GHSA-X8QW-HC9F-QXQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 15:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtksdio: fix infinite loop in btmtksdio_txrx_work()
Every once in a while we see a hung btmtksdio_flush() task:
INFO: task kworker/u17:0:189 blocked for more than 122 seconds. __cancel_work_timer+0x3f4/0x460 cancel_work_sync+0x1c/0x2c btmtksdio_flush+0x2c/0x40 hci_dev_open_sync+0x10c4/0x2190 [..]
It all boils down to incorrect time_is_before_jiffies() usage in
btmtksdio_txrx_work(). The btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop is expected
to be terminated if running for longer than 5HZ. However the
timeout check is twisted: time_is_before_jiffies(old_jiffies + 5HZ)
evaluates to true when old_jiffies + 5*HZ is in the past i.e. when a
timeout has occurred. Using OR with time_is_before_jiffies(txrx_timeout)
means that:
- before the 5-second timeout: the condition is int_status || false,
so it loops as long as there are pending interrupts.
- after the 5-second timeout: the condition becomes int_status || true,
which is always true.
When the loop becomes infinite btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop never terminates and never releases the SDIO host.
Fix loop termination condition to actually enforce a 5*HZ timeout.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64409"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-835"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: btmtksdio: fix infinite loop in btmtksdio_txrx_work()\n\nEvery once in a while we see a hung btmtksdio_flush() task:\n\n INFO: task kworker/u17:0:189 blocked for more than 122 seconds.\n __cancel_work_timer+0x3f4/0x460\n cancel_work_sync+0x1c/0x2c\n btmtksdio_flush+0x2c/0x40\n hci_dev_open_sync+0x10c4/0x2190\n [..]\n\nIt all boils down to incorrect time_is_before_jiffies() usage in\nbtmtksdio_txrx_work(). The btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop is expected\nto be terminated if running for longer than 5*HZ. However the\ntimeout check is twisted: time_is_before_jiffies(old_jiffies + 5*HZ)\nevaluates to true when old_jiffies + 5*HZ is in the past i.e. when a\ntimeout has occurred. Using OR with time_is_before_jiffies(txrx_timeout)\nmeans that:\n- before the 5-second timeout: the condition is `int_status || false`,\n so it loops as long as there are pending interrupts.\n- after the 5-second timeout: the condition becomes `int_status || true`,\n which is always true.\n\nWhen the loop becomes infinite btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop never\nterminates and never releases the SDIO host.\n\nFix loop termination condition to actually enforce a 5*HZ timeout.",
"id": "GHSA-x8qw-hc9f-qxq2",
"modified": "2026-09-04T15:35:53Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0039bdde36b23ccf1196635f1d52c5490481544d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f0a83e26a9c7fd4b243c315ce07161d2496d83d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/466540e045d01fcacf383a5beb8a2dad2fc53a26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b429d611060e87752e848851815537963726493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a257407e2bbbb099ed427719a50563f67fa366d8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6682c23b6fac4780d297ae4662053d17e58fd52"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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