GHSA-X738-FP96-2H57
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-04 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
configfs-tsm-report: Fix NULL dereference of tsm_ops
Unlike sysfs, the lifetime of configfs objects is controlled by userspace. There is no mechanism for the kernel to find and delete all created config-items. Instead, the configfs-tsm-report mechanism has an expectation that tsm_unregister() can happen at any time and cause established config-item access to start failing.
That expectation is not fully satisfied. While tsm_report_read(), tsm_report_{is,is_bin}_visible(), and tsm_report_make_item() safely fail if tsm_ops have been unregistered, tsm_report_privlevel_store() tsm_report_provider_show() fail to check for ops registration. Add the missing checks for tsm_ops having been removed.
Now, in supporting the ability for tsm_unregister() to always succeed, it leaves the problem of what to do with lingering config-items. The expectation is that the admin that arranges for the ->remove() (unbind) of the ${tsm_arch}-guest driver is also responsible for deletion of all open config-items. Until that deletion happens, ->probe() (reload / bind) of the ${tsm_arch}-guest driver fails.
This allows for emergency shutdown / revocation of attestation interfaces, and requires coordinated restart.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-38210"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-04T14:15:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nconfigfs-tsm-report: Fix NULL dereference of tsm_ops\n\nUnlike sysfs, the lifetime of configfs objects is controlled by\nuserspace. There is no mechanism for the kernel to find and delete all\ncreated config-items. Instead, the configfs-tsm-report mechanism has an\nexpectation that tsm_unregister() can happen at any time and cause\nestablished config-item access to start failing.\n\nThat expectation is not fully satisfied. While tsm_report_read(),\ntsm_report_{is,is_bin}_visible(), and tsm_report_make_item() safely fail\nif tsm_ops have been unregistered, tsm_report_privlevel_store()\ntsm_report_provider_show() fail to check for ops registration. Add the\nmissing checks for tsm_ops having been removed.\n\nNow, in supporting the ability for tsm_unregister() to always succeed,\nit leaves the problem of what to do with lingering config-items. The\nexpectation is that the admin that arranges for the -\u003eremove() (unbind)\nof the ${tsm_arch}-guest driver is also responsible for deletion of all\nopen config-items. Until that deletion happens, -\u003eprobe() (reload /\nbind) of the ${tsm_arch}-guest driver fails.\n\nThis allows for emergency shutdown / revocation of attestation\ninterfaces, and requires coordinated restart.",
"id": "GHSA-x738-fp96-2h57",
"modified": "2025-11-18T18:32:47Z",
"published": "2025-07-04T15:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38210"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/015f04ac884a454d4d8aaa7b67758f047742b1cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cefbafcbdef011d6ef9414902311afdfba3c33eb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fba4ceaa242d2bdf4c04b77bda41d32d02d3925d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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