GHSA-X678-33CQ-R6HR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:41In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mark signal tracepoint siginfo arguments as scalar
The signal_generate and signal_deliver tracepoints declare their info argument as a struct kernel_siginfo pointer. btf_ctx_access() therefore treats it as a trusted pointer for tp_btf programs.
Signal delivery also uses SEND_SIG_NOINFO and SEND_SIG_PRIV as special values for this argument. Those values are zero and one respectively, and are not pointers. A tp_btf program can currently dereference either value and fault the kernel. In particular, signal_generate can run from timer interrupt context, turning the fault into a kernel panic.
Record both tracepoints in raw_tp_null_args[] and mark argument one as a non-pointer. This preserves scalar access to the cookie while rejecting direct and helper-mediated pointer use. Merely marking it nullable would not suffice because SEND_SIG_PRIV is nonzero.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98062"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Mark signal tracepoint siginfo arguments as scalar\n\nThe signal_generate and signal_deliver tracepoints declare their info\nargument as a struct kernel_siginfo pointer. btf_ctx_access() therefore\ntreats it as a trusted pointer for tp_btf programs.\n\nSignal delivery also uses SEND_SIG_NOINFO and SEND_SIG_PRIV as special\nvalues for this argument. Those values are zero and one respectively,\nand are not pointers. A tp_btf program can currently dereference either\nvalue and fault the kernel. In particular, signal_generate can run from\ntimer interrupt context, turning the fault into a kernel panic.\n\nRecord both tracepoints in raw_tp_null_args[] and mark argument one as\na non-pointer. This preserves scalar access to the cookie while rejecting\ndirect and helper-mediated pointer use. Merely marking it nullable would\nnot suffice because SEND_SIG_PRIV is nonzero.",
"id": "GHSA-x678-33cq-r6hr",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:41:40Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98062"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05757377fa0447163d07c43a119f81abe1eef8dc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e78cb242a57e481061fcb542fed4d51afba25c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77515ab12e4983e6416f8c35039a3f0c0822ac70"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2eaea3599bcce659ce91862254dc91bcbdb6351"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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