocation.

The setattr inode lock does not exclude every rename: a same-directory rename of a source directory need not take that directory's inode lock. It can therefore change the dentry name while setattr records its event. Inline names and separately loaded lengths can also change during trace record sizing and copying.

Take a dentry name snapshot around each of these six trace calls and pass both the string and length from the snapshot. Check event enablement before taking a snapshot. Keep the event classes and formats unchanged.

Also remove the redundant NULL-inode check in the read callback. file_inode() returns the open file's inode, which is already used by the trace call above the check.

The historical report below is from the read path.

KASAN report as below:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strlen+0x85/0xa0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810a5b2b18 by task python3/496

[CPU and host details omitted.]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
 print_report+0xce/0x630
 ? strlen+0x85/0xa0
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
 ? strlen+0x85/0xa0
 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
 ? strlen+0x85/0xa0
 strlen+0x85/0xa0
 trace_event_raw_event_ocfs2__file_ops+0xf0/0x480
 ? __pfx_trace_event_raw_event_ocfs2__file_ops+0x10/0x10
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? pmbd_probe_hit_cookie+0xe7/0x1c0
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? __pfx_pmbd_probe_hit_cookie+0x10/0x10
 ocfs2_file_read_iter+0x6cd/0xb30
 ? __pfx_ocfs2_file_read_iter+0x10/0x10
 ? selinux_file_permission+0x11d/0x540
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? security_file_permission+0x26/0x80
 vfs_read+0x7d2/0xc20
 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
 ksys_read+0x111/0x200
 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
 ? irqentry_exit+0xbe/0x820
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x11d/0x150
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[User register dump omitted.]
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 489:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2de/0x780
 __d_alloc+0x5fc/0x8c0
 d_alloc_parallel+0x106/0x11d0
 lookup_open+0x3ff/0

---truncated---

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99428"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:55Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: snapshot dentry names in file and setattr traces\n\nPatch series \"ocfs2: stabilize dentry names in file and setattr traces\",\nv4.\n\nSnapshot names at all six users of ocfs2__file_ops and at the separate\nsetattr event. Patch 1 handles the five ordinary file-operation callers\nand setattr. Patch 2 handles release separately to preserve its locked\nopen-count sample and take the snapshot outside that critical section.\n\nThe release explanation distinguishes its existing RCU lifetime coverage\nfrom name/length consistency. It does not claim that the ordinary\ncallers\u0027 external-name UAF interleaving crosses the held inode spinlock.\nThe release source change is unchanged from v3.\n\nPatch 1 also removes the read callback\u0027s redundant NULL-inode check.\nThe two patches apply independently and leave trace formats unchanged.\n\n\nThis patch (of 2):\n\nThe open, fsync, read, write and splice-read trace calls pass the live\ndentry name and length to the shared ocfs2__file_ops event class.\nocfs2_setattr() passes the same unprotected arguments to its own event.\nBoth events size and copy a __string field separately. A reference to\nthe dentry does not pin the external storage backing an individual name.\n\nWith an event enabled, a caller can be preempted after loading the name\npointer. A long-to-short rename can then replace the name and reclaim its\nold external allocation before the trace callback sizes or copies it,\nprovided no other snapshot retains that allocation.\n\nThe setattr inode lock does not exclude every rename: a same-directory\nrename of a source directory need not take that directory\u0027s inode lock.\nIt can therefore change the dentry name while setattr records its event.\nInline names and separately loaded lengths can also change during trace\nrecord sizing and copying.\n\nTake a dentry name snapshot around each of these six trace calls and\npass both the string and length from the snapshot. Check event enablement\nbefore taking a snapshot. Keep the event classes and formats unchanged.\n\nAlso remove the redundant NULL-inode check in the read callback.\nfile_inode() returns the open file\u0027s inode, which is already used by the\ntrace call above the check.\n\nThe historical report below is from the read path.\n\nKASAN report as below:\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strlen+0x85/0xa0\n    Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810a5b2b18 by task python3/496\n\n    [CPU and host details omitted.]\n    Call Trace:\n     \u003cTASK\u003e\n     dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0\n     print_report+0xce/0x630\n     ? strlen+0x85/0xa0\n     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n     ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420\n     ? strlen+0x85/0xa0\n     kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n     ? strlen+0x85/0xa0\n     strlen+0x85/0xa0\n     trace_event_raw_event_ocfs2__file_ops+0xf0/0x480\n     ? __pfx_trace_event_raw_event_ocfs2__file_ops+0x10/0x10\n     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n     ? pmbd_probe_hit_cookie+0xe7/0x1c0\n     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n     ? __pfx_pmbd_probe_hit_cookie+0x10/0x10\n     ocfs2_file_read_iter+0x6cd/0xb30\n     ? __pfx_ocfs2_file_read_iter+0x10/0x10\n     ? selinux_file_permission+0x11d/0x540\n     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n     ? security_file_permission+0x26/0x80\n     vfs_read+0x7d2/0xc20\n     ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10\n     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n     ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10\n     ksys_read+0x111/0x200\n     ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10\n     ? irqentry_exit+0xbe/0x820\n     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n     ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x11d/0x150\n     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n     do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620\n     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n    [User register dump omitted.]\n     \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n    Allocated by task 489:\n     kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n     kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n     __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0\n     __kmalloc_noprof+0x2de/0x780\n     __d_alloc+0x5fc/0x8c0\n     d_alloc_parallel+0x106/0x11d0\n     lookup_open+0x3ff/0\n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-x9w7-ch6f-9pqx",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99428"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84908981fbda3c133b60e75568d853d3191f9fb2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8cd3ff30659775a6831c66687a69d2b83d163591"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2052367cbdad321d131e6280f41c4be5a1b5c96"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f976692490bbdf670d4cc241b8951c8cfddb1583"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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