GHSA-X287-WCFC-Q46C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 23:00 – Updated: 2026-10-30 23:00
VLAI
Summary
Nuxt dev server arbitrary file read through client error reports
Details

Summary

A client that can connect to the dev server's HMR socket can send a nuxt:dev:client-error event whose message ends in an absolute file path. The dev server reads that file while building the error report, and its contents are returned in the error overlay, on the dev error channel, and in the report shown in the terminal.

Impact

This affects the development server only; production builds contain none of this code. Affected versions are 4.6.0 to 4.6.2.

Reading the file requires TCP access to the dev server, so the default localhost bind limits this to local processes, which can usually read the same files directly. With the dev server exposed to a network (nuxt dev --host, nuxt dev --tunnel, or a proxy onto the dev port), anyone who can reach the port can read any file the dev process can read: SSH keys, .env files, cloud credentials and other files outside the project. The same path is refused by Vite's server.fs allow list over /_nuxt/@fs/; the client error channel bypasses that check.

No user interaction is needed and no browser is involved: a plain WebSocket client is enough, as long as it does not send Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site. A web page on another origin cannot retrieve the report: the overlay and channel endpoints reject browser requests from other origins.

Nuxt 3 is not affected.

Patches

Fixed in @nuxt/vite-builder 4.6.3, which nuxt 4.6.3 depends on. A client-reported error is no longer turned into a compile report, and report building for it no longer reads from the filesystem; file content now comes only from the dev server's module graph.

Workarounds

Do not expose the dev server to untrusted networks: keep the default localhost bind, and avoid nuxt dev --host, nuxt dev --tunnel and proxies onto the dev port. If the dev port was reachable from an untrusted network while a vulnerable version was running, treat any file readable by the dev process on that machine as exposed, and rotate credentials such as SSH keys and .env secrets.

Credits

Thanks to @samsulselfut for the report.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nuxt/vite-builder"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-119198"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T23:00:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-29T21:17:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA client that can connect to the dev server\u0027s HMR socket can send a `nuxt:dev:client-error` event whose message ends in an absolute file path. The dev server reads that file while building the error report, and its contents are returned in the error overlay, on the dev error channel, and in the report shown in the terminal.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis affects the development server only; production builds contain none of this code. Affected versions are `4.6.0` to `4.6.2`.\n\nReading the file requires TCP access to the dev server, so the default localhost bind limits this to local processes, which can usually read the same files directly. With the dev server exposed to a network (`nuxt dev --host`, `nuxt dev --tunnel`, or a proxy onto the dev port), anyone who can reach the port can read any file the dev process can read: SSH keys, `.env` files, cloud credentials and other files outside the project. The same path is refused by Vite\u0027s `server.fs` allow list over `/_nuxt/@fs/`; the client error channel bypasses that check.\n\nNo user interaction is needed and no browser is involved: a plain WebSocket client is enough, as long as it does not send `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`. A web page on another origin cannot retrieve the report: the overlay and channel endpoints reject browser requests from other origins.\n\nNuxt 3 is not affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `@nuxt/vite-builder` 4.6.3, which `nuxt` 4.6.3 depends on. A client-reported error is no longer turned into a compile report, and report building for it no longer reads from the filesystem; file content now comes only from the dev server\u0027s module graph.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not expose the dev server to untrusted networks: keep the default localhost bind, and avoid `nuxt dev --host`, `nuxt dev --tunnel` and proxies onto the dev port. If the dev port was reachable from an untrusted network while a vulnerable version was running, treat any file readable by the dev process on that machine as exposed, and rotate credentials such as SSH keys and `.env` secrets.\n\n### Credits\n\nThanks to [@samsulselfut](https://github.com/samsulselfut) for the report.",
  "id": "GHSA-x287-wcfc-q46c",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T23:00:48Z",
  "published": "2026-10-30T23:00:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-x287-wcfc-q46c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119198"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/35856eb148bf8d6f1ad753c5b8b337c52b4fd6b3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/aec8129f68e9b870ca919f8f60e65a4608c8a6d8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/releases/tag/v4.6.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuxt dev server arbitrary file read through client error reports"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.