GHSA-X5QJ-865H-MGVM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 16:46 – Updated: 2026-06-15 16:46
VLAI
Summary
Symfony: HtmlSanitizer UrlAttributeSanitizer Misses URL Attributes
Details

Description

Symfony\Component\HtmlSanitizer\Visitor\AttributeSanitizer\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes() enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through UrlSanitizer::sanitize() (scheme and host allow-lists, javascript: rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is ['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping', 'action', 'formaction', 'poster', 'cite']. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: <object data=…>, <applet codebase=…>, <applet archive=…> and <object archive=…>, <iframe longdesc=…> and <img longdesc=…>. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via allowElement('object', ['data']), allowElement('applet', ['codebase']), etc., or via allowAttribute(), no URL sanitization runs: data="javascript:alert(1)" and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.

<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url=…"> is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field content attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable <meta> with the content attribute (e.g. via allowStaticElements()) see content="0; url=javascript:alert(1)" pass through, producing a refresh-driven navigation to a javascript: URL.

Default configurations are not affected: <object>, <applet> and <iframe> are not in W3CReference::BODY_ELEMENTS and <meta> requires an explicit opt-in to <head> context. The vulnerability surface is integrators who explicitly allow any of those elements together with the listed URL-bearing attributes.

Resolution

UrlAttributeSanitizer now also routes data, codebase, archive and longdesc through UrlSanitizer::sanitize(). A new MetaRefreshAttributeSanitizer registered as a default attribute sanitizer detects the <delay>; url=<url> syntax inside <meta content>, sanitizes the embedded URL, and drops the attribute if the URL is rejected; non-refresh meta content values are passed through unchanged.

The patches for this issue are available here for branch 6.4 (and forward-ported to 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1).

Credits

Symfony would like to thank Scott Arciszewski (Trail of Bits) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/html-sanitizer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.4.41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/html-sanitizer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/html-sanitizer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/symfony"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.4.41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/symfony"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/symfony"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48761"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1023",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T16:46:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HtmlSanitizer\\Visitor\\AttributeSanitizer\\UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` enumerates the attribute names whose values are scrubbed through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()` (scheme and host allow-lists, `javascript:` rejection, BiDi check, etc.). The list is `[\u0027src\u0027, \u0027href\u0027, \u0027lowsrc\u0027, \u0027background\u0027, \u0027ping\u0027, \u0027action\u0027, \u0027formaction\u0027, \u0027poster\u0027, \u0027cite\u0027]`. Other URL-bearing attributes are absent: `\u003cobject data=\u2026\u003e`, `\u003capplet codebase=\u2026\u003e`, `\u003capplet archive=\u2026\u003e` and `\u003cobject archive=\u2026\u003e`, `\u003ciframe longdesc=\u2026\u003e` and `\u003cimg longdesc=\u2026\u003e`. When an integrator opts these elements/attributes in via `allowElement(\u0027object\u0027, [\u0027data\u0027])`, `allowElement(\u0027applet\u0027, [\u0027codebase\u0027])`, etc., or via `allowAttribute()`, no URL sanitization runs: `data=\"javascript:alert(1)\"` and similar payloads ship through unchanged into the output, enabling stored XSS.\n\n`\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0; url=\u2026\"\u003e` is the same class of bug routed differently: the URL is embedded inside a multi-field `content` attribute that the per-attribute sanitizer cannot detect from the attribute name alone. Integrators who enable `\u003cmeta\u003e` with the `content` attribute (e.g. via `allowStaticElements()`) see `content=\"0; url=javascript:alert(1)\"` pass through, producing a refresh-driven navigation to a `javascript:` URL.\n\nDefault configurations are not affected: `\u003cobject\u003e`, `\u003capplet\u003e` and `\u003ciframe\u003e` are not in `W3CReference::BODY_ELEMENTS` and `\u003cmeta\u003e` requires an explicit opt-in to `\u003chead\u003e` context. The vulnerability surface is integrators who explicitly allow any of those elements together with the listed URL-bearing attributes.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`UrlAttributeSanitizer` now also routes `data`, `codebase`, `archive` and `longdesc` through `UrlSanitizer::sanitize()`. A new `MetaRefreshAttributeSanitizer` registered as a default attribute sanitizer detects the `\u003cdelay\u003e; url=\u003curl\u003e` syntax inside `\u003cmeta content\u003e`, sanitizes the embedded URL, and drops the attribute if the URL is rejected; non-refresh meta `content` values are passed through unchanged.\n\nThe patches for this issue are available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/069a70f9f26e61e9de3b7f9a864a86ed24b36bd0) for branch 6.4 (and forward-ported to 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1).\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Scott Arciszewski (Trail of Bits) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm",
  "modified": "2026-06-15T16:46:53Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T16:46:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-x5qj-865h-mgvm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/069a70f9f26e61e9de3b7f9a864a86ed24b36bd0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/html-sanitizer/CVE-2026-48761.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2026-48761.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2026-48761"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Symfony: HtmlSanitizer UrlAttributeSanitizer Misses URL Attributes"
}



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