{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.84.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.84.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46371"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T21:00:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA vulnerability in Fleet\u0027s Apple MDM commands listing endpoint allowed authenticated users with the lowest-privilege Observer role to extract sensitive values from joined database tables \u2014 including host enrollment secrets and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS) tokens \u2014 through a cursor-based binary search oracle. The endpoint accepted a user-supplied `order_key` parameter that was not validated against a column allowlist.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe `GET /api/v1/fleet/mdm/apple/commands` endpoint constructs its query using a deprecated helper that did not restrict which columns could appear in the `ORDER BY` clause. The underlying query joins the `hosts` and `nano_enrollments` tables, so any column on those tables could be supplied as `order_key`. An attacker with Observer credentials could then use the cursor-based pagination parameter (`after`) to binary-search the value of the chosen column one character at a time. The targeted values never appeared in the response body, but the presence or absence of results revealed each character.\n\nWith extracted `node_key` or `orbit_node_key` values, an attacker could impersonate enrolled hosts to Fleet\u0027s osquery and Orbit endpoints, submit fabricated host data, and retrieve pending scripts and commands. The APNS values are exploitable only by a party that also possesses the organization\u0027s APNS certificate.\n\nExploitation required authenticated Observer access and a Fleet deployment with Apple MDM enabled and at least one queued MDM command. Instances without Apple MDM configured were not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf an immediate upgrade is not possible, administrators should:\n\n- Restrict the Observer role to fully trusted users until the patch is applied\n- Rotate `node_key` and `orbit_node_key` for any host suspected of exposure by re-enrolling the affected hosts\n\n### For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\nEmail Fleet at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)\nJoin #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)\n\n### Credits\n\nFleet thanks the Security Team at Palantir Technologies for responsibly reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-x4qr-qw6h-wvxq",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T20:20:41Z",
  "published": "2026-06-12T21:00:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-x4qr-qw6h-wvxq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fleet: Observer-level enrollment secret extraction via ORDER BY oracle on Apple MDM commands endpoint"
}