GHSA-X287-5C68-36WP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 14:38 – Updated: 2026-08-26 14:38Summary
OpenWISP IPAM is multi-tenant: every Subnet belongs to an organization, and API access is scoped to the organizations a user belongs to. The CSV export endpoint, ExportSubnetView, omits the organization-membership check that its import sibling performs, and loads the subnet by primary key with no organization filter. An authenticated user who is a member of one organization can therefore export a subnet belonging to another organization — its name, CIDR, organization slug and every IP address in it — by issuing an export request for that subnet's id.
Details
ImportSubnetView.post() authorizes first, by calling assert_organization_permissions():
# openwisp_ipam/api/views.py (ImportSubnetView)
def post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
self.assert_organization_permissions(request) # <-- org-membership check
file = request.FILES["csvfile"]
...
self.subnet_model().import_csv(file)
# openwisp_ipam/api/utils.py:16 (AuthorizeCSVImport)
def assert_organization_permissions(self, request):
if request.user.is_superuser:
return
# ... otherwise verifies the user belongs to the target organization
ExportSubnetView.post() performs no such check. It is declared with IpAddressOrgMixin (whose organization scoping lives in get_queryset()), but its overridden post() never calls get_queryset() or assert_organization_permissions() — it goes straight to export_csv():
# openwisp_ipam/api/views.py:246
class ExportSubnetView(ProtectedAPIMixin, IpAddressOrgMixin, CreateAPIView):
subnet_model = Subnet
def post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
response = HttpResponse(content_type="text/csv")
response["Content-Disposition"] = 'attachment; filename="ip_address.csv"'
writer = csv.writer(response)
self.subnet_model().export_csv(kwargs["subnet_id"], writer) # no org check reached
return response
export_csv() resolves the subnet by primary key with no organization filter and writes its full contents:
# openwisp_ipam/base/models.py:242
def export_csv(self, subnet_id, writer):
ipaddress_model = load_model("openwisp_ipam", "IpAddress")
subnet = load_model("openwisp_ipam", "Subnet").objects.get(pk=subnet_id) # any org's subnet
# ... writes subnet name, CIDR, organization slug, and every IpAddress (address, description, …)
The subnet_id is a random UUIDField (migrations/0001_initial.py: models.UUIDField(default=uuid.uuid4)), so an attacker must obtain the target subnet's id rather than enumerate it — hence Attack Complexity: High. This is a genuine missing-authorization flaw regardless: the import/export asymmetry shows the check was intended, and subnet ids routinely appear in URLs, logs, shared CSV exports and support tickets, from which a cross-organization id can leak.
The same single-object pattern (resolving the subnet by subnet_id outside the org-scoped queryset) also appears in AvailableIpView.get() and RequestIPView.post() (the latter additionally writes an IP into the target subnet); these are worth reviewing alongside the export fix.
Proof of concept
Prerequisites: an OpenWISP IPAM instance with two organizations OrgA and OrgB; a normal (non-superuser) user who is a member of OrgB only; a subnet in OrgA whose id S is known to the attacker (e.g. leaked via a URL/log/shared export).
- As the OrgB user, authenticate to the API.
POST /api/v1/subnet/{S}/export/(OrgA's subnet id).- Result: a CSV download containing OrgA's subnet name, CIDR, organization slug and every IP address in it — even though the user belongs only to OrgB.
- Control (proves it's an oversight): the corresponding import endpoint
POST /api/v1/import-subnet/with OrgA data is rejected for the same user byassert_organization_permissions().
(Reported from a first-hand source review of the current master: the missing check in ExportSubnetView.post, the guarded ImportSubnetView.post sibling, the un-filtered Subnet.objects.get(pk=…) in export_csv, and the UUIDField primary key were each verified by hand. The fix is a one-line authorization call, so a maintainer can confirm trivially with two organizations.)
Impact
A member of one organization can read the complete contents of another organization's subnet — its IP allocation inventory (addresses, descriptions, organization slug, CIDR). In a WISP / network-management deployment this discloses another tenant's network topology and host inventory. Exploitation requires obtaining the target subnet's UUID (AC:H), but the authorization check is missing outright. (RequestIPView shares the pattern and additionally allows writing an IP into another organization's subnet — a separate integrity concern for the maintainer to confirm.)
Remediation
Add the organization-membership check to ExportSubnetView.post() — call self.assert_organization_permissions(request) (as ImportSubnetView does), or resolve the subnet through the org-scoped get_queryset() / get_object() and return 404 when it isn't in the caller's organizations. Apply the same to AvailableIpView and RequestIPView.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.0.post1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "openwisp-ipam"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-26T14:38:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpenWISP IPAM is multi-tenant: every `Subnet` belongs to an `organization`, and API access is scoped to the organizations a user belongs to. The CSV **export** endpoint, `ExportSubnetView`, omits the organization-membership check that its **import** sibling performs, and loads the subnet by primary key with no organization filter. An authenticated user who is a member of one organization can therefore export a subnet belonging to **another** organization \u2014 its name, CIDR, organization slug and every IP address in it \u2014 by issuing an export request for that subnet\u0027s id.\n\n## Details\n\n`ImportSubnetView.post()` authorizes first, by calling `assert_organization_permissions()`:\n\n```python\n# openwisp_ipam/api/views.py (ImportSubnetView)\ndef post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):\n self.assert_organization_permissions(request) # \u003c-- org-membership check\n file = request.FILES[\"csvfile\"]\n ...\n self.subnet_model().import_csv(file)\n```\n```python\n# openwisp_ipam/api/utils.py:16 (AuthorizeCSVImport)\ndef assert_organization_permissions(self, request):\n if request.user.is_superuser:\n return\n # ... otherwise verifies the user belongs to the target organization\n```\n\n`ExportSubnetView.post()` performs **no** such check. It is declared with `IpAddressOrgMixin` (whose organization scoping lives in `get_queryset()`), but its overridden `post()` never calls `get_queryset()` **or** `assert_organization_permissions()` \u2014 it goes straight to `export_csv()`:\n\n```python\n# openwisp_ipam/api/views.py:246\nclass ExportSubnetView(ProtectedAPIMixin, IpAddressOrgMixin, CreateAPIView):\n subnet_model = Subnet\n def post(self, request, *args, **kwargs):\n response = HttpResponse(content_type=\"text/csv\")\n response[\"Content-Disposition\"] = \u0027attachment; filename=\"ip_address.csv\"\u0027\n writer = csv.writer(response)\n self.subnet_model().export_csv(kwargs[\"subnet_id\"], writer) # no org check reached\n return response\n```\n\n`export_csv()` resolves the subnet by primary key with no organization filter and writes its full contents:\n\n```python\n# openwisp_ipam/base/models.py:242\ndef export_csv(self, subnet_id, writer):\n ipaddress_model = load_model(\"openwisp_ipam\", \"IpAddress\")\n subnet = load_model(\"openwisp_ipam\", \"Subnet\").objects.get(pk=subnet_id) # any org\u0027s subnet\n # ... writes subnet name, CIDR, organization slug, and every IpAddress (address, description, \u2026)\n```\n\nThe `subnet_id` is a random `UUIDField` (`migrations/0001_initial.py`: `models.UUIDField(default=uuid.uuid4)`), so an attacker must **obtain** the target subnet\u0027s id rather than enumerate it \u2014 hence **Attack Complexity: High**. This is a genuine missing-authorization flaw regardless: the import/export asymmetry shows the check was intended, and subnet ids routinely appear in URLs, logs, shared CSV exports and support tickets, from which a cross-organization id can leak.\n\nThe same single-object pattern (resolving the subnet by `subnet_id` outside the org-scoped queryset) also appears in `AvailableIpView.get()` and `RequestIPView.post()` (the latter additionally **writes** an IP into the target subnet); these are worth reviewing alongside the export fix.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nPrerequisites: an OpenWISP IPAM instance with two organizations **OrgA** and **OrgB**; a normal (non-superuser) user who is a member of **OrgB** only; a subnet in **OrgA** whose id `S` is known to the attacker (e.g. leaked via a URL/log/shared export).\n\n1. As the OrgB user, authenticate to the API.\n2. `POST /api/v1/subnet/{S}/export/` (OrgA\u0027s subnet id).\n3. **Result:** a CSV download containing OrgA\u0027s subnet name, CIDR, organization slug and every IP address in it \u2014 even though the user belongs only to OrgB.\n4. **Control (proves it\u0027s an oversight):** the corresponding import endpoint `POST /api/v1/import-subnet/` with OrgA data is rejected for the same user by `assert_organization_permissions()`.\n\n*(Reported from a first-hand source review of the current `master`: the missing check in `ExportSubnetView.post`, the guarded `ImportSubnetView.post` sibling, the un-filtered `Subnet.objects.get(pk=\u2026)` in `export_csv`, and the `UUIDField` primary key were each verified by hand. The fix is a one-line authorization call, so a maintainer can confirm trivially with two organizations.)*\n\n## Impact\n\nA member of one organization can read the complete contents of another organization\u0027s subnet \u2014 its IP allocation inventory (addresses, descriptions, organization slug, CIDR). In a WISP / network-management deployment this discloses another tenant\u0027s network topology and host inventory. Exploitation requires obtaining the target subnet\u0027s UUID (AC:H), but the authorization check is missing outright. (`RequestIPView` shares the pattern and additionally allows writing an IP into another organization\u0027s subnet \u2014 a separate integrity concern for the maintainer to confirm.)\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd the organization-membership check to `ExportSubnetView.post()` \u2014 call `self.assert_organization_permissions(request)` (as `ImportSubnetView` does), or resolve the subnet through the org-scoped `get_queryset()` / `get_object()` and return 404 when it isn\u0027t in the caller\u0027s organizations. Apply the same to `AvailableIpView` and `RequestIPView`.",
"id": "GHSA-x287-5c68-36wp",
"modified": "2026-08-26T14:38:10Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T14:38:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/security/advisories/GHSA-x287-5c68-36wp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/pull/220"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/commit/04a2ef949498c6591f9ac35713d7451fb9f75362"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/commit/a4b272461bfa7a1762baf0b1fd76b4f5b681586b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openwisp/openwisp-ipam/releases/tag/1.2.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenWISP IPAM has broken object-level authorization: ExportSubnetView lets a member of one organization export another organization\u0027s subnet and all its IP addresses"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.