GHSA-X755-7343-MR27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: convert pmsr_free_wk to wiphy_work to fix deadlock
When a netlink socket that owns a PMSR session is closed, cfg80211_release_pmsr() clears the request's nl_portid and queues pmsr_free_wk to call cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() asynchronously.
If the interface tears down concurrently, cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() is called under wiphy_lock and calls cancel_work_sync(&pmsr_free_wk) to wait for any running work. The work function acquires wiphy_lock via guard(wiphy) before calling process_abort.
This is a deadlock: wdev_down holds wiphy_lock and blocks inside cancel_work_sync(); pmsr_free_wk blocks trying to acquire that same wiphy_lock. Neither thread can proceed.
The same deadlock is reachable from cfg80211_leave_locked(), which calls cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() for all interface types under wiphy_lock.
Fix this by converting pmsr_free_wk from a plain work_struct to a wiphy_work. The wiphy_work dispatcher holds wiphy_lock when running work items, so the explicit guard(wiphy) in the work function is no longer needed. wiphy_work_cancel() can be called safely while holding wiphy_lock - since wiphy_lock prevents the work from running concurrently, wiphy_work_cancel() never blocks, eliminating the deadlock.
Remove the cancel_work_sync() for pmsr_free_wk from the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN handler. cfg80211_leave(), called unconditionally just before it, already cancels any pending work under wiphy_lock via wiphy_work_cancel() inside cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68408"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:34Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: cfg80211: convert pmsr_free_wk to wiphy_work to fix deadlock\n\nWhen a netlink socket that owns a PMSR session is closed,\ncfg80211_release_pmsr() clears the request\u0027s nl_portid and queues\npmsr_free_wk to call cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() asynchronously.\n\nIf the interface tears down concurrently, cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down()\nis called under wiphy_lock and calls cancel_work_sync(\u0026pmsr_free_wk)\nto wait for any running work. The work function acquires wiphy_lock\nvia guard(wiphy) before calling process_abort.\n\nThis is a deadlock: wdev_down holds wiphy_lock and blocks inside\ncancel_work_sync(); pmsr_free_wk blocks trying to acquire that same\nwiphy_lock. Neither thread can proceed.\n\nThe same deadlock is reachable from cfg80211_leave_locked(), which\ncalls cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() for all interface types under\nwiphy_lock.\n\nFix this by converting pmsr_free_wk from a plain work_struct to a\nwiphy_work. The wiphy_work dispatcher holds wiphy_lock when running\nwork items, so the explicit guard(wiphy) in the work function is no\nlonger needed. wiphy_work_cancel() can be called safely while holding\nwiphy_lock - since wiphy_lock prevents the work from running\nconcurrently, wiphy_work_cancel() never blocks, eliminating the\ndeadlock.\n\nRemove the cancel_work_sync() for pmsr_free_wk from the\nNETDEV_GOING_DOWN handler. cfg80211_leave(), called unconditionally\njust before it, already cancels any pending work under wiphy_lock\nvia wiphy_work_cancel() inside cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down().",
"id": "GHSA-x755-7343-mr27",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:00Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68408"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a77d9fb4d5c0e01306cd406ffdee8f1fe955c0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/133684982dd0c24359fcc641d19d89cc17d6e5ef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21512b5f7a74fd18c996c22e6854efe57d570816"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b0eab425e1f658d8fe1df7590e3b9af5959505e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30c67926d41c456809857976cd3cd71b2290e0c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efe47df4de5e3e19b0670c5f2f67bdc4c9dc02af"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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