GHSA-X3G2-PPF3-8GJH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:41In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Move representor vnic reporter to eswitch devlink port
The representor vnic devlink health reporter is created and destroyed along the representor netdev (un)load path, which is not serialized by the devlink instance lock. Destroying the reporter from there triggers a devl_assert_locked() splat on driver unbind: WARNING: net/devlink/core.c:259 at devl_assert_locked+0x54/0x70, CPU#2: bash/3758 Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_core ... CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3758 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.19.0+ #1 PREEMPT Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), ... RIP: 0010:devl_assert_locked+0x54/0x70 Call Trace: devl_health_reporter_destroy+0x3a/0x1b0 mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x12d/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x1b8/0x220 [mlx5_core] ? __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x190/0x190 [mlx5_core] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc3/0xf0 device_release_driver_internal+0x3b2/0x560 unbind_store+0xce/0xf0
Move the reporter's lifecycle to the eswitch devlink port (un)register paths, which are already serialized by the devlink instance lock, and store the handle on mlx5_devlink_port. Use the port's mlx5_vport as the reporter priv since the diagnose callback only needs a device handle and a vport number, and mlx5_vport carries both and is initialized before any representor driver probes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97962"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:23Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Move representor vnic reporter to eswitch devlink port\n\nThe representor vnic devlink health reporter is created and destroyed\nalong the representor netdev (un)load path, which is not serialized by\nthe devlink instance lock. Destroying the reporter from there triggers\na devl_assert_locked() splat on driver unbind:\n WARNING: net/devlink/core.c:259 at devl_assert_locked+0x54/0x70, CPU#2: bash/3758\n Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_core ...\n CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3758 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.19.0+ #1 PREEMPT\n Tainted: [W]=WARN\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), ...\n RIP: 0010:devl_assert_locked+0x54/0x70\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n devl_health_reporter_destroy+0x3a/0x1b0\n mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x12d/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x1b8/0x220 [mlx5_core]\n ? __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x190/0x190 [mlx5_core]\n ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc3/0xf0\n device_release_driver_internal+0x3b2/0x560\n unbind_store+0xce/0xf0\n\nMove the reporter\u0027s lifecycle to the eswitch devlink port (un)register\npaths, which are already serialized by the devlink instance lock, and\nstore the handle on mlx5_devlink_port. Use the port\u0027s mlx5_vport as the\nreporter priv since the diagnose callback only needs a device handle and\na vport number, and mlx5_vport carries both and is initialized before\nany representor driver probes.",
"id": "GHSA-x3g2-ppf3-8gjh",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:41:37Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97962"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f26a5e8040b4957ef4dbdfcde6cc7ba2db53937"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1fcff9b39bac188ef62a77ebd176484be928ec2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d552beb9d278aeb180d26c3889b6bd21444ad11e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcaba72c85c14fe7393a59d61695941e6ccbd7d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb52d58f7d6abc2f956d9c1ac472c709f7bb33c2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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