GHSA-X7FV-MVJX-M6C8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-24 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: Fix pcluster memleak when its block address is zero
syzkaller reported a memleak: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=62f37ff612f0021641eda5b17f056f1668aa9aed
unreferenced object 0xffff88811009c7f8 (size 136): ... backtrace: [] z_erofs_do_read_page+0x99b/0x1740 [] z_erofs_readahead+0x24e/0x580 [] read_pages+0x86/0x3d0 ...
syzkaller constructed a case: in z_erofs_register_pcluster(), ztailpacking = false and map->m_pa = zero. This makes pcl->obj.index be zero although pcl is not a inline pcluster.
Then following path adds refcount for grp, but the refcount won't be put because pcl is inline.
z_erofs_readahead() z_erofs_do_read_page() # for another page z_erofs_collector_begin() erofs_find_workgroup() erofs_workgroup_get()
Since it's illegal for the block address of a non-inlined pcluster to be zero, add check here to avoid registering the pcluster which would be leaked.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50743"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T13:16:01Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nerofs: Fix pcluster memleak when its block address is zero\n\nsyzkaller reported a memleak:\nhttps://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=62f37ff612f0021641eda5b17f056f1668aa9aed\n\nunreferenced object 0xffff88811009c7f8 (size 136):\n ...\n backtrace:\n [\u003cffffffff821db19b\u003e] z_erofs_do_read_page+0x99b/0x1740\n [\u003cffffffff821dee9e\u003e] z_erofs_readahead+0x24e/0x580\n [\u003cffffffff814bc0d6\u003e] read_pages+0x86/0x3d0\n ...\n\nsyzkaller constructed a case: in z_erofs_register_pcluster(),\nztailpacking = false and map-\u003em_pa = zero. This makes pcl-\u003eobj.index be\nzero although pcl is not a inline pcluster.\n\nThen following path adds refcount for grp, but the refcount won\u0027t be put\nbecause pcl is inline.\n\nz_erofs_readahead()\n z_erofs_do_read_page() # for another page\n z_erofs_collector_begin()\n erofs_find_workgroup()\n erofs_workgroup_get()\n\nSince it\u0027s illegal for the block address of a non-inlined pcluster to\nbe zero, add check here to avoid registering the pcluster which would\nbe leaked.",
"id": "GHSA-x7fv-mvjx-m6c8",
"modified": "2025-12-24T15:30:33Z",
"published": "2025-12-24T15:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50743"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/618e712b99c78d1004b70a1a9ab0a4830d0b2673"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac54c1f7b288d83b6ba1e320efff24ecc21309cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c42c0ffe81176940bd5dead474216b7198d77675"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.