GHSA-X6MJ-8JX9-QHQV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 23:44 – Updated: 2026-11-12 23:44
VLAI
Summary
Action Pack: Possible sensitive session information leak in Active Storage proxy mode
Details

Impact

When ActionDispatch::Cookies reads a signed or encrypted cookie that was written under a rotated secret (config.action_dispatch.cookies_rotations) or in the format that a :hybrid cookie serializer migrates from, it writes the cookie back to the response in the current format, and that write ignores request.session_options[:skip]. ActiveStorage::DisableSession relies on that option to keep the session cookie off the public, immutable responses of the Active Storage proxy controllers, but those controllers still load the session, so a request carrying an old-format session cookie could receive the rewritten session cookie in Set-Cookie on a cacheable response. A shared cache that stores such a response together with its Set-Cookie header could then serve one user's session to later requesters of the same URL, or serve an attacker's session to other users.

Applications are affected when they serve Active Storage files through the proxy controllers, have a cookie rotation or a :hybrid serializer migration configured, and run behind a cache that stores Set-Cookie on public responses. This is a path around the fix for CVE-2024-26144.

Details

In the fixed releases, a response that skips the session leaves an old-format signed or encrypted cookie unchanged, and the next request that does not skip the session upgrades it. An application that skips the session on every request no longer upgrades its signed or encrypted cookies. Cookies that the application sets explicitly are still written. See the Action Pack CHANGELOG.

Workarounds

Configure caching proxies not to store responses that carry a Set-Cookie header, or complete the cookie rotation or serializer migration and remove it from the configuration.

Releases

The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.

Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once: - 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/849a6c30eacbb6ca4722132f43c4333a93188556.patch - 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/0e6cf8faa89caf4c64311d35ca2bc88c1458d4e3.patch

Credit

This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher flashmyname.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "actionpack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.1.0.beta1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.1.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "actionpack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-126077"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T23:44:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T21:19:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nWhen `ActionDispatch::Cookies` reads a signed or encrypted cookie that was written under a rotated secret (`config.action_dispatch.cookies_rotations`) or in the format that a `:hybrid` cookie serializer migrates from, it writes the cookie back to the response in the current format, and that write ignores `request.session_options[:skip]`. `ActiveStorage::DisableSession` relies on that option to keep the session cookie off the public, immutable responses of the Active Storage proxy controllers, but those controllers still load the session, so a request carrying an old-format session cookie could receive the rewritten session cookie in `Set-Cookie` on a cacheable response. A shared cache that stores such a response together with its `Set-Cookie` header could then serve one user\u0027s session to later requesters of the same URL, or serve an attacker\u0027s session to other users.\n\nApplications are affected when they serve Active Storage files through the proxy controllers, have a cookie rotation or a `:hybrid` serializer migration configured, and run behind a cache that stores `Set-Cookie` on public responses. This is a path around the fix for [CVE-2024-26144](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8h22-8cf7-hq6g).\n\n### Details\nIn the fixed releases, a response that skips the session leaves an old-format signed or encrypted cookie unchanged, and the next request that does not skip the session upgrades it. An application that skips the session on every request no longer upgrades its signed or encrypted cookies. Cookies that the application sets explicitly are still written. See the Action Pack CHANGELOG.\n\n### Workarounds\nConfigure caching proxies not to store responses that carry a `Set-Cookie` header, or complete the cookie rotation or serializer migration and remove it from the configuration.\n\n### Releases\nThe fixed releases are available at the normal locations.\n\nPatches for those who cannot upgrade at once:\n- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/849a6c30eacbb6ca4722132f43c4333a93188556.patch\n- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/0e6cf8faa89caf4c64311d35ca2bc88c1458d4e3.patch\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher [flashmyname](https://hackerone.com/flashmyname).",
  "id": "GHSA-x6mj-8jx9-qhqv",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T23:44:39Z",
  "published": "2026-11-12T23:44:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/security/advisories/GHSA-x6mj-8jx9-qhqv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-126077"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/0e6cf8faa89caf4c64311d35ca2bc88c1458d4e3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/849a6c30eacbb6ca4722132f43c4333a93188556"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rails/rails"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.0.5.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.1.4.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/actionpack/GHSA-x6mj-8jx9-qhqv.yml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Action Pack: Possible sensitive session information leak in Active Storage proxy mode"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.