GHSA-X7Q5-8HV5-RV8M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/bugs: Select the BHI mitigation based on the attack vector properly

The BHI mitigation selection is inconsistent with the documentation (attack_vector_controls.rst), which lists BHI under both the user->kernel and guest->host attack vectors. bhi_select_mitigation() only enables it when CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST is set; otherwise it selects BHI_MITIGATION_OFF, even if CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL is set.

As a result, a kernel compiled with KVM disabled gets BHI automatically disabled, since CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST defaults to off without KVM. This is a bug, given that CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL still needs it: on affected Intel CPUs these kernels lose BHI_DIS_S or the BHB clearing loop by default. Booting with mitigations=auto,no_guest_host has the same effect.

Select BHI_MITIGATION_ON whenever user->kernel is mitigated, and keep BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY for the guest->host-only case.

[ bp: Clarify commit title. ]

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99745"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:12Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/bugs: Select the BHI mitigation based on the attack vector properly\n\nThe BHI mitigation selection is inconsistent with the documentation\n(attack_vector_controls.rst), which lists BHI under both the\nuser-\u003ekernel and guest-\u003ehost attack vectors. bhi_select_mitigation()\nonly enables it when CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST is set; otherwise it\nselects BHI_MITIGATION_OFF, even if CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL is set.\n\nAs a result, a kernel compiled with KVM disabled gets BHI automatically\ndisabled, since CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST defaults to off without KVM.\nThis is a bug, given that CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL still needs it: on\naffected Intel CPUs these kernels lose BHI_DIS_S or the BHB clearing\nloop by default. Booting with mitigations=auto,no_guest_host has the\nsame effect.\n\nSelect BHI_MITIGATION_ON whenever user-\u003ekernel is mitigated, and keep\nBHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY for the guest-\u003ehost-only case.\n\n  [ bp: Clarify commit title. ]",
  "id": "GHSA-x7q5-8hv5-rv8m",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99745"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3457b3bcd344005af894876cab4e634cabdcbb62"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5bc572befb2990cb2ad83ca447f64e6654a9889f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f9f2a155078cf7b10dd8b1ffdacf0a3aeb8baeb5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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